Four Decades Of US-UK Attempts To Topple Gadafi - Media Lens

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April 28, 2011 If At First You Don't Succeed - Four Decades Of US-UK Attempts To Topple Gadafi Guest Media Alert by Richard Lance Keeble, Professor of Journalism at the University of Lincoln    Behind a wall of silence, the US and UK have been conducting over the last four decades a massive, largely secret war against Libya – often using Chad, the country lying on its southern border, as its base. The current attacks on Col. Gadafi’s troops and attempts to assassinate the Libyan leader with the US deployment of unmanned drones are best seen as part of a wide-ranging and long-standing strategy by the US/UK secret states to dislodge Gadafi. Seizing power in Libya by ousting King Idris in a 1969 coup, [1] Gadafi (who intriguingly had undertaken a military training course in England in 1966) quickly became the target of massive covert operations by the French, US, Israeli and British. Stephen Dorril (2000), in his seminal history of MI6, records how in 1971 a British plan to invade the country, release political prisoners and restore the monarchy ended in a complete flop. Dorril reports: ‘What became known as the “Hilton assignment” was one of MI6’s last attempts at a major special operation designed to overthrow a regime opposed to British interests.’ The plan to bring down Gadafi had originally been a joint MI6/CIA operation but the CIA suddenly withdrew after they concluded that ‘although Gadaffi was anti-West, he was also anti-Soviet, which meant there could be someone a lot worse running Libya. The British disagreed’ (ibid: 736). Easy To Hate In 1980, the head of the French secret service, Col. Alain de Gaigneronde de Marolles, resigned after a French-led plan ended in disaster when a rebellion by Libyan troops in Tobruk was rapidly suppressed (Deacon 1990: 262-264). Throughout the early 1980s Gadafi was demonised in the mainstream US and UK media as a ‘terrorist warlord’ and prime agent of a Soviet-inspired ‘terror network’. According to Noam Chomsky, Reagan’s campaign against ‘international terrorism’ was a natural choice for the propaganda system in furtherance of its basic agenda: ‘expansion of the state sector of the economy; transfer of resources from the poor to the rich and a more “activist” (i.e. terrorist and aggressive) foreign policy’. Such policies needed the public to be frightened into obedience by some ‘terrible enemy’. And Libya fitted the need perfectly (Chomsky 1991: 120). As Chomsky commented: ‘Gadafi is easy to hate, particularly against the backdrop of rampant anti-Arab racism in the United States and the deep commitment of the educated classes, with only the rarest of exceptions, to US-Israeli rejectionism and violence. He has created an ugly and repressive society and is indeed guilty of retail terrorism, primarily against Libyans’ (ibid). In July 1981, a CIA plan to overthrow and possibly kill Gadafi was leaked to the press. At roughly the same time, Libyan hit squads were reported to have entered the United States, though this has since been revealed to have been a piece of Israeli secret service disinformation (Rusbridger 1989: 80). Joe Flynn, the infamous con man, was also able to exploit Fleet Street’s fascination with the Gadafi myth. In September 1981, posing as an Athens-based arms dealer he tricked almost £3,000 out of the News of the World with his story that the Libyan leader was ‘masterminding a secret plot to arm black revolutionary murder squads in Britain’ (Lycett 1995). Then in 1982, away from the glare of the media, Hissène Habré, with the backing of the CIA and Israeli troops (Cockburn and Cockburn 1992: 123), overthrew the Chadian government of Goukouni Wedeye. Human Rights Watch records: ‘Under President Reagan, the United States gave covert CIA paramilitary support to help install Habré in order, according to secretary of state Alexander Haig, to “bloody Gadafi’s nose”.’ Bob Woodward, in his semi-official history of the CIA, reveals that the Chad covert operation was the first undertaken by the new CIA chief William Casey and that throughout the decade Libya ranked almost as high as the Soviet Union as the ‘bête noir’ of the administration (Woodward 1987: 348, 363, 410-11). A report from Amnesty, Chad: The Habré Legacy, [2] recorded massive military and financial support for Habré by the US Congress. It added: ‘None of the documents presented to Congress and consulted by Amnesty International covering the period 1984 to 1989 make any reference to human rights violations.’ US official records indicate that funding for the Chad-based secret war against Libya also came from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Israel and Iraq (Hunter 1991: 49). According to John Prades (1986: 383), the Saudis, for instance, donated $7m to an opposition group, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (also backed by French intelligence and the CIA). But a plan to assassinate Gadafi and take over the government on 8 May 1984 was crushed (Perry 1992: 165). In the following year, the US asked Egypt to invade Libya and overthrow Gadafi but President Mubarak refused (Martin and Walcott 1988: 265-6). By the end of 1985, the Washington Post had exposed the plan after congressional leaders opposing it wrote in protest to President Reagan. Thrilled To Blitz Frustrated in its covert attempts to topple Gadafi, the US government’s strategy suddenly shifted. In March 1986, US planes patrolling the Gulf of Sidra were reported to have been attacked by Libyan missiles. But Noam Chomsky suggests this incident was a provocation ‘enabling US forces to sink several Libyan boats, killing more than 50 Libyans and, it was hoped, to incite Gadafi to acts of terror against Americans, as was subsequently claimed’ (Chomsky op cit: 124). In the following month, the US responded with a military strike on key Libyan targets. The attack was widely condemned. James Adams (1987: 372) quotes a British intelligence source: ‘Although we allowed the raid there was a general feeling that America had become uncontrollable and unless we did something Reagan would be even more violent the next time.’ Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was perhaps hoping for an action-replay of the Falklands factor when she gave the US permission to fly F-111 attack jets from bases in East Anglia to bomb Libyan targets. Also, according to Annie Machon, Mrs Thatcher was ‘anxious for revenge’ after the shooting of W.P.C. Fletcher during a demonstration by Libyan oppositionists outside the Libyan embassy in London in 1984 (Machon 2005: 104). It was an archetypal move of the secret state: only a select few in her cabinet were involved in the decision. Yet the attack appeared to win little support from the public. Harris, Gallup and MORI all showed substantial majorities opposed. Much of the UK mainstream press, however, responded with jingoistic jubilation. The Sun’s front page screamed: ‘Thrilled to blitz: Bombing Gadaffi was my greatest day, says US airman.’ The Mirror concluded: ‘What was the alternative? In what other way was Colonel Gadafi to be forced to understand that he had a price to pay for his terrorism?’; The Times: ‘The greatest threat to Western freedoms may be the Soviet Union but that does not make the USSR the only threat. The growth of terrorist states must be curbed while it can be curbed. The risks of extension of the conflict must be minimised. And in this case it would appear that it has been.’ The Star’s front page proclaimed: ‘Reagan was right.’ In the Sunday Telegraph, of 1 June, columnist Paul Johnson denounced the ‘distasteful whiff of pure cowardice in the air’ as ‘the wimps’ raised doubts about the US bombing of ‘terrorist bases’ in Libya. But there was an intriguing mediacentric dimension to the mission as the BBC, transformed into the ‘enemy within’ of the vulnerable state, was to come under some considerable attack from the Conservative government over its coverage of the attacks. Though most of the press responded ecstatically to Britain’s role in the bombing, all their contrived jingoism could not hide the fact that the raid failed to capture the imagination of important elements of the elite. Opposition even came from cabinet members. The BBC became the perfect scapegoat. Kate Adie’s on-the-spot reports could not fail to mention the casualties (Sebba 1994: 266-7). Many of the main targets were missed. Four 2,000lb bombs fell on the suburb of Bin Ghashir, causing far more devastation than any ‘terrorist’ bomb could ever achieve. Even so, Norman Tebbitt, chairman of the Conservative Party, engaged in a highly personalised attack on Adie. Yet there was an air of theatre about the whole event. Adie was one of the most trusted BBC correspondents. And both government and BBC could benefit from the spat. The Tory right, on the ascendancy at the time, and ever hasty to criticise the BBC it so desperately wanted privatised as the ‘enemy within’, was satisfied and the BBC, who stuck by their star reporter throughout the attacks, could appear to be courageously defending media freedom. Amidst the many contradictions and complexities of modern-day politics, mediacentric elements are put to many diverse uses by (usually competing) factions in the ruling elites. According to US academic Douglas Kellner, the bombing was a manufactured crisis, staged as a media event and co-ordinated to coincide with the beginning of the 7 pm news in the US (Kellner 1990: 138). Two hours later President Reagan went on network television to justify the raid. Chomsky also argues that the attack was ‘the first bombing in history staged for prime-time television’ (Chomsky op cit: 127). Administration press conferences soon after the raid ensured ‘total domination of the propaganda system during the crucial early hours’. Chomsky continues: ‘One might argue that the administration took a gamble in this transparent public relations operation, since journalists could have asked some difficult questions. But the White House was justly confident that nothing untoward would occur and its faith in the servility of the media proved to be entirely warranted.’ Yet the main purpose of the raid was to kill the Libyan President – dubbed a ‘mad dog’ by Reagan. David Yallop quotes ‘a member of the United States Air Force intelligence unit who took part in the pre-raid briefing’: ‘Nine of 18 F-111s that left from the UK were specifically briefed to bomb Gadafi’s residence inside the barracks where he was living with his family’ (Yallop 1994: 713). In the event, the first bomb to drop on Tripoli hit Gadafi’s home killing Hana, his adopted daughter aged 15 months – while his eight other children and wife Safiya were all hospitalised, some with serious injuries. The president escaped. David Blundy and Andrew Lycett report (1987: 22): The attack on Gadafi’s Aziziya compound was a military failure. Gadafi himself was deep underground. The administration building, where he lives, was missed by two bombs which fell thirty yards away, knocking out the windows but doing no structural damage. The tennis courts received two direct hits and a bomb fell outside the front door of the building where Gadafi’s family lives. Blasts tore through the small bedrooms to the right of the living room, injuring two of Gadafi’s sons and killing his fifteen-month