Ecole Normale Supérieure of geography,
Hakim El Karoui has taught at the University of Lyon II before joining the
Prime Minister in 2002. After a spell at Bercy, he joined in 2006 the
Rothschild bank.In 2011, he
joined the consulting firm Roland Berger Strategy where he is co-responsible
for Africa and consulting the French government.In 2016, he founded his own Volentia
strategic consulting firm.He is
also an essayist and social entrepreneur (he created the club XXIth century
and the Young Mediterranean Leaders).
"It is because of mistrust, ignorance and the growing
hostility of a section of the population threatens national cohesion it is
essential that Muslims in France lead a battle of knowledge to fight against
ideas received and against fundamentalism "
Hakim El Karoui
Why drive work on Islam?
fundamentalism is spreading with force on our territory while if exacerbating
the controversies around the inscription signs of Islamic affiliation in public
space, raising tensions and anxieties.These
fears are reinforced by a general ignorance of Muslims in France, their
aspirations and their religious practices.
Who are they?What relationship
do they have with their religion?What
beliefs they share?
Today, the discourse on Islam and the image of Islam are largely made by
proponents of a legalistic Islam, even authoritarian.The majority of Muslims France no longer feel
represented by this not yet Islam there.
the portrait of the silent majority that stands the Institut Montaigne is
which it is subject is explained in large part by the difficulty to precisely
know the sociology of the Muslim population in France.It is to remedy a pioneering
investigation, solid and rigorous methodology was conducted with Ifop.
Facing the terrorist danger brought by individuals claiming to Islam, the first
state response has been and remains safe.If
this response is legitimate in this context so dramatic, it may be sufficient
to preserve social cohesion and national harmony for generations to come.
The speeches and proposals that emerge in the course of the presidential
campaign of 2017 will undoubtedly being fed by prejudice, fear and even hatred.This is not only meet by knowing the
challenges that the tragic events of 2015 and 2016 gave birth, but also to
inform debate ahead of objective factors.The Institut Montaigne believes
that building an Islam french is possible.But its organization, its
funding, its links with the state and with the countries called
"original" must be transformed under penalty, the result of fault,
making unbearable social tensions that every attack deepens.
of sociology and French
profile of Muslims in France is too little known today.To overcome this deficit, the Institut
Montaigne led with Ifopa pioneering survey of Muslims living in
France, without restricting the immigrants or immigrant.This
study represents an essential step forward in the knowledge of their social
profile, attitudes and aspirations.The analysis of unpublished data was performed
by Antoine Garden, Doctor of Political Science and research engineer at CNRS.
This methodology allowed for a solid estimate of the number of
Muslims or of Muslim origin in the population.
Ifop has resorted to a very large nationally representative
sample of over 15,000 people, within which a sub-sample of 1029 people
declaring themselves Muslim or having at least one Muslim parent was extracted.more details.
This survey is a pioneer in France, it is appropriate to use the results with
caution and moderation.The
lessons it says reflect a state of opinion at the moment of its realization,
not a prediction.Data analysis
was performed using verifiable technical and is in compliance with the highest
academic standards to date.
Who are the Muslims of France?
portrait of Muslims in France as reflected in the survey described a very
mixed.First, contrary to much
conventional wisdom, is thatthere is no "Muslim
community" nor "Muslim communalism 'single and organized.There are French culture and Islamic
faith, the feeling belonging to the Muslim community is primarily individual:
some voluntary commitment on behalf of Islam, or the weakness of a sense of
The movement of "exit" intergenerational Islam appears
two times greater than the movement of conversion to Islam.
The results of this survey indicate thatpeople who declare themselves Muslims
represent 5.6% of the metropolitan population of more than 15 years in France.Among
our sample of 1029 people, 155 people - 15% of this sample - declare non-Muslim
but have at least one Muslim parent, or 1% of the overall sample.These trajectories "output"
of Islam - or disaffiliation - are twice as important as the paths
"entry", as 7.5% of respondents declare themselves Muslims while
indicating that no parent n ' is himself a Muslim.
