Saturday, September 27, 2014

Book Review - Across the Durand Line - By Owen Bennett Jones - London Review of Books

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n18/owen-bennett-jones/across-the-durand-line

London Review of Books

Across the Durand Line

Owen Bennett-Jones

  • The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan by Abubakar Siddique
    Hurst, 271 pp, £30.00, May, ISBN 978 1 84904 292 5
  • The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier by Hassan Abbas
    Yale, 280 pp, £18.99, May, ISBN 978 0 300 17884 5

The conflict in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands has similarities with other contemporary struggles. From Timbuktu to Kandahar, jihadis, national governments, ethnic groups and, in some cases, tribes are fighting for supremacy. In each place there are complicating local factors: badly drawn international borders; the relative strength or weakness of non-violent Islamist movements; the presence or absence of foreign forces, whether Western or jihadi; and different historical experiences of colonialism. From the point of view of Western policymakers some of these conflicts seem to be more important than others. For the French, the potential fall of Mali to radical Islamist forces was unacceptable, so they intervened. In Somalia, by contrast, the problem has largely been ignored by the West and is mostly being dealt with by the African Union. It was said that al-Qaida must not be allowed to hold territory in Syria, but both an al-Qaida affiliate and Isis have been doing just that, and it wasn’t until earlier this month that Obama announced he’d strike Isis from the air.

It’s far from clear that these varied responses to jihadi activity are the result of rational decision-making. In Yemen, for example, al-Qaida supporters move about freely and plot attacks against the West. Yet although the US has used air power in Yemen it has for the most part left the fighting to the far from capable Yemeni armed forces. But the Pashtun areas of the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands are an exception to the mixed messages. There the West has used every tactic at its disposal to confront jihadis: boots on the ground, air strikes, drone attacks, bribes, social welfare programmes and infrastructure projects – the effort to control the Pashtuns hasn’t lacked commitment. There are, of course, important differences between Yemen and the Pashtun areas.

Attacks organised in Pashtun areas – including 9/11 and 7/7 – have succeeded; even the most sophisticated plot to emerge from Yemen, in which bombs were disguised as printer cartridges, was foiled. And it isn’t just that the US was impelled to avenge 9/11. The outside world is interested in the Pashtuns’ poppy crop and their hosting of much of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Over the last century and a half the intricacies of Pashtun politics have been discussed by politicians and their advisers in the capitals of all the Great Powers: it’s Washington that’s worrying today, but it used to be Moscow, and before that London.

In 1893 the British created the Durand Line to divide Afghanistan from the north-west corner of the Raj (now Pakistan). These days Pakistan accepts the border and Afghanistan doesn’t. The line cuts the Pashtun people in two: roughly a third of them are in Afghanistan and two-thirds in Pakistan. The Durand Line had a specific purpose, and governed British policy towards the Pashtuns. 

This was not an imperial heartland but a buffer zone and British administrative arrangements reflected this. Some British-controlled Pashtun areas were declared ‘settled’; others, close to the line, were designated ‘tribal’. The tribal elders were given subsidies and status: in return, they were expected to keep the peace and, crucially, to ensure the roads stayed open. And so the military objective of protecting the edge of the empire was achieved with minimum resources. Just in case the bribes were insufficient, the elders were further persuaded to co-operate by the Frontier Crimes Regulation, imposed in 1901. It had two crucial elements: first, people could be held indefinitely without charge; second, it allowed collective punishment, meaning that whole communities could be sanctioned for the crimes of one member.

Map of Afghanistan

As some British administrators realised at the time, the system entrenched tribal structures. It might have been thought that the birth of Pakistan in 1947 would transform the situation, with the new state making efforts to drag the tribal areas towards more regular constitutional arrangements. In fact little changed. Collective punishments against the families and communities of suspected miscreants are still handed down. The Pakistani officials who implement the system are still called political agents, just like their British forebears. Their powers remain sweeping and arbitrary. ‘Around here,’ a Khyber political agent once told me, ‘I am Allah’s deputy.’ On the Afghan side of the border, too, the central government has never been strong enough to break down tribal affiliations. On both sides of the Durand Line the result has been economically and socially disastrous – on the Pakistani side female illiteracy stands at more than 70 per cent.

The unusual methods of governance in the Pashtun areas became especially significant after 9/11. When the Taliban and al-Qaida fled Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002, many ended up in Pashtun areas on the Pakistani side of the line. They took advantage of the fact that jihadis and tribesmen are free to move across it but the military forces of Washington, Kabul and Islamabad are not. As the war in Afghanistan ground on, and the Afghan Taliban regrouped, the US had a choice. It could work with Pakistan’s political agents to bribe and bully tribal elders to hand over Taliban fighters seeking refuge in Pakistan; or it could use force. Unwilling to delegate a frontline in the war on terror to a bunch of tribal administrators, the US deployed soldiers in Afghanistan and drones and special forces on both sides of the Durand Line. The tribal elders found themselves squeezed by the forces surrounding them. Should they offer sanctuary to the jihadis? Or should they capture them and take US money for handing them over? As they considered their options, the elders took into account the challenges posed by local political competition, including both religious and nationalist leaders.

In recent years the religious elements have been in the ascendant, but the nationalists also have deep roots in the Pashtun areas. The faqir of Ipi, a Pashtun leader who fought the British in the 1930s, represented both aspects of Pashtun society. An obscure rural cleric from North Waziristan, he became a symbol of opposition to the British Empire. The case that thrust him to prominence has a modern parallel. The story goes that Mullah Omar established his leadership credentials in the Afghan Taliban by challenging a warlord near Kandahar who had buggered a local boy. The faqir of Ipi began his career by complaining about a British Indian court’s ruling against the marriage of a 15-year-old girl to a Muslim man. The court found that the girl, originally a Hindu, had been converted when she was a minor and so removed her from her husband. The faqir used the case to unite tribal forces and was soon able to raise a private army of thousands, drawn from Afghanistan as well as areas under British control. At this stage, his pitch was religious: he spoke about the impending doomsday, when only those Muslims who answered his call to action would gain entry to paradise. His followers believed he could heal the sick and turn air ordnance into paper. The British practice of airdropping propaganda leaflets confirmed the faqir’s powers.