old adopted daughter, Hana. Hana was publicly acknowledged only in death. During interviews only a month before Gadafi had said, sadly, that he had only one daughter, eight-year-old Aisha, and wished that he had more. He did not say that his wife had adopted a baby girl ten months before. Consider the outrage in the Western media if a relative of Reagan had been killed by a Libyan bomb. There was no such outrage over the Libyan deaths. In November, the UN General Assembly passed a motion condemning the raid. Interestingly, Israel was one of the few countries to back the US over the raid. Yet when the Israeli representative came to justify his country’s stance, he used evidence of Gadafi’s alleged commitment to terrorism taken from the German mass-selling newspaper Bild am Sonntag and the London-based Daily Telegraph (Yallop op cit: 695). Following the April 1986 attack, reports of US military action against Libya disappeared from the media. But away from the media glare, the CIA launched by far its most extensive effort yet to spark an anti-Gadafi coup. A secret army was recruited from among the many Libyans captured in border battles with Chad during the 1980s (Perry op cit: 166). And, as concern grew in MI6 over Gadafi’s alleged plans to develop chemical weapons, Britain funded various opposition groups in Libya including the London-based Libyan National Movement. Then in 1990, with the crisis in the Gulf developing, French troops helped oust Habré and install Idriss Déby as the new president in a secret operation. The French government had tired of Habré’s genocidal policies while the Bush administration decided not to frustrate France’s objectives in exchange for their co-operation in the war against Iraq. Yet even under Déby the abuses of civil rights by government forces have continued.[3] Attempts to oust Gadafi also continued. David Shayler, a former MI5 agent, even alleged that MI6 were involved in a plot in 1996 to assassinate the Libyan leader (Hunter op cit). His motorcade was attacked by dissidents with Kalashnikovs and rocket grenades but while Gadafi escaped six bystanders were killed. Shayler claimed MI6 paid the Islamic Fighting group £100,000 to carry out the attack (see Dorril op cit: 793-794; Machon op cit: 172; Jaber 2010). Following Libya’s decision after the 9/11 US terrorist attacks to build closer ties with the West and renounce all efforts to develop nuclear weapons, UN sanctions against the country were lifted in 2003. The demonisation of Col. Gadafi predictably declined and members of the political, financial and academic British elite lined up to welcome the Libyan leader back into the ‘international community’. The recent rising against the authoritarian Gadafi regime has changed all that. And the Western elites (assisted by a compliant mainstream media) are seizing the new opportunities in their increasingly desperate attempts to eliminate the Libyan leader. Notes [1] The role of the CIA in the coup is disputed. Blundy and Lycett (1987: 69) report the former Libyan Prime Minister, Abdul Hamid Bakoush, saying: ‘The Americans had contacts with Gadaffi through the embassy in Tripoli. They encouraged him to take over. There were dozens of CIA operatives in Libya at that time and they knew what was going on. The Americans were frightened of the senior officers and the intelligentsia in Libya because they thought that these people were independent and could not be run as puppets.’ But Blundy and Lycett add (ibid): ‘Bakoush’s refusal to give names that might corroborate his theory does not help his credibility.’ [2] See http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/AFR20/004/2001/fr/2343f1a0-d902-11dd-ad8c-f3d4445c118e/afr200042001en.html, accessed on 1 May 2010 [3] See http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/chad/report-2010, accessed on 1 January 2011 References Adams, James (1987) Secret armies: The full story of SAS, Delta Force and Spetsnaz, London: Hutchinson Blundy, David and Lycett, Andrew (1987) Qaddafi and the Libyan revolution, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Chomsky, Noam (1991) Pirates and emperors, Montreal/New York: Black Rose Books Cockburn, Alexander and Cockburn, Leslie (1992) Dangerous liaison: The inside story of US-Israeli covert relationship, London: Bodley Head Deacon, Richard (1990) The French secret service, Grafton Books: London Dorril, Stephen (2000) MI6: Fifty years of special operations, London: Fourth Estate Hunter, Jane (1991) Dismantling the war on Libya, Covert Action Information Bulletin, summer pp 47-51 Jaber, Hala (2010) Libyans thwart Fletcher inquiry, Sunday Times, 19 September Kellner, Douglas (1990) Television and the crisis of democracy, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Lycett, Andrew (1995) I study my targets. I find out what makes them tick, Independent, 22 June Machon, Annie (2005) Spies, lies and whistleblowers, Lewes, East Sussex: The Book Guild Martin, David and Walcott, John (1988) Best laid plans: The inside story of America’s war against terrorism, New York: Harper and Row Perry, Mark (1992) Eclipse: The last days of the CIA, New York: William Morrow and Company Prades, John (1986) President’s secret wars: CIA and Pentagon covert operations from World War II through Iranscan, New York: William Morrow Rusbridger, James (1989) The intelligence game: Illusions and delusions of international espionage, London: Bodley Head Sebba, Anna (1994) Battling for news: The rise of the woman reporter, London: Hodder and Stoughton Woodward, Bob (1987) Veil: The secret wars of the CIA, London: Simon Schuster Yallop, David (1994) To the ends of the earth: The hunt for the Jackal, London: Corgi