If the parents of the respondents are, in most cases, foreign born,more than one in two was born in France, 24% are French by acquisition and
26% are foreign nationals.
Ayounger population the national average.Sample
Muslims are older, on average, 35.8 years against 53 years for Christians and
43.5 years for those without religion, for example.
The socio-professional structure of the population that defines itself as
Muslim in this survey is marked by anover-representation of the working classes and
remote employment population.It
has almost 25% of workers, against 13.1% in the overall sample, and 38% of
inactive against half in overall sample.
profile of Muslims in activity emphasizes a relatively high exposure to
precarious forms of employment (fixed term, temporary, part-time).However, we also see the emergence of
a middle and upper class: 10% of middle management and 5% of managers and
professionals greater among Muslim religion or culture.
of Muslims think that secularism allows people to live freely their religion in
France.A majority of Muslims in France is
part of a system of values and religious practice that fit smoothly in the
republican and national corpus (46%).
The most common social practice is not wearing the
veil.Two-thirds of women of Muslim culture say they do not wear the veil.57% say they have never worn and 8%
claim to have ever worn, but no longer do so today.
shared traits are characteristic of Muslims in France: 1.regular
religious practice:31% of respondents declaring themselves Muslims go once a week in
a mosque or prayer room, against 8.2% in the general population ;2.marked respect for halal food
standard: 70% of respondents say they "always"
buy halal meat, 22% by buying "sometimes" and only 6%
"never";3.veiling support, majority
despite major divisions:65% Muslim - religion or culture - are in
favor of the veil ;4.the absence of widespread
Muslim communalism:78% of respondents declaring themselves
Muslims - registered on electoral lists - say they do not always vote for a
Muslim candidate in various elections.> Details of these data
But the portrait of Muslims
in France is of course not limited to these common features.They are more differences and
discrepancies dominate. > Why? The methodical analysis of the results identifies three groups:
·the "silent majority"group comprising 46% of respondents.Their value system is in line with the
French company, they contribute also to change their religious specificities;
composite group, they make up 25% of the sample and are at the heart of the
political and ideological battle that proposals of this report should allow to
lead and win.Proud to be Muslim,
they claim the opportunity to express their religion in public space.Very religious (Sharia is of great
importance to them, without passing the Law of the Republic), they are often
favorable for the expression of religion in the workplace, and have widely
adopted the halal standard as a definition of "the be Muslim. "They reject clearly the niqab and
polygamy and accept secularism;
·the "authoritarian" form the last group, 28% of the whole.They are mostly young, low-skilled and
low inserted in employment.They
live in large cities popular suburbs.This
group is further defined by his use of Islam to signify his vis-à-vis revolt
from the rest of French society by its conservatism.
France is fragmented and diverse:there is no one Islam but
disseminated by institutions and national movements, transnational
organizations or foreign states.This
multiplicity of actors in the French Muslim field, they create tensions and
rivalries they feed, to the complexity of understanding of Islam in France.
These are the original states of Muslim French to whom the State has delegated
the management of Islam and the framing of Muslims in France.1950 to today, the original states
supported their efforts to maintain their control over migrant populations.However, there are two forms of
consular Islam:1.the model developed by the population of
issuing States,foremost among them Algeria, Morocco and Turkey> Its history, its development
and the country by country analysis2.the model implemented by non public issuers stateslike Saudi Arabia and Qatar, seeking
to disseminate worldwide Islamic ideology> Religion as a soft power
consular Islam participates in the organization of Muslim worship in its
administrative dimension, but its normative and prescripif power in religious
matters has eroded.