When it came to the creation of Pakistan, the faqir, knowing that it would be difficult to object on religious grounds to a country created in the name of Islam, opposed it for nationalist reasons. He argued that for the Pashtuns to be ruled by Pakistanis was hardly better than being ruled by the British. After 1947 he allied himself with the Pashtun nationalist leader Abdul Ghaffar Khan, whose followers were known as Red Shirts (their uniforms were stained with brick dust). As the British prepared to leave the subcontinent, Ghaffar Khan’s anti-imperialist rhetoric resonated throughout the Pashtun areas. To accommodate the nationalist movement, the British decided to hold a referendum in the North-West Frontier Province. Ghaffar Khan demanded that as well as offering a choice between India and Pakistan, the British should allow the Pashtuns to vote for an independent state, Pashtunkhwa. The government in Kabul argued for a fourth option: union with Afghanistan. Lord Mountbatten, however, permitted just two choices: union with India or Pakistan. Ghaffar Khan, desiring neither outcome, boycotted the vote. Of those who voted, 99 per cent opted for Pakistan.

*

The nationalist movement didn’t go away. Ten years ago I watched a rally in north-west Pakistan that was attended by thousands of people wearing red shirts. The event was organised by the Awami National Party (ANP), the direct political descendant of Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s movement: it is currently led by his grandson Asfandyar Wali Khan. Wali Khan has always been careful to ask only for greater autonomy (Pakistani law forbids open demands for secession), but few doubt that if Pashtun independence were on offer he would grasp it. The ANP can be seen as just an obscure regional party with – now – only one member in the National Assembly. But you could argue that it is one of the most important parties in Pakistan: unlike most of the others, it articulates liberal values and directly opposes the Taliban. While everyone else has compromised with the jihadis, the ANP has taken a stand, and paid a terrible price. Recognising that the ANP is its main ideological challenger, the Pakistani Taliban has relentlessly targeted the party’s leaders. As the death toll mounted, the electorate came to see the ANP as weak and, in the unforgiving world of patronage politics, voters lost confidence that the party would be able to secure benefits from the government in Islamabad and so rejected it at the polls. The ANP’s lonely stand against the religious extremists was further undermined by the central government’s fears that the party threatens Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

If it was looking for existential threats, Islamabad would have been better advised to worry about the jihadis. The Pashtun nationalists have always faced insurmountable obstacles. They are divided between two states – Pakistan and Afghanistan – that have no intention of giving up territory. Just as the Line of Control has fatally undermined the attempts of Kashmiri nationalists to break free of India and Pakistan, so the Durand Line has obstructed the Pashtun nationalist cause. And by giving senior military and bureaucratic jobs to a few Pashtuns from prominent families, Islamabad and Kabul have been able to co-opt potential separatist leaders. Pakistani Pashtuns are now so well represented in the army and the civil service, and so commercially active in Karachi, that independence would come at a cost higher than most would be willing to pay.

For all their appeal to many Pashtuns, the nationalists seem doomed to remain bystanders to another struggle: between the tribal and religious leaderships. At the time of Pakistan’s creation, the tribal elders had the upper hand. The mullahs were seen as uneducated, socially inferior functionaries whose main role was to supervise marriages and funerals. Over the last decade there have been moments when tribal elders on both sides of the Durand Line (often encouraged by US bribes) have protected their interests by forming lashkars – private armies – to fight Taliban forces. All the governments involved in fighting the Taliban have tried to leverage tribal loyalties, although this policy has the arguably counterproductive effect of entrenching the tribal structures that have held back social and economic development: in the long run this only helps the jihadis find more recruits. In some ways the origins of the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban movements lie in a revolutionary politics demanding the overthrow of the tribal structures. There is no doubt about the intensity of this contest. It is reckoned that over the last decade the Pakistani Taliban have killed nearly a thousand tribal elders.

The ethnic, religious and tribal affiliations in the Pashtun areas are not always easy to disentangle. Take Jalalludin Haqqani, the man who has overseen the growth of the Haqqani network, a formidable military force that over four decades has worked with a wide range of international jihadi organisations, al-Qaida, Pakistan, the UAE and both the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban movements. It has also sometimes acted as a mediator between them. It has fought against both the Soviet Union and the United States with considerable success. Haqqani supports his military activities with a diverse international business that ranges from scrap metal to hostage-taking. At one point he even had a private airport. Four of his children have been killed: two by drones; one by US ground forces in eastern Afghanistan; one in mysterious circumstances last year in Islamabad. The Haqqanis first stood out from the other tribal leaders when they encouraged Arab volunteers to join the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan. One of Jalalludin’s early recruits was Osama bin Laden and it could be said that the Haqqanis pioneered global jihad before bin Laden had even thought of it. The network has hosted jihadis from China, Chechnya, Central Asia and Europe. Because of its might and its international approach to business and conflict, the Haqqani network has been a close ally of the Afghan Taliban but has never been subsumed by it.
As well as its bases in eastern Afghanistan, the Haqqani network has religious and military training facilities on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line, and so has needed to stay on good terms with the Pakistani state. It has achieved this by providing services: in the 1990s it trained militants to fight as Pakistani state proxies in Kashmir; more recently it has bombed Indian and US targets in Afghanistan – in some cases with the connivance of the ISI. One of these attacks, in 2011, involved a truckload of explosives sent by the Haqqanis from Pakistan to a Nato base in Afghanistan. The Americans had intelligence about the truck and asked Pakistan to stop it. Despite assurances from Pakistan’s chief of army staff, General Kayani, the truck continued into Afghanistan. The Americans were monitoring its progress using spy drones but the Haqqanis outwitted them by switching vehicles in a tunnel. The truck bomb wounded 77 US personnel.

The US became so frustrated by the Pakistani state’s links to the Haqqani network that in 2011, despite America’s longstanding effort to keep up appearances in its relationship with Pakistan, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, could contain himself no longer. ‘The Haqqani network,’ he complained to the US Senate Armed Services Committee, ‘acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency.’ In 2012, Washington put the Haqqani network on its list of designated terrorist organisations. The Pakistani state, however, continued to allow it freedom of action, even overlooking its close relations with the Pakistani Taliban. Having cleared the Pakistani Taliban from six of the seven tribal areas – in a series of campaigns that led to the deaths of five thousand Pakistani soldiers – the high command in Rawalpindi failed for years to mount a final offensive in the one place that remained in militants’ hands: North Waziristan. It wanted to allow the Haqqani network’s operations there to continue without disruption. When the offensive finally took place earlier this year, the Haqqanis were given sufficient warning to enable them to slip to the relative safety of Afghanistan.

