My Impressions of Libya and Some Afterthoughts - By Waheeduddin Ahmed, Ph.D

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My Impressions of Libya and Some Afterthoughts  

By Waheeduddin Ahmed, Ph.D

I went to Libya in the early Seventies. Having obtained a Ph.D. from the University of London two years previously, I received a telegram from the University of Libya in Tripoli (now Al Fateh University) to come and teach there. After arriving in Libya, I was told that I was to teach industrial chemistry to the B.Sc. students. This was a surprise since my training was not in that area. 

However, I designed a course in a week or so which was available before the semester started and hoped to do the best. Soon thereafter, the October War (the Yaum Kippur War) started. Although Libya was not involved in the war, there was much excitement on the campus. Qadhafi was complaining in his speeches that he was not consulted --- Obviously, Sadat, nor any other Arab leader had trusted him. However, I saw many battle tanks with Algerian markings moving along the main highway towards Egypt but before the Boumediene's forces could reach the battle front, the war was over as Nixon had sent Apache helicopters with antitank weaponry directly to the war theatre from the American bases in Italy and Sharon had found a gap in the Egyptian positions to pour in troops at the rear of the Egyptian lines and had destroyed the missile batteries which were vital to the air defense. The Egyptian professors on the campus told me that defeat was staring Egypt in its face. So much for the war Euphoria! We did settle down to teaching chemistry after the war was over.

As a person teaching industrial chemistry, I had an opportunity to see some of the country's industrial infrastructure first hand, as I took students on visits to industries as a part of the curriculum. I found that at least in those days the infrastructure was feeble and scanty and mostly manned by foreign workers. What was hindering progress was obviously a shortage of skilled manpower. Many decades have passed since but what is obvious is that even allowing for sanctions, the country is, as yet, far from becoming a Malaysia, a Singapore or even a Dubai or Qatar. The country's cash reserves are enormous but the lack of opulence among the common people is strikingly clear. I must admit that I have soft corners for this planned egalitarianism but the hazards of one man’s whims have had their effect as we shall see later, which could put this idealism in disrepute.

I saw Qadhafi only once during my stay. It was when he came to supervise elections of one of the “ people’s committees” (lajnat-al-Shabia) in the university. The jamaheer (democracies) idea had a striking similarity with the soviets and the Chinese communes, which were hybridized with Qadhafi’s own brand of Islamism --- Literature from the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China was banned in Libya and was made inaccessible to the people for comparison. We knew about Mao Tsetung’s Cultural Revolution, his Red Guards and the Red Book. Amid this cultural turmoil in the world Qadhafi’s own Green Book took shape and a bizarre cult of personality ensued. More about this later:

When Qadhafi and his associates staged the coup against King Idris, he had attracted attention from much of the Muslim population of the world because of his youth, his charisma and the fact that his rhetoric included reference to Islam in the governance of the country, in marked contrast to the prevailing secular and socialist ideologies in most Arab countries, notably in Algeria, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. However, the mask soon came off when during my stay there the Muslim Brotherhood members were persecuted and crushed. Some of the University students at that time became victims of this persecution.

In the following years, Qadhafi became the supreme leader, the law giver, the jurist, the mujtahid, commander-in-chief of the armed forces and everything else one could possibly think of. He dismantled the traditional military structure and gave the task of defense to people’s committees, whose unprofessionalism soon became fatal as was evident when those responsible for manning missile batteries proved to be incompetent in even defending Qadhafi’s abode against an air raid ordered by President Reagan. He modified the Islamic calendar, which is in use in Libya and nowhere else. He effaced the influence of Ulama and Fuqaha as he envisaged himself to be the sole interpreter of the Sharia. He saw no need for the Qur’anic interpreters, as in his words “Qur’an was revealed in plain Arabic” and therefore Arabs did not need intermediaries between them and God. He considered no other source beside Qur’an to be valid. Next in importance was the Green Book (three volumes), written by him, without any partnership, which encompassed the constitutional framework of the government, the law, judicial exegeses, the penal code, philosophical anecdotes and everything else on earth. His own wisdom became sacrosanct, unrivalled even by Confucius. So as a result of his systematic destruction of all traditional institutions, at present there is no social, military and religious infrastructure in Libya to be relied upon in the aftermath of the overthrow of his regime.