UOIF: an Islam to the French
Union of Islamic Organisations of France (UOIF) is an important component of
the landscape of French Islam.Historically
close to the Muslim Brotherhood, the UOIF kept an Islamist discourse that has
evolved over time, including through the institutionalization of this
organization, particularly on the occasion of the creation of the French
Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) in 2003 . Today the UOIF is a federation of
"200 Muslim associations spread throughout the French territory."the UOIF has gradually established a double territorial network
strategy of segmentation of its activities and the company's grid French Muslim.It
is thus one of the main interlocutors of governments in terms of organization
of Islam in France.> Its history, its organization,
its funding and its evolution
withdrawal of the UOIF the French Muslim Council (CFCM), in 2011, resulted in
the paralysis of this body.If it
has successfully established itself as a pivotal player in the Islam of France,
representativeness is however more proven.Given
our survey, only 12% of Muslim respondents declare themselves close to this
organization, while more than two-thirds of them say they do not know its
Islam of France to become French.It is not today.
He faces a double challenge. Finally out of the guardianship of foreign states
and centralize its organization, with the general interest of Muslim French as
a guiding principle
it should be funded by French money, must produce and disseminate religious
knowledge and rely finally on women and new men, from the silent majority of
Muslims of France.
For the French Islam can
adopt a theological line compatible with society, must create institutions
capable of producing and disseminating ideas and French values.
Five major changes must be initiated:1.Build a
French Islam, based on truly representative bodies of Muslims in France : the results of our survey reveal a
deficit of notoriety and legitimacy of Islamic Organisations in France.Thus, more than two-thirds of
respondents say they do not know the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM).And among the 300 respondents know the
institution, only 28% say they feel represented by this structure.We saw that it was the same for the
UOIF.Achieving this goal is
conditioned by two imperatives.
o Ending the guardianship - long accepted or
even encouraged by France - foreign stateswhich tolerate in no
way on their land what they practice in France.Put an end to this situation requires
that financial flows from these countries are no longer directed to
"their" community, but in a clear and transparent manner, to a
recognized organization whose resources will be used in the interest of all
Muslims in France, whatever their origin.
o Bring out new frameworks,
religious and laity, born in France, anxious to take control of an embryonic
community and respond to the many challenges facing the Muslims of France.The
key to achieving this is to help them build institutional legitimacy by
involving them in the creation and governance of the Foundation for Islam in
France and the Muslim Association for an Islam of France, planned to as we
write these lines.
2.Ensure to Islam of France
transparent financial resources for collective useto structure a real organization of
Islam, pay salaries of imams and respond to undeniable social fact that is
"the new Islamic pride" many Muslims in France, which make Islam a less
religious qu'identitaire object.The
solution involves a royalty on halal and recognized institutions, able to
attract and centralize donations.3.Contribute as much as allowed
by the 1905 law, the fight against fundamentalist discourse,notably through funding cultural
training and work of chaplains in all enclosed places (schools, prisons,
armies, hospitals, etc.) and through the teaching of Arabic in public schools.In a context in which this teaching is
spreading very fast in mosques and Koranic schools, particularly due to the
lack of training offered to public school.4.Consideration must finally be
brought to the absence of Islam concordatgoverning, even today, the
relationship between religions and the state in Alsace-Moselle.So is the equality of citizens and the
state's ability to create a theological faculty able to work quickly on
religious interpretations compatible with French society today.5.Ambiguities facing certain
leases, church square, loan guarantees) to assure Muslims that these legal
practices are consistent with the Constitution.
to overcome in order to build this French Islam
Geopolitical,first, because the organization of Islam in
France is embedded in the complex web of relations between France and the
Maghreb countries and Turkey;Organizational,then, because, despite concerns
regarding Muslim communalism, the "Muslim community in France" simply
is not: neither a sense of belonging or common interests identified or cluster
approach capacity.For thirty
years, successive Ministers of Interior have also all failed to find a
representative interlocutorFinanciersalso because, despite some funding
came from foreign countries "friends" (Morocco, Turkey, Algeria and
Saudi Arabia), Islam in France is underfunded and suffers, moreover, a lack of
transparency for damaging his reputation and hampering its ability to collect
donations of the faithfulInstitutionalfinally, because we need the french
government to do much more confidence to Muslims in France and including
representatives of the silent majority ready to commit.
