THERE NOTHING MUCH TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE US AND QADDAFI, WHEN IT COMES TO VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD. US IS AS BRUTAL, AS INSENSITIVE, AS UNMINDFUL OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS, AS QADDAFI COULD BE. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO IS THAT US HAS AN UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF THE WORLD MEDIA AND WEAK UN MEMBERS TO FORCE A WIDER APPEARANCE OF CONSENSUS THAN QADDAFI WOULD EVEN BOTHER.
HOWEVER, THE THREAT TO THE WORLD PEACE IS MORE FROM US ACTIONS THAN THAT OF QADDAFI.
GHULAM MUHAMMED, MUMBAI
HOWEVER, THE THREAT TO THE WORLD PEACE IS MORE FROM US ACTIONS THAN THAT OF QADDAFI.
GHULAM MUHAMMED, MUMBAI
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http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
Even a Weakened Qaddafi May Be Hard to Dislodge
By STEVEN ERLANGER
Published: March 1, 2011
PARIS — The regime of the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, has been badly undermined, but he retains enough support among critical tribes and institutions, including parts of the army and the air force, that he might be able to retain power in the capital, Tripoli, for some time to come, say experts on Libya and its military.
They caution that the situation on the ground is both fluid and confusing. But they emphasize that tribal loyalties remain an important indicator, and that there is no clear geographical dividing line between the opponents to Colonel Qaddafi and his supporters.
They suggest that eastern Libya, which was first to fall to the opposition, was always considered the most rebellious part of the country and had been starved of funds and equipment by Colonel Qaddafi. The region, known as Cyrenaica, was an Italian colony and the heartland of the Senussi tribe that produced the monarch, King Idris I, who was overthrown by Colonel Qaddafi and his army colleagues in 1969.
But they suggest that tribes in the other important areas of Libya — Tripolitania and Fezzan — remain nominally loyal to the regime. The revolutionaries of 1969 came largely from three tribes — the Qadhadhfa (the colonel’s own ), the Maghraha and the Warfalla — which had been subservient to the Senussis.
The Warfalla are now wavering, with its leaders supporting the opposition, having been implicated in coup attempts in the 1990’s, but its other members split. The other two tribes “still seem loyal so far to the regime, in which they have vested interests,” said George Joffé, a scholar of North Africa at Cambridge University in England.
Other tribes in the areas of Fezzan and Tripolitania are “watching and waiting,” Mr. Joffé said.
Another source of potential opposition might be the old Free Officers Movement, he added, an Arab nationalist group that carried out the 1969 coup but was subsequently marginalized by the Qaddafi regime.
“It’s quite clear that the army, some 45,000 strong, has split, but in exactly what proportions we don’t know,” Mr. Joffé said.
Colonel Qaddafi mistrusted the army and monitored its behavior carefully. He paid particular attention to the units in the rebellious east of the country, starving them of the best equipment and training, which he reserved to more loyal tribes and paramilitary units, said Shashank Joshi, an Associate Fellow at London’s Royal United Services Institute, which specializes in the military.
“The situation is more fluid than we imagine, with Qaddafi capable of launching military operations outside Tripoli,” including air force sorties, “and retaining his grip on Sirte,” Mr. Joshi said.
“Qaddafi has retained significant elements of the army and lost the elements he was always afraid he could lose, those affiliated with tribes he had targeted.”
The discovery of large deposits of oil changed the old bargain among tribes and areas in Libya, and both required and enabled Colonel Qaddafi to build more of a centralized state to fully exploit the resource, said Jean-Yves Moisseron, editor in chief of the French-based magazine “Maghreb-Machrek,” which concentrates on the Arab world.
Oil revenues also enabled Colonel Qaddafi to spread the wealth among tribes, reducing traditional conflicts, Mr. Moisseron said, and to build up a well equipped paramilitary system loyal to the regime.
Colonel Qaddafi at the same time established other military and paramilitary units, like the 32d Brigade, based in Tripoli and commanded by one of his sons, Khamis. That brigade, which is known as the “deterrent brigade,” is used for internal repression and is backed up by foreign mercenaries. Its size is not clear, but it is said to be equipped with advanced arms and munitions and trained by outsiders.
The mercenaries themselves are an offshoot of the Islamic Legion, a pan-Arab expeditionary force Colonel Qaddafi established in 1972, soon after taking power, when he tried to create a grand Islamic state of the Sahel. First focused on Chad and Sudan, it was made up of immigrants from poorer African countries looking for work.
The idea was recreated after 2000 to bolster the regime, and recruits were drawn from the million or so sub-Saharan Africans who had come to Libya to find work or as refugees, Mr. Joffé said.
In addition, Colonel Qaddafi also set up the Revolutionary Committee Movement, itself a paramilitary unit mostly drawn from the same three reliable tribes, the Warfalla, the Qadhadhfa and the Maghraha, which was used to terrify opponents with revolutionary justice.
In general, Mr. Joffé said, some 119,000 Libyans are part of the security services, including the army of some 45,000, out of a largely desert country of only some 6.4 million people.
But the oil-based pact in Libya suffered from a stagnation in oil revenues and the global economic crisis of 2008, which reduced Libyan oil revenues by 40 percent, Mr. Moisseron wrote in an article for Libération, the French daily “The most worrisome sign for the immediate future of Colonel Qaddafi is the rupturing of the tribal pact,” he said.