*

In The Pashtun Question, Abubakar Siddique, a correspondent for Radio Free Europe, argues that if the Pashtuns had been able to govern themselves from 1947 they might have drawn on moderate indigenous traditions represented by figures such as Pir Roshan, a 16th-century cleric whose opposition to the Mughals unified the tribes. Roshan gave the Pashtun language a script, introduced external intellectual influences and accepted Sufi interpretations of sharia. That Pashtun society moved in a less tolerant direction was a result of the new Pakistani state’s sense of insecurity. Karachi (the first capital) and later Islamabad had an interest in encouraging less benign strains of thinking. The Pakistan military backed successive jihads against Kabul, partly as a way of resisting Afghan attempts to undermine the Durand Line, and having become a tool of Pakistani policy, the jihadis were empowered for decades by the huge levels of funding – an estimated $20 billion – that flowed in from the US and Saudi Arabia during the anti-Soviet struggle. By sponsoring religious parties and establishing a network of madrasas to train up zealous cannon fodder, Islamabad created the conditions in which not only the Taliban but also al-Qaida could flourish.

On this account, the creation of Pakistan, rather than emancipating the Pashtuns, simply replaced one set of outside rulers with another. For Siddique, the entrenchment of regressive power structures by a succession of outsiders is a better explanation for what is going on than the alternative argument that the roots of jihadism in the borderlands lie in the predisposition of the tribesmen to violence.

Westerners misunderstand Pashtun society, Siddique argues, in part because they are often fixated on romantic ideas about Pashtunwali – the tribal code that is said to prize honour, revenge and hospitality above all other virtues. Understandably irritated that British imperialists and today’s foreign correspondents have reduced his culture to an Orientalist fantasy, Siddique points out that, far from relishing the chance to murder one another, most Pashtuns, just like everyone else, would be very happy to live in peace. As for Pashtunwali, as well as allowing for the violent resolution of disputes, its traditions include taking decisions after broad consultation and discussion aimed at finding consensus.

Hassan Abbas, a former police officer in north-west Pakistan, also objects to those who see the Pashtuns as ferocious tribesmen with traditions and attitudes at odds with the modern world. In The Taliban Revival, he offers rational explanations for their having fought against the British, the Soviets and the Americans: the Pashtuns have a culture of resisting invaders, he writes, because they have always lived on the edge of other people’s empires and so have been invaded with remarkable frequency.

The Afghan Taliban, Abbas argues, was able to re-emerge after its defeat in 2001 for a number of reasons, including the presence of US forces in Afghanistan and the profits being made by criminals associated with the organisation. As for the Pakistani Taliban, it drew strength from the lack of state control in the tribal areas and, for some years, from Musharraf’s ambiguous policy of supporting those elements of the Taliban movements which he thought could further Pakistani interests. Both Talibans were helped by Saudi funding and by the Pakistani concern that trumped all other considerations: the fear of growing Indian influence in Afghanistan and Balochistan. But while Pakistan was busy bolstering the Afghan Taliban to counter the Indians, it found that the Pakistani Taliban was an increasing problem. Islamabad was comfortable with the Afghan Taliban’s objective of getting back into power in Kabul, but had trouble containing the Pakistani Taliban’s growing independence. Some ISI officers shared Mullah Omar’s frustration with the Pakistani Taliban fighters who refused to rally to his Afghan cause. As Abbas points out, recruits for the Pakistani Taliban have been drawn not just from the Pashtun belt but from all over Pakistan. Sectarian militants from Punjab and alumni from Karachi’s radical madrasas joined up not to fight alongside Pashtuns and against the US, but to topple the Pakistani government and establish religious rule in Islamabad and beyond. The strategic and ideological differences between the two Talibans manifest themselves in many ways. The more ideological and internationalist Pakistani Taliban, for example, has opposed polio vaccinations; the more pragmatic Afghan Taliban has been much more willing to allow UN health teams to do their work.

When foreigners consider Siddique’s ‘Pashtun question’ they tend to do so in the hope that resolving conflict in the Pashtun belt will make the West safer. Pashtuns want the question answered for different reasons. They want to escape the poverty and insecurity that has plagued and brutalised several generations. It isn’t just that a great many Pashtuns have been killed over the last century: even more have been dispersed. There are now more Pashtuns living in Karachi than in Peshawar or Kandahar. Wherever they live, many would agree with Siddique that the answer lies in economic development.

But Pashtun nationalists face a contradiction. Siddique argues that more should be done to incorporate the Pashtuns into regular state structures: for one thing, laws that apply in the rest of Pakistan should replace the repressive Frontier Crimes Regulation. But any process of political modernisation and reform will necessarily include the acceptance of the Durand Line as the international border. Modern states exist only because they have borders that they police. But this would entrench the division of the Pashtun people. Siddique tries to get round the problem by proposing the recognition of the line as a border but allowing free movement across it. It’s a solution that can’t work: as long as militants are able to cross the border more freely than the two states’ security personnel, the Taliban movements will maintain a crucial advantage. Mullah Omar is based in Pakistan and the Pakistani Taliban’s leader, Mullah Fazlullah, operates from Afghanistan. Distrust between the governments in Kabul and Islamabad is so acute that the intelligence agencies of both sides are happy to host each other’s enemies.

Governments in the Middle East and North Africa are using different methods to try to control religious movements with political ambitions. In Syria, the Assads have massacred them. In Egypt, Sisi has imprisoned them. In Tunisia, Gannouchi is trying to use politics to outwit them. But in Pakistan and Afghanistan, despite everything that’s been thrown at them, the two Talibans are still standing. The Pashtuns have suffered decades of conflict and few expect that the US withdrawal from Afghanistan will bring an end to internal strife. Iran, India and China are already being drawn in to fill the vacuum left by the US. If history is any guide they will each back different warlords in an attempt to maintain influence or at least to prevent others from getting influence over the government in Kabul. And once again the Pashtuns will be caught in the crossfire.