For the French Islam can
adopt a theological line compatible with French society and so it can break
with speeches issued by States issuers legalistic ideologies, we must create
instances - managed by a new generation Muslims - capable of producing and disseminating
ideas and French values.
Islam is not integrated in
Alsace and Moselle Concordat regime.It
is a cult "unrecognized".Therefore, the financing of the Muslim faith
- and more broadly that of new cults - is not aligned with the treatment
accorded to the four recognized religions (Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist,
- Know and take stock of the situation by religious statistics.The
French reluctance to religious census and existing estimates about religious
affiliation do not allow finely monitor religious elements within the
- write an academic book of common history with the Italy, Spain,
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, to put in historical perspective mutual
contributions and religious and cultural similarities between the two shores of
would have main missions:
- to send a strong political signal, leaving relations with cults safe prism -
that can induce the current attachment of Religious Affairs, Ministry of
Interior - and promoting interdepartmental logic in relations with the various
- to respond to the fragmented administration of the imamate, the allocation of
visas to foreign imams, training of chaplains, the attachment of the french
Institute of chaplains and control religious associations;
- to liaise between the government, the insurance fund old age disability cults
diseases (CAVIMAC) and cults;
- to ensure the implementation of the 1905 law, the neutrality of public
services, not recognizing any religion and treating all religions equally;
- ensuring the administrative police cults;
- maintain regular and constructive relations with the religious authorities
and religious associations in each department - including the appointment of
one delegate for religious affairs and secularism in each prefecture of
department or region.
This document presents the
Ifop questionnaire to our representative sample of the population residing in
metropolitan France - 15 459 people aged 15 and over were interviewed - in
which was extracted a specific sample of Muslims or of Muslim culture;they represent 1029 people, including
874 themselves as "Muslims".
This survey was conducted from 13 April to 23 May 2016. The interviews were
conducted by telephone.The
representativeness of the overall sample was ensured by the quota method in
• socio-demographic criteria (sex of the individual, age of the individual);
• socio-professional criteria (profession of the individual);
• of geographical criteria (administrative region, urban unit size, proportion
of immigrants in the city or neighborhood (IRIS) of residence)
. • civic criteria (nationality)
These quotas were defined using census data from INSEE for the population aged
15 and over residing in France (INSEE RP-2012).
This questionnaire was used to collect objective data (gender, age,
nationality, socio-professional category, marital status, etc.) and subjective
(religious views, social and political attitudes, etc.).
This is an experimental survey conducted on the opinions and social practices
of the Muslim people, and from Muslim families in France.The analysis of these data was
performed by Antoine Garden, Doctor of Political Science and research engineer
at CNRS.Data from this survey
are available to researchers who formulate requests, supported by a supervisor,
as is customary for works of this nature.
This investigation is not within the ethnic statistics.Its methodology is based on anonymity
and the agreement of respondents who self-declared Muslim.No ethno-national meeting,
ethno-racial or religious have been performed.This complete and valid survey results
of pioneering work on migrants and descendants of migrants, such as the 2006
survey RAPFI and TeO survey in 2008.
The uniqueness of this work is to be selected as filter religion which
identifies individuals and not their relation to immigration.These two approaches are
complementary, not contradictory.Choosing the religious prism to define the
sample does not mean that all the answers are explained from the relationship
to religion.On the contrary, the report stresses the social,
educational, gender and generation to put into perspective their answers.
This work meets the scientific and ethical
principles of the sample survey.She
stumbles on the same difficulties: the average margin of error for a survey of
a sample of 1,000 people is about 3%, that inherent in the analysis of a
subgroup in the same sample increases significantly and may be between 6 and
the lessons she wears reflect a state of opinion at the moment of its
realization, not a prediction.The surveys do not produce an objective knowledge
of social reality.However, a
reasonable use of these methods to validate or invalidate assumptions made by
qualitative work by working from a representative sample.
The results presented are a first exploratory analysis, the development of
future projects will complement and confirm - or refute - the first results.