All this would have been considered maverick and scholarly, if one could not notice in his eyes clear signs of a disturbed personality. His behavior ranges from idiosyncratic to psychotic. He reminds me of the Fatimid khalifa Al-Hakim, who showed signs of psychosis and was run out from Cairo by the populace.

It is natural for us to be skeptical when the West demonizes a Muslim leader. He automatically gets the benefit of our doubt but in this case evidence against him is abundant. He forced Wahdah (unification), first on Egypt then on Tunisia.

When the Arab countries did not show any interest, he turned towards Sub-Saharan Africa and wanted to lead her in a United States of Africa. That dream also did not materialize. He tried to purchase an atom bomb from China. Spurned by Zhou En-Lai, he turned towards Pakistan. When Pakistan too said no, he became very bitter. He ordered Egyptian navy during the period of unification, to sink the luxury ocean liner QE2, full of American tourists, in the Mediterranean. The naval commander would not do it without referring to Sadat. There were reports that he asked Nasser permission to shoot King Husain in an Arab summit conference in Cairo. It is also a known fact that he sent assassins to kill King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. The blowing up of the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie in Scotland is another example of bizarre behavior. Then all of a sudden he metamorphosed from Mr. Hyde to Dr. Jekyll and became from enemy number one to the best friend of the West, meeting with Condoleezza Rice and embracing Gordon Brown, Sarkozy and Berlusconi.

We need no further evidence to conclude that autocracy, whether benevolent or tyrannical, is something we must not tolerate in the Muslim world. It will certainly be inimical to human development.

My experience of the Libyan people is that they are very sweet, friendly and full of promise. They deserve a better leadership. However, there is a real danger now that the upheaval in the Arab countries may once again provide entries to Trojan Horses --- I am not talking about Islamists --- and usher in another era of exploitation. The Revolutions must be on their guard against such hazards.

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You may read my articles on my website: www.mjournal.org

Even a Weakened Qaddafi May Be Hard to Dislodge - By STEVEN ERLANGER - The New York Times

THERE NOTHING MUCH TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE US AND QADDAFI, WHEN IT COMES TO VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD. US IS AS BRUTAL, AS INSENSITIVE, AS UNMINDFUL OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS, AS QADDAFI COULD BE. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO IS THAT US HAS AN UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF THE WORLD MEDIA AND WEAK UN MEMBERS TO FORCE A WIDER APPEARANCE OF CONSENSUS THAN QADDAFI WOULD EVEN BOTHER.

HOWEVER, THE THREAT TO THE WORLD PEACE IS MORE FROM US ACTIONS THAN THAT OF QADDAFI.

GHULAM MUHAMMED, MUMBAI

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http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/world/africa/02tribes.html?_r=1&nl=afternoonupdate&emc=aua2

Even a Weakened Qaddafi May Be Hard to Dislodge

By STEVEN ERLANGER

Published: March 1, 2011

PARIS — The regime of the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, has been badly undermined, but he retains enough support among critical tribes and institutions, including parts of the army and the air force, that he might be able to retain power in the capital, Tripoli, for some time to come, say experts on Libya and its military.

They caution that the situation on the ground is both fluid and confusing. But they emphasize that tribal loyalties remain an important indicator, and that there is no clear geographical dividing line between the opponents to Colonel Qaddafi and his supporters.


They suggest that eastern Libya, which was first to fall to the opposition, was always considered the most rebellious part of the country and had been starved of funds and equipment by Colonel Qaddafi. The region, known as Cyrenaica, was an Italian colony and the heartland of the Senussi tribe that produced the monarch, King Idris I, who was overthrown by Colonel Qaddafi and his army colleagues in 1969.

But they suggest that tribes in the other important areas of Libya — Tripolitania and Fezzan — remain nominally loyal to the regime. The revolutionaries of 1969 came largely from three tribes — the Qadhadhfa (the colonel’s own ), the Maghraha and the Warfalla — which had been subservient to the Senussis.