‘Like never before, I the Muslim am seen as the root cause of nation’s problems’ - Abdul Khaliq, Secretary General, Lok Janshakti Party

THE INDIAN EXPRESS

Nation  

Saturday, Sep 27, 2014
 

‘Like never before, I the Muslim am seen as the root cause of nation’s problems’

 
New Delhi | Posted: September 27, 2014 1:28 am | Updated: September 27, 2014 3:32 am

With six MPs, the Lok Janshakti Party may not count for much in the 330-plus ruling NDA. But ABDUL KHALIQ, secretary general of LJP, is the first ally to speak out against ‘the unfettered hate being spewed’ against Muslims by ‘a long list of hate mongers’

The by-election results in Bihar and UP are being viewed as a vindication of the deep-rooted and strong secular credentials of the nation. As heartening to the secular devotees is the Prime Minister’s statement that Indian Muslims would live and die for the country. However, the fact that the PM has thought it necessary to underline the patriotism of Muslims is in itself deeply disturbing. Implicit in the statement is the frightening reality of how the Muslim is viewed in today’s India.

I am an Indian but the fact that I am a Muslim has endangered my claim to equal citizenship. I say this not because of our laws which are unexceptionable but because of the mind-numbing environment of hostility and prejudice, the inexorable growth of sheer  distrust and hatred for the Muslim and all that he represents.
Although the Muslims are near the bottom of the socio-economic ladder and at par with the Dalits in almost every human development index, the public discourse today is not about the economic and educational backwardness of this beleaguered community but about the huge affliction they are in the nation’s social fabric.

The plight of the ordinary Muslim is getting progressively worse. Living on the margins of society, he has always been up against it in the field of education, in the job market, even when looking for accommodation. He is also burdened with the stigma of being in tacit collusion with terrorists. But hitherto, the discrimination and the distrust of the Muslim were covert. Now the gloves are off and the hatred is in-your-face.

Like never before, the Muslim is viewed not just as “the other” but as the root cause of the nation’s problems. The most pernicious myths are being given the widest publicity — about forced conversion of Hindu girls as a “love jihad” conspiracy to distort the population ratio, about every conversion to Islam creating one more enemy for Hindus, about 90 per cent of all rapes being committed by Muslims, about Muslims provoking riots, about there being no place for non-Muslims in areas where there are more than 35 per cent Muslims. The miasma of distrust, of hate, of prejudice hangs like a black cloud over the community.

Today Praveen Togadia is passé. What was the narrative of the shakhas and the fulminations of right wing fundamentalists are now mainstream discourse. The most inflammatory and divisive rhetoric has become commonplace. Leading a long list of hate mongers, Member of Parliament, Sakshi Maharaj, uses the public platform to allege that the madrasas across the country are imparting the ‘education of terror’ and ‘love jihad’.

Maneka Gandhi, Minister and inveterate animal lover, has no qualms in making the outrageously mendacious statement that profits from trade of slaughtered animals go into financing terrorism. Senior police officers express the most poisonous views against Muslims and Islam in their internet discussion forum on Yahoo.


At a time when there are legitimate fears of Hindu majoritarianism, a Supreme Court judge has publicly announced that if he had been the dictator of India, he would have introduced Gita and Mahabharata in schools. Tragically, these deviant thoughts, which violate the basic canons of secular humanism, are not an aberration but an everyday, recurring theme in our fractured society.

In this iniquitous environment where even allegedly secular parties tango to the politics of community and caste, rational but lonesome voices like Fali Nariman, Rajmohan Gandhi and Meghnad Desai have warned against the anti-minority bigotry and rabid hate being freely aired in the public space and the studied silence of the governing class.

Significantly, Nariman in his keynote address at a National Minorities Commission forum had exhorted the commission to fulfill its constitutional mandate of protecting the interests of minorities by filing criminal complaints and taking other strong measures to counter the hate tirades against minorities. In limp response, the commission has appealed to the Home Minister to take suitable action, thereby reinforcing the view of minorities that they cannot depend on state institutions for redress of their problems.

It is unfortunate that the observations of such enlightened individuals do not constitute “breaking news” and are hence consigned to peripheral by lines whereas the hate-soaked ranting of a Yogi Adityanath captures banner headlines and ‘eyeballs’. With the media’s lopsided focus on the sensational, everybody knows what the Yogi has said. But the rational voice is muted. It is high time that the media seriously introspected on how it projects such nation-threatening issues.

Significantly, those who are working to create a permanent rift between communities and isolate the Muslims are actually executing the pernicious plot of the separatists and other enemies of the state who thrive on social discord. It is foolhardy to believe that the nation can progress by banishing 150 million Indians into ghettoes and isolation.

Our Prime Minister has, in that most compelling slogan “Sabke saath sabka vikas”, nailed the panacea for the nation’s problems. This slogan needs to become a reality or else we face the deluge.

(The writer, a former civil servant, is secretary general of the Lok Janshakti Party. The views are personal)
 
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Friday, September 26, 2014

$10,000 bounty for serving summons to Modi - By Narayan Lakshman in New York - THE HINDU, Chennai, INDIA


http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/10000-bounty-for-serving-summons-to-modi/article6451261.ece?homepage=true#comments

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International » World

New York, September 27, 2014
Updated: September 27, 2014 07:22 IST

$10,000 bounty for serving summons to Modi

Narayan Lakshman
Comment (15)   ·   print   ·   T  T  
Attorney Gurpatwant Pannun from lawyers for rights group the American Justice Centre, during a press conference in New York on Friday.
AP Attorney Gurpatwant Pannun from lawyers for rights group the American Justice Centre, during a press conference in New York on Friday.

'Summons could simply be served by ascertaining the presence of Mr. Modi in relatively close proximity, for example depositing the summons at his feet'
 
The organisation behind a lawsuit filed against Prime Minister Narendra Modi has offered a bounty of $10,000 to anyone who could serve him with the summons issued by a federal district court and capture the service on video, sparking concerns that there could be a security incident during Mr. Modi’s historic five-day visit to the U.S.