Will Islamic banks become the rivals of Rothschild and the banks of USA and EU?

(This article does not necessarily reflect the true nature of Islamic Banking and its inroads in International Investment Banking. All declarations need verifications. Published to encourage discussion of the subject matter. GM)


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Will Islamic banks become the rivals of Rothschild and the banks of USA and EU?

27 April 03:25 PM

Bank news. Recently an interesting article under an intriguing title “Rothschilds against Arab rulers” has appeared on a web-site islam.ru. Although a number of analytics have perceived it as a continuation of the threadbare theme about the world’s behind the scenes, which is interesting only to the old-timer conspiracy theorists that are likely to perceive almost in anything “the long arm” of secret societies, organizations, families, or clans. The present article has irrevocably been referred to the whole regiment of similar creations from the range of “Rothschilds rule the world”, if it had not been for one “but”. It remarks a truly interesting idea that in critical conditions the western banking system has faced a strong rival, represented by Islamic banking. In order to conquer it, the western banking system has started revolutions in Arabic world. Beyond any doubt, this quite interesting hypothesis needs comments.

What is the point of Islam banking?

As the community experts of Islamic countries of Masterforex-V Academy note, the so-called Islamic banks are still one of the most mysterious phenomena in the world’s financial system:

1. Islamic bank is one of the institutions, created on the basis of Muslim right’s concepts, where the most significant place is occupied by a ban on usury. The usurer himself falls into sin as well as the person who benefits from his services.

2. This means that Islamic banks entirely refuse from collection of interest and futures transactions (they are also under a strong ban on the Koran).

3. The major ban in Islamic banking system is the ban on time games. In other words, it is impossible to pledge future time for the present speculative business.

4. Moreover, Islamic banks adhere to the strongest ban on gambling. They cannot participate in lotteries or any other similar actions.

5. All deposits of the population are interest free.

6. Consequently, a ban on collection of interest from loans (riby) and a refusal from intended risk (garara) is the main difference of Islamic banks from western. Therefore, interest crediting and speculative business at fund and currency markets are not practiced.

Islamic bank is an investor-bank.

• As a matter of fact, the present Islamic bank deals with project investment, sharing every possible risk with its clients. It cannot insure its investments. Jointly with borrowers, Islamic banks suffer losses on the projects, in which the funds have been invested.