The Warfalla are now wavering, with its leaders supporting the opposition, having been implicated in coup attempts in the 1990’s, but its other members split. The other two tribes “still seem loyal so far to the regime, in which they have vested interests,” said George Joffé, a scholar of North Africa at Cambridge University in England.

Other tribes in the areas of Fezzan and Tripolitania are “watching and waiting,” Mr. Joffé said.
Another source of potential opposition might be the old Free Officers Movement, he added, an Arab nationalist group that carried out the 1969 coup but was subsequently marginalized by the Qaddafi regime.

“It’s quite clear that the army, some 45,000 strong, has split, but in exactly what proportions we don’t know,” Mr. Joffé said.

Colonel Qaddafi mistrusted the army and monitored its behavior carefully. He paid particular attention to the units in the rebellious east of the country, starving them of the best equipment and training, which he reserved to more loyal tribes and paramilitary units, said Shashank Joshi, an Associate Fellow at London’s Royal United Services Institute, which specializes in the military.
“The situation is more fluid than we imagine, with Qaddafi capable of launching military operations outside Tripoli,” including air force sorties, “and retaining his grip on Sirte,” Mr. Joshi said. 

“Qaddafi has retained significant elements of the army and lost the elements he was always afraid he could lose, those affiliated with tribes he had targeted.”

The discovery of large deposits of oil changed the old bargain among tribes and areas in Libya, and both required and enabled Colonel Qaddafi to build more of a centralized state to fully exploit the resource, said Jean-Yves Moisseron, editor in chief of the French-based magazine “Maghreb-Machrek,” which concentrates on the Arab world.

Oil revenues also enabled Colonel Qaddafi to spread the wealth among tribes, reducing traditional conflicts, Mr. Moisseron said, and to build up a well equipped paramilitary system loyal to the regime.
Colonel Qaddafi at the same time established other military and paramilitary units, like the 32d Brigade, based in Tripoli and commanded by one of his sons, Khamis. That brigade, which is known as the “deterrent brigade,” is used for internal repression and is backed up by foreign mercenaries. Its size is not clear, but it is said to be equipped with advanced arms and munitions and trained by outsiders.

The mercenaries themselves are an offshoot of the Islamic Legion, a pan-Arab expeditionary force Colonel Qaddafi established in 1972, soon after taking power, when he tried to create a grand Islamic state of the Sahel. First focused on Chad and Sudan, it was made up of immigrants from poorer African countries looking for work.

The idea was recreated after 2000 to bolster the regime, and recruits were drawn from the million or so sub-Saharan Africans who had come to Libya to find work or as refugees, Mr. Joffé said.
In addition, Colonel Qaddafi also set up the Revolutionary Committee Movement, itself a paramilitary unit mostly drawn from the same three reliable tribes, the Warfalla, the Qadhadhfa and the Maghraha, which was used to terrify opponents with revolutionary justice.

In general, Mr. Joffé said, some 119,000 Libyans are part of the security services, including the army of some 45,000, out of a largely desert country of only some 6.4 million people.

But the oil-based pact in Libya suffered from a stagnation in oil revenues and the global economic crisis of 2008, which reduced Libyan oil revenues by 40 percent, Mr. Moisseron wrote in an article for Libération, the French daily “The most worrisome sign for the immediate future of Colonel Qaddafi is the rupturing of the tribal pact,” he said.

But Colonel Qaddafi retains significant strength, Mr. Joshi said. He is thought to still control the air force, though some elements have defected. And while there have been clashes in Tripoli, with sniper and small-arms fire in areas of the capital, “it is not a war zone and not a city in rebellion,” he said.

While the colonel is thought to be delusional, he and his commanders have proved capable so far of using their forces with some care, Mr. Joshi said. “There have been no large massacres, air power is being used in a calculated way and he is launching probing attacks” while “making constant efforts in the suburbs of Tripoli to check small gestures of dissent.”

The struggle in Libya “could go on a long time,” Mr. Joshi said. “Tripoli is not a bunker. And this is not the decision-making of a man totally out of touch with reality.”