In a statement, the American Justice Centre (AJC) said that the award for serving Mr. Modi was announced “due to the fact that the PM's visit will only last 5 days and will include a packed schedule of meetings and speeches. Servers are expected to produce a video of the serving to be eligible for the award.” 

On Thursday human rights group AJC filed a 28-page complaint against Mr. Modi on behalf of multiple plaintiffs who hailed from Gujarat and suffered serious injury or the death or injury of a family member, alleging that Mr. Modi was culpable for his role in presiding over the 2002 anti-Muslim pogrom in the state.

The same day the federal court in the Southern District of New York issued summons to Mr. Modi to answer the plaintiffs within 21 days or face a “default judgment,” which could include categorisation of the 2002 riots as a “genocide” and potential compensation to the plaintiffs.

On Friday morning, during a White House briefing regarding bilateral prospects coming out of the summit meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama, a senior administration official clarified that the summons could not be delivered to him while he was in the U.S. or attending the United Nations General Assembly, as he was immune from prosecution, and “Sitting Heads of Government also enjoy personal inviolability while in the U.S., which means they cannot be personally handed or delivered papers… to begin the process of a lawsuit.”

However, answering this argument the AJC counsel Gurpatwant Singh Pannun said, “(As) Per the precedence established in the case of former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the immunity extends only to acts committed during the individual’s tenure as Head of State. Our case against Mr. Modi is related to his complicity in the Gujarat pogroms of 2002, when he was Chief Minister of the state.”

In the cases brought against Dr. Singh, allegations made against him that after 2004, he shielded Jagdish Tytler and others linked to the 1984 riots were not entertained by the U.S. court as he was deemed to be immune from prosecution given the fact that he was the Head of the Government at the time.

However, he was considered by the court to be potentially liable to answer allegations made that during 1991-1996 he helped finance counter-insurgency measures in India leading to numerous extra-judicial deaths, the reason for which was the fact that he was only the Finance Minister of India at the time and not a Head of Government.

In a conversation with The Hindu Mr. Pannun further explained that as this was a civil proceeding against Mr. Modi, New York laws applied at this time, and summons could simply be served by ascertaining the presence of Mr. Modi in relatively close proximity, for example depositing the summons at his feet.

However for the more creatively minded, an equally acceptable means would be to throw the summons at Mr. Modi’s feet after attracting his attention, even from ten feet away, in a way that he was made aware of the summons landing there, Mr. Pannun said.

“We are banking on community members, at least one of them, to stand up for human rights and deliver the summons,” Mr. Pannun said, adding that it was quite possible given the large number of community interactions planned in Mr. Modi’s schedule.

When asked whether this could spark any security concerns given the sensitive nature of the task Mr. Pannun said, “No, he is definitely secured and in good hands. It will just be down to an individual’s willingness to hand him a piece of paper.” 

A brief glance through New York law on summons suggests that the only available option for delivering summons to Mr. Modi, who does not have a place of residence or business in the state, would be “personal delivery,” for which a copy of the summons and complaint may be served by giving it to the concerned person in their hand, after which the server must fill out an affidavit of service and return it to the court within 14 days of the service.

Although The Hindu reached out to officials of India's Ministry of External Affairs who are in New York at the moment, a reply was not received by the time this article was published. 



Thursday, September 25, 2014

My TWEETS of today: Ghulam Muhammed

  https://twitter.com/GhulamMuhammed?lang=en

My TWEETS of today:


Ghulam Muhammed: U.S. court issues summons against Modi - By Narayan Lakshman - Suhasini Haider - THE HINDU... http://ghulammuhammed.blogspot.com/2014/09/us-court-issues-summons-against-modi-by.html?spref=tw 


Shiv Sena has to confront the neo-Mughals to save its homeland. Fortunately there is most fertile ground for Shiv Sena to claim the state.


Shiv Sena has to realise that BJP capturing center, can't leave Maharashtra in the hands of locals. Unlike BJP/RSS, SS is not idealist.


How can the world differentiate between violence unleashed by US/UK/France/Israel at much greater scale than that by ISIS and Al Qaida?

U.S. court issues summons against Modi - By Narayan Lakshman -Suhasini Haidar - THE HINDU, CHENNAI, INDIA



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U.S. court issues summons against Modi


    By Narayan Lakshman -Suhasini Haidar
     
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U.S. federal law first gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear lawsuits filed by U.S. residents for acts committed in violation of international law outside the U.S. Photo: R.V. Moorthy
The Hindu U.S. federal law first gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear lawsuits filed by U.S. residents for acts committed in violation of international law outside the U.S. Photo: R.V. Moorthy

Even before he touched down on U.S. soil after a nine-year visa ban, a federal court in New York has issued summons against the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for his role in presiding over the anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat during 2002 when he was Chief Minister of the state.
 The lawsuit, filed by the American Justice Center (AJC), a non-profit human rights organisation identified among the plaintiffs “two survivors of the horrific and organised violence of Gujarat 2002”, and called for a response from Mr. Modi based on the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).

Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, whose law firm represents the plaintiffs, explained via email to The Hindu that the summons issued by the Federal Court of Southern District of New York requires Mr. Modi to respond within 21 days after it is served.

The summons document, which also alludes to the 21-day deadline, notes that if the Prime Minster fails to answer the attached complaint, “Judgement by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint,” adding that Mr. Modi was expected to file his answer or motion with the court.

Specifically the twenty-eight page complaint filed was said to seek compensatory and punitive damages and “charges PM Modi with committing crimes against humanity, extra-judicial killings, torture and inflicting mental and physical trauma on the victims, mostly from the Muslim community”.

Mr. Pannun further noted that the “default judgement”, which in other cases has been entered against defendants in their absence, would be a “declaration from Federal Court that 2002 killing of Muslims was ‘Genocide’ as per US and international law”, and possibly grant compensatory and punitive damages for the riot victims.

According to a statement by the plaintiffs the ATCA, also known as Alien Tort Statute (ATS), is a U.S. federal law first adopted in 1789 that gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear lawsuits filed by U.S. residents for acts committed in violation of international law outside the US.

Commenting on the summons issued by the John Bradley, a Director at the AJC said, “The Tort Case against Prime Minister Modi is an unequivocal message to human rights abusers everywhere… Time and place and the trappings of power will not be an impediment to justice”.