• It is for this reason that the bank carefully examines its future client, gets acquainted with its business-plan, allows itself to give advice. The bank is interested in the success of a started business not less than the person who addressed the bank for help.

• Consequently, Islamic bank is oriented on real production, but not speculative business.

• Credits for personal needs and credits for business development, received in Islamic banks, have considerable differences. Both of them are interest free, but in the second case the bank and the businessman sign an agreement, according to which profit as well as loss shall be shared.

• Ordinary investors can also sign an agreement with the bank, entitling it to use their funds as investments (mudaraba) or refusing to give such privilege to the bank. In case of agreement, the investor shall receive his share in profit (from a successful transaction) or, vice versa, shall suffer certain losses. However, the particular feature of such transaction is represented by a total acknowledgement of the investor about the sphere, in which his money is involved. He is certain that these funds have not been involved in activities that are banned by Shariat (the production of alcohol, drugs, prostitution, gambling, pork processing and its trade, etc.).

• Despite all the “ingenuity” in their operation, Islamic banks do not become bankrupts and even obtain considerable profit.

How do Islamic banks earn?

This definitely is a very important question. By refusing from the western system, which is based on usury, Islamic banking initially puts itself in a losing condition in comparison to the former. There arises a question: “By which means can there exist a bank that does not collect interest?”

1. Real property resale by installments. Instead of giving a loan to the client for the purchase of housing, the bank buys it and later sells it to the client by installments, but at a higher price. It is not considered to be a collection of interest, but a certain payment for the risk.

2. Participation in the funding of projects for a certain share in profit. Consequently, Islamic banks, unlike western, are aimed not at receiving maximum profit, but at creation of additional value.

3. Islamic banks also practice such transaction as murabaha. In other words, they deal with purchase and sale. According to an agreement with a client, the bank purchases certain goods for sale. In this case the bank can deal with marketing, transportation, storage, the sale itself.

4. Granting of a special credit "sukuk". The bank receives its percentage not from a granted amount but from the profit of an indebted company.

5. Islamic banks also actively deal with security papers, but are represented more like bidders.

6. Many faithful Muslims pay zakiat – tax on wealth. This is demanded not by the state, but by Shariat. Zakiat is a solely voluntary action intended to help the poor. In such a case, the faithful most frequently bring these funds into Islamic banks.

Is Islamic banking conquering the world?

The first Islamic banks appeared in Middle East slightly earlier than 30 years ago:

• At present they are represented in 75 countries of the world (not only Islamic).

• Their mutual resources amount to more than 300 billion dollars.

• According to some assessments, the quantity of Islamic investments in the world’s economies has reached the amount of 400 billion dollars.

• The volume of transactions in the international Islamic banks system undergoes a yearly growth of 15%.

• Islamic banks confidently enter the world’s financial market, where the establish partnership with the world’s largest banks.

• Deutsche bank, Citibank, HSBC open special Islamic departments. Citibank has opened a specialized section. So-called “Islamic windows” operate in many European and American banks. However, in the last case there exists a considerable risk for a faithful Muslim that his money can be mixed with non-halal (impure) money, which is received from criminal.

• Islamic banks have almost not suffered from the world’s financial crises, having demonstrated the highest effectiveness. • Therefore, the present Islamic banking system is making considerable steps towards integration into the world’s financial system. At the same time, the largest western banks do not show hostility towards it (openly at least) and meet its needs in every possible way. The West is bond to take into consideration the billion of Muslims and their values.

Talks about the efforts of the West to “crash” Islamic banking by means of “Arabic revolutions” are no more than exaggerations. The only example with the first Tunisian Islamic bank “Zituna”, which after the revolution has been engulfed by Tunisian Central Bank that is under the control of the Rothschilds, is not very persuasive. At the same time, Americans were doing their best to save the overloaded with Islamic banks Bahrain from revolution. UAE and Saudi Arabia, where only Islamic banks exist, are predominated by peace and stability. However, in “revolutionary” Egypt and Tunisia only several financial establishments of this kind exist. At present, the same can be related to uneasy Yemen and Siria.

For a more objective assessment of the situation, the staff of the magazine "Market Leader" suggests a questionnaire in trader’s forum: in your opinion, for the western world Islamic banking system is:

• an excellent solution of a difficult situation;

• a real threat;

• just an interesting exotica.

You are free to discuss this article here:   forum for traders and investors