But Colonel Qaddafi retains significant strength, Mr. Joshi said. He is thought to still control the air force, though some elements have defected. And while there have been clashes in Tripoli, with sniper and small-arms fire in areas of the capital, “it is not a war zone and not a city in rebellion,” he said.
While the colonel is thought to be delusional, he and his commanders have proved capable so far of using their forces with some care, Mr. Joshi said. “There have been no large massacres, air power is being used in a calculated way and he is launching probing attacks” while “making constant efforts in the suburbs of Tripoli to check small gestures of dissent.”
The struggle in Libya “could go on a long time,” Mr. Joshi said. “Tripoli is not a bunker. And this is not the decision-making of a man totally out of touch with reality.”
They suggest that eastern Libya, which was first to fall to the opposition, was always considered the most rebellious part of the country and had been starved of funds and equipment by Colonel Qaddafi. The region, known as Cyrenaica, was an Italian colony and the heartland of the Senussi tribe that produced the monarch, King Idris I, who was overthrown by Colonel Qaddafi and his army colleagues in 1969.
But they suggest that tribes in the other important areas of Libya — Tripolitania and Fezzan — remain nominally loyal to the regime. The revolutionaries of 1969 came largely from three tribes — the Qadhadhfa (the colonel’s own ), the Maghraha and the Warfalla — which had been subservient to the Senussis.
The Warfalla are now wavering, with its leaders supporting the opposition, having been implicated in coup attempts in the 1990’s, but its other members split. The other two tribes “still seem loyal so far to the regime, in which they have vested interests,” said George Joffé, a scholar of North Africa at Cambridge University in England.
Other tribes in the areas of Fezzan and Tripolitania are “watching and waiting,” Mr. Joffé said.
Another source of potential opposition might be the old Free Officers Movement, he added, an Arab nationalist group that carried out the 1969 coup but was subsequently marginalized by the Qaddafi regime.
“It’s quite clear that the army, some 45,000 strong, has split, but in exactly what proportions we don’t know,” Mr. Joffé said.
Colonel Qaddafi mistrusted the army and monitored its behavior carefully. He paid particular attention to the units in the rebellious east of the country, starving them of the best equipment and training, which he reserved to more loyal tribes and paramilitary units, said Shashank Joshi, an Associate Fellow at London’s Royal United Services Institute, which specializes in the military.
“The situation is more fluid than we imagine, with Qaddafi capable of launching military operations outside Tripoli,” including air force sorties, “and retaining his grip on Sirte,” Mr. Joshi said.
“Qaddafi has retained significant elements of the army and lost the elements he was always afraid he could lose, those affiliated with tribes he had targeted.”
The discovery of large deposits of oil changed the old bargain among tribes and areas in Libya, and both required and enabled Colonel Qaddafi to build more of a centralized state to fully exploit the resource, said Jean-Yves Moisseron, editor in chief of the French-based magazine “Maghreb-Machrek,” which concentrates on the Arab world.
Oil revenues also enabled Colonel Qaddafi to spread the wealth among tribes, reducing traditional conflicts, Mr. Moisseron said, and to build up a well equipped paramilitary system loyal to the regime.
Colonel Qaddafi at the same time established other military and paramilitary units, like the 32d Brigade, based in Tripoli and commanded by one of his sons, Khamis. That brigade, which is known as the “deterrent brigade,” is used for internal repression and is backed up by foreign mercenaries. Its size is not clear, but it is said to be equipped with advanced arms and munitions and trained by outsiders.
The mercenaries themselves are an offshoot of the Islamic Legion, a pan-Arab expeditionary force Colonel Qaddafi established in 1972, soon after taking power, when he tried to create a grand Islamic state of the Sahel. First focused on Chad and Sudan, it was made up of immigrants from poorer African countries looking for work.
The idea was recreated after 2000 to bolster the regime, and recruits were drawn from the million or so sub-Saharan Africans who had come to Libya to find work or as refugees, Mr. Joffé said.
In addition, Colonel Qaddafi also set up the Revolutionary Committee Movement, itself a paramilitary unit mostly drawn from the same three reliable tribes, the Warfalla, the Qadhadhfa and the Maghraha, which was used to terrify opponents with revolutionary justice.
In general, Mr. Joffé said, some 119,000 Libyans are part of the security services, including the army of some 45,000, out of a largely desert country of only some 6.4 million people.
But the oil-based pact in Libya suffered from a stagnation in oil revenues and the global economic crisis of 2008, which reduced Libyan oil revenues by 40 percent, Mr. Moisseron wrote in an article for Libération, the French daily “The most worrisome sign for the immediate future of Colonel Qaddafi is the rupturing of the tribal pact,” he said.
But Colonel Qaddafi retains significant strength, Mr. Joshi said. He is thought to still control the air force, though some elements have defected. And while there have been clashes in Tripoli, with sniper and small-arms fire in areas of the capital, “it is not a war zone and not a city in rebellion,” he said.
While the colonel is thought to be delusional, he and his commanders have proved capable so far of using their forces with some care, Mr. Joshi said. “There have been no large massacres, air power is being used in a calculated way and he is launching probing attacks” while “making constant efforts in the suburbs of Tripoli to check small gestures of dissent.”
The struggle in Libya “could go on a long time,” Mr. Joshi said. “Tripoli is not a bunker. And this is not the decision-making of a man totally out of touch with reality.”
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