The AJC is scheduled to hold press conference on September 26 to clarify the implications of the lawsuit filed in terms of the legal path ahead in the survivors’ quest for justice, according to a statement the organisation issued.

Maharashtra politicians seek mandate over messages, get voter list apps - Times of India, Mumbai


 https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=3441003027486211979#editor/target=post;postID=4757153206665669094

Maharashtra politicians seek mandate over messages, get voter list apps



MUMBAI: The wrangling over seats has delayed most parties' candidate lists, but Vidhan Sabha hopefuls are already hard at work, roping in technology to make up for time. As the wait for party approvals drags on, some candidates have hit social media and messaging platforms to gauge support. Other politicians, certain of their candidature, are using mobile apps to scan voter lists and plan their campaigns.

In fact, local software companies have won over several Maharashtra politicians, like Ajit Pawar, Nawab Malik and Ram Kadam, with mobile apps that promise a smooth run of this election.

The apps allow users to download voter lists for specific constituencies, do searches based on gender or location and send messages to select voters. Though some campaign managers are sceptical about these apps, politicians are not taking chances with tales of how technology won the recent Lok Sabha elections still doing the rounds. "If you don't adopt technology, you will become outdated na?" says Malik, the NCP spokesperson and MLA from Anushakti Nagar. He says his Voter List of Anushakti Nagar app has received a good response.

Jiten Gajaria, convener of the BJP's social media cell, says apps can be used to fine-tune data. "If somebody has moved house or got married after the LS elections, I can revise my data so that campaign material reaches all," he says.


The technology, available even during the LS polls, seems to have taken off in Maharashtra now. Pune-based Tushar Nikam's KTech Beans Software has 49 apps under the Rajyog brand. "I expect 100 more projects after tickets are finalised. Many are waiting before investing," says Nikam, whose mobile app costs Rs 25,000, while a desktop version is available for Rs 50,000. However, some politicians say such packages are priced upwards of Rs 1 lakh. Nikam says bickering over seats won't have an impact as workers can use these apps even on the last day. He adds downloads will pick up 10-15 days before polling when campaigning is at its peak. "When voters come to booths, workers can enter details have a final tally from each booth at the end of the day," he says.

"It takes time to make people adopt a system. Unless your workers are committed, how will you put these apps to good use?" says Dilip Chalil, head of the Congress's IT and social media. A campaign manager claims the profusion of apps is directly proportional to politicians' gullibility. "Many think apps are the same as social media and businessmen are making a packet out of this," says the manager.

But tech-savvy politicians would disagree. Panvel MLA Prashant Thakur, who joined the BJP on Tuesday, earlier sent out bulk SMSes to people in his constituency. "Do you think Prashant Thakur should fight this election? If yes, then give a missed call on...," the SMS said.

Vinod Shekhar, a Congress aspirant from Colaba, too sent bulk messages and voice mails to voters in his constituency asking if they support his candidature. "This election we have very less time for canvassing," he told TOI. Krishna Hegde, a Congress incumbent from Vile Parle says he sought people's mandate through his Facebook account. "Candidates will not get much time for campaigns so they are adopting such measures," says a PR consultant who handles social media drives for politicians.

BJP spokesperson Madhav Bhandari said, "While taking up such campaigns one should remember they are also encroaching upon people's privacy. BJP and many other parties have done such campaigns in the past but at times people rejected such practices through their mandate," he said.

Not sure PM meant what he said about Muslims: Asaduddin Owaisi - Interview by Zeeshan Shaikh - The Indian Express, Mumbai

The Indian Express, Mumbai



Not sure PM meant what he said about Muslims: Asaduddin Owaisi

Written by Zeeshan Shaikh | Mumbai | Posted: September 25, 2014 2:54 am

Asaduddin Owaisi is the president of the Hyderabad-centred All-India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen, which is contesting the elections in Maharashtra. Visiting Mumbai, he spoke about his party’s poll prospects and Muslims in India.

How many seats is the MIM planning to contest? Are you open to alliances?
 
We have not yet decided on the number of seats. We are definitely looking at striking an alliance with Dalit and OBC groups. The MIM is in Maharashtra for the long haul. The party will henceforth contest elections at all levels in the state.

What issues will you take up?

The most important issue is the political dis-empowerment of Muslims, and secondly, the socio-economic indicators of the community. From 1962 to 2009, there have been 3,108 MLAs elected in Maharashtra, of whom 119 were Muslims. With their proportion in the population, the number should have been 286. The political representation of Muslims is only 3.8 per cent. Report after report, from that of the Planning Commission to those of state-appointed committees such as the Rahman Committee, have pointed out the piteous conditions of Muslims. You also have a high incidence of communal conflicts. Innocent Muslims are illegally being put in jail. We plan to raise all these issues. The aim of the MIM is to work with all minorities who face these problems, including Dalits and OBCs.

Some Muslim intellectuals have said your entry will polarise society and malign Muslims’ image.

First of all, inclusive politics was never practised in Maharashtra by either the Congress-NCP or the Shiv Sena-BJP. I want to question people who attack me, why has not a single Muslim MP been elected from Maharashtra? Why has the Srikrishna Commission report never been implemented in the state? The population of Muslims in Maharashtra and Telangana is the same. Telangana has set aside Rs 1.000 crore for minorities; in Maharashtra it is only Rs 368 crore and it has not been spent. The Centre had identified four districts of Maharashtra under the Minority Multi-sectoral Development Plan. The implementation of these funds is less than 5 per cent in Parbhani and Washim. Now if we raise such issues, we are deemed to be communal. It has become very easy to blame Muslims for all the ills of the country.

How do you view Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement about Muslims living and dying for the country?

For the last 10 years, every prime minister who has gone to the United States has been forced to say this. When Manmohan Singh went he too made a statement about Indian Muslims. My question is, if the prime minister feels the way he does, why are his party men sending out such varying signals by attacking Muslims? Why are there still so many Muslims languishing in Gujarat’s jails? Muslims have never indulged in anti-national activities. When you look at Kashmir militancy, which was at its peak in the 1990s, not a single Muslim from other states joined it. I have my doubts about the prime minister’s statement. I am not sure whether he really meant what he said. I don’t know if this is a late realisation by the PM, or a statement made due to international compulsions.

There are reports of a lot of Muslim youths going to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS.

ISIS is one of the most evil entities. The MIM as well as senior clerics of Hyderabad have repeatedly been making statements condemning ISIS. I would tell the youth who are thinking of joining such evil entities that they should take part in the struggle to address the huge problems that the Muslim community in India faces. They should struggle to eradicate poverty. They should take part in the democratic process to take on communal forces.

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Wednesday, September 24, 2014

My tweet of today: PM Modi will meet 15 top US corporate heads --- Ghulam Muhammed

My tweet of today:



PM Modi will meet 15 top US corporate heads; practically all Jews. With corporates now ruling India, will India be taken over by Jews/Israel

Jail official asked me to cut beard, terror accused tells court, seeks compensation - By Maghna Yelluru - The Indian Express, Mumbai

Monday, September 22, 2014

Is it permissible to give meat from the udhiyah (Qurbani) to a non-Muslim neighbour?

Is it permissible to give meat from the udhiyah (Qurbani) to a non-Muslim neighbour?

 

from: Altaf Shaikh <altafs@alkabeer.com>
to:
date: Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 2:13 AM
subject: Is it permissible to give meat from the udhiyah to a non-Muslim neighbour?








 

Is it permissible to give meat from the udhiyah to a non-Muslim neighbour?


I hope the brother can answer my question in accordance with the Qur’an and Sunnah, along with of the evidence. I have a Christian colleague who refuses to accept the udhiyah meat from me, and he says that is because the Bible that they have does not allow them to do that.

Praise be to Allah.
There is nothing wrong with giving meat from the udhiyah to a non-Muslim, especially if he is a relative or neighbour or is poor. 
That is indicated by the verse in which Allah, may He be exalted, says (interpretation of the meaning):
“Allah does not forbid you to deal justly and kindly with those who fought not against you on account of religion and did not drive you out of your homes. Verily, Allah loves those who deal with equity”
[al-Mumtahinah 60:8]
Giving him some meat from the udhiyah comes under the heading of dealing justly and kindly with them, which Allah has permitted to us.
It was narrated from Mujaahid that a sheep was slaughtered for ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amr by a member of his family, and when he came, he said: Did you give some to our Jewish neighbour, did you give some to our Jewish neighbour? For I heard the Messenger of Allah (blessings and peace of Allah be upon him) say: “Jibreel kept urging me to treat neighbours kindly until I thought that he would make neighbours heirs.” Narrated by at-Tirmidhi (1943); classed as saheeh by al-Albaani. 
Ibn Qudaamah said: It is permissible to give some of it to a disbeliever, because it is voluntary charity which may be given to non-Muslims living under Muslim rule and prisoners of war, like all other kinds of voluntary charity.
End quote from al-Mughni (9/450) 
In Fataawa al-Lajnah ad-Daa’imah (11/424) it says: It is permissible for us to give meat from the udhiyah to non-Muslims who have a treaty with the Muslims and to prisoners of war, and it is permissible to give it to him on the basis that he is poor, or a relative, or a neighbour, or so as to soften his heart towards Islam, because of the general meaning of the verses in which Allah, may He be exalted, says (interpretation of the meaning):
“Allah does not forbid you to deal justly and kindly with those who fought not against you on account of religion and did not drive you out of your homes. Verily, Allah loves those who deal with equity”
[al-Mumtahinah 60:8].
And because the Prophet (blessings and peace of Allah be upon him) instructed Asma’ bint Abi Bakr (may Allah be pleased with her) to uphold ties of kinship with her mother by giving her money when she was still a mushrik at the time of the truce. End quote. 
Shaykh Ibn Baaz (may Allah have mercy on him) said: With regard to the disbeliever who is not in a state of war with us, such as one who has been granted protection by the Muslims or one who is living under Muslim rule, he may be given meat from the udhiyah, and other kinds of charity.
End quote from Majmoo‘ Fataawa Ibn Baaz (18/48) 
And Allah knows best.

After Rancor, Afghans Agree to Share Power - By ROD NORDLAND - The New York Time

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/world/asia/afghan-presidential-election.html?emc=edit_th_20140922&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=28904237

The New York Times

After Rancor, Afghans Agree to Share Power

By   SEPT. 21, 2014
 
Photo
Abdullah Abdullah, center left, and Ashraf Ghani embraced during a brief ceremony on Sunday during which the two men signed a power-sharing agreement. Credit Jawad Jalali/European Pressphoto Agency

KABUL, Afghanistan — Their campaign workers traded blows over ballot boxes during an election widely seen as fraudulent. Some of the warlords backing them have muttered about starting a parallel government, a potential recipe for civil war in Afghanistan. And they’ve just come out of a vote so discredited that some officials don’t want the final tallies announced.
Now Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan’s new president-elect, and his opponent, Abdullah Abdullah, have joined together in a national unity government in which they will share power.
After eight months of enmity over the protracted presidential election, with two rounds of voting, an international audit and power-sharing negotiations finally behind them, they will have to confront the challenges of jointly governing a country that in many ways is far worse off than it was before the campaign began last February.
The Taliban have had one of their most successful fighting seasons since the beginning of the war, and the security forces are reeling from heavy casualties, a high desertion rate and poor morale. The Afghan economy is battered by election uncertainty and rising unemployment, and in desperate need of emergency financing from the United States and other donors.


  Video
Play Video|0:27

Afghanistan Gets a New President

Ashraf Ghani was declared the winner of the presidential elections after he and Abdullah Abdullah signed a deal on Sunday for a power-sharing government in Kabul.
Video Credit By Reuters on Publish Date September 21, 2014. Image CreditOmar Sobhani/Reuters

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But both Mr. Ghani and Mr. Abdullah are expected to bring a welcome change from the confrontational relationship between the incumbent, President Hamid Karzai, and his American allies. Their relationship with the Americans will be one of the points of concord in what could well turn into a discordant and possibly unstable government.
In an interview with The New York Times last month, Mr. Ghani cited a parable to describe the problem confronting them. “Two people are riding in a boat and one of them took a chisel and started making a hole in the bottom and the other one said, ‘What are you doing? You’re going to drown us.’ And the other said, ‘I’m making the hole in my part of the boat.’ ”
“That captures it,” he said. “There are not two boats.”
The agreement forming the new government, brokered by Secretary of State John Kerry, who led an intense diplomatic effort over the past month, makes Mr. Abdullah or his nominee the chief executive of the government, with the sort of powers a prime minister normally has. While reporting to the president, the chief executive will handle the daily running of the government. At the same time, Mr. Ghani keeps all the powers granted to the president by the Afghan Constitution.
Already, supporters for each side have debated whether Mr. Ghani will have more power, or whether Mr. Abdullah will be an equal partner.
That does not bode well. Neither did the brief ceremony Sunday afternoon during which the two men signed the power-sharing agreement in front of President Karzai and their top supporters.
They hugged one another stiffly afterward, to decidedly tepid applause, and the entire event lasted less than a quarter-hour. They failed to show up for a planned joint news conference on Sunday, sending spokesmen instead.
While Mr. Ghani and Mr. Abdullah have known one another for many years, having served together in various positions in Afghan governments under Mr. Karzai, they have long had relations widely described as strained.
“They have created a fabricated national unity government, and I don’t think such a government can last,” said Wadir Safi, a political analyst at Kabul University.

Photo
In Kabul, supporters of Mr. Ghani celebrated the announcement that he had won the election. Credit Massoud Hossaini/Associated Press
 
At the same time, a national unity government is not a completely alien idea here. Mr. Karzai adroitly brought leaders from diverse ethnic and political groups into his government, and the security ministries especially — defense, interior and intelligence — were usually headed by northern Tajiks rather than Mr. Karzai’s fellow Pashtuns.
The two new leaders have plenty of common ground as well. Both are generally pro-American in their views; Mr. Ghani lived and worked there for many years, and Mr. Abdullah was a frequent visitor, and a close ally when the United States invaded Afghanistan alongside his Northern Alliance.
They both say they plan to sign the bilateral security agreement with the United States the moment they take office. Delayed a year because Mr. Karzai refused to sign it, the agreement is necessary if American troops are to remain in Afghanistan after the end of the current combat mission this year.
With 30,000 Americans and 17,000 other coalition troops still here, planning a sudden withdrawal by the end of the year would have been a challenge, but neither leader wants to renegotiate the agreement. Only a handful of Afghan military and police units are rated as completely self-sufficient without coalition support, which would potentially make a total pullout a disaster that neither leader wants.

There are strong indications, too, that the Taliban have taken advantage of the power vacuum caused by the long election imbroglio to step up their campaign, carrying out 700 ground offensives in the first six months of the current Afghan year, which began March 21, and killing 1,368 policemen and 800 soldiers, more than in any similar period.

Both Mr. Ghani and Mr. Abdullah have similar views on fighting the Taliban, agreeing that the country needs the sort of wartime commander in chief it has not had under Mr. Karzai, who has long seemed as if he simply wanted to wish the war away.

American diplomats who worked closely with both men in recent months, setting up and attending many meetings between the two, say their understanding of one another has grown greatly, and differences have increasingly been greater among some of their harder-line staff members than with each other.

A European official and a former Afghan official said that powerful backers of each candidate appeared to be making no moves to stand down the militias they control, preferring to see what happens in the coming months before sending home the gunmen they had raised over the summer.

“We’ve seen no moves in the north or outside Kabul or in eastern areas where these illegal armies are concentrated,” said the European official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he did not want to further inflame tensions in Afghanistan.

Photographs

Campaign of Resilience

Afghans voted in the first election in the nation’s modern history with the potential to bring a peaceful change of leadership.
OPEN Photographs

“There are going to be lots of centers of power in the government. Who will dominate? Abdullah’s people are worried that he’s going to be relegated to being nothing more than a senior adviser, and they’ll all be shoved aside by Ghani’s supporters, who want to be able to protect their claims on power and businesses,” the European official said.In addition to wartime concerns, their government will have to tackle an economy in deep crisis. The election impasse chased away investment, slowed economic activity and worsened an already growing unemployment problem as the military has been greatly reducing its presence.

By midyear, the Ministry of Finance was reporting net income of less than zero, as the cost of collecting taxes and customs duties exceeded the revenue raised. Afghanistan seemed unlikely to meet even its projected revenue goal of $2 billion this year, which already was $5 billion short of its needs, according to American officials. This month, teachers and other public workers were facing a payless payday, while the government asked donors for $537 million in emergency funding so it could meet its payrolls.

Less quantifiable would be the damage to the reputations of Afghanistan and its supporters in creating a viable democracy — although that, too, could have a price, since donor countries have made a free and fair election and a democratic, peaceful transfer of power the basis for continued aid. In Tokyo last year, for instance, donor nations made satisfactory elections a precondition for $16 billion in development assistance.

Despite as much as a half-billion dollars in international support for the elections and the audit (even the lowest estimates exceed $200 million), in the end the two candidates cut a political deal before the vote totals were even announced.

At the last minute, Mr. Abdullah had threatened to boycott the deal altogether unless the Independent Election Commission did not release the vote totals, and that is what happened Sunday. The commission merely announced that Mr. Ghani was the winner, without citing any numbers.

The European Union’s observer mission, which had more than 410 people here, called the United Nations-supervised audit “unsatisfactory” and expressed “regrets that no precise results figures have been published.”

“Many people risked their lives to vote, some lost their lives and this is a very bad precedent,” said Nader Nadery, the head of the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan, a respected Afghan monitoring group. “To persuade people to come back and vote again will be very hard.”

Mr. Nadery, whose organization monitored the vote, said it had estimated that the final total would be about 54 percent to 45 percent in favor of Mr. Ghani, even after fraudulent votes were discounted. He said there was clearly large-scale fraud on both sides.

American officials were eager to portray Sunday’s outcome as an important milestone, and proof that the country could weather its first change of power peacefully and democratically.

It was emblematic of the confused ending to the election ordeal that no one was even sure when President-elect Ghani would be inaugurated. Under the deal, he is obliged to appoint Mr. Abdullah as chief executive at that inauguration, so they will both be in the same boat immediately.

Matthew Rosenberg contributed reporting from Washington. 

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