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14 August 2012, 06:04 PM IST On 10th August 2012, I was sitting with a bureaucrat friend of mine, in a Delhi restaurant. This friend occupies an important position in the government connected with maintaining law and order. We were discussing my blog post - Pune Blasts: The Story Behind the Story”. At one point in the article I elaborate upon the chilling fourth degree torture unleashed allegedly under the overall superintendence of Rakesh Maria—the current Maharashtra ATS chief—way back in 1993—on the kin of the 1993 Mumbai blast.
The alleged torture story is truly horrific and contains unspeakable instances of state-sponsored sadism on men, women and children.
Our conversation drifted to the framing of innocent Muslim youth in terror cases—the most glaring of which remains the 2008 Malegaon blast instance. Here, even after the late Hemant Karkare exposed the hand of right-wing, Sangh Parivar backed terrorism behind the blasts, Muslims initially charged with the crime—in which nearly all victims were Muslims—were not let off till 2012—and that too only on bail.
The said bureaucrat was worried over several Malegaon blast type incidents existing in India—and the deep sense of alienation that Muslim youths are passing through. At one point, I remarked in the usual arm chair discussion mode that “what will happen if 25 crore Indian Muslims decide to revolt?”
My friend replied calmly that forget about crores—the Indian security apparatus will not be able to handle even a 10,000 strong, militant crowd.
Next day, on 11th August 2012, my friend’s words came back to haunt me as I saw the footage of not more than 500-1000 people, thrashing up the police, media and anyone who came their way.
This aggressive mass had emerged from a 50,000 strong gathering at Azad Maidan, Mumbai, called by different Muslim groups such as the Raza Academy to protest against Assam ethnic violence and the systematic killing of Rohingiya Muslims in Myanmar.
Now, newspaper reports/commentators are talking about the hidden NCP-Congress fight in Mumbai; how the Raza Academy group of maulavis are close to NCP; and how the Azad Maidan protest was used by Sharad Pawar to shift focus away from the investigations (of corruption charges) against a NCP minister and the like.
As an active participant in several mass movements—some of which I actually led in my capacity as a Left student leader of Allahabad University—a campus famous for anti-establishment student militancy—I could not but express scepticism at the NCP-conspiracy angle. I remember in 1985, the students of Allahabad University had organized a massive movement against fee rise; ordinary students—some of them toppers of their disciplines—fought the police for hours with nothing but stones—so much so that several companies of the famed Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) of Uttar Pradesh had to retreat, not once but twice.
During the 1985 Allahabad movement, several elements who kept hand-made guns (katta) and hand-made bombs in their rooms (a normal practice in Uttar Pradesh campus’ at least till the 1990s), too came out to fight when the PAC started invading hostels and beating up the students mercilessly in the lathi-charge melee.
Bombs were thrown—guns were fired—at PAC jawans. All this was done without exception by senior, upper caste Hindu boys, dominating the hostels, some of whom had clear, but small time, criminal connections.
Yet, guns and bombs constituted less than 5 per cent of the student upsurge. The nature of mass movements is such that all elements of society—including the criminal-lumpen constituent—tend to participate. But ordinary people/students/youngsters always—without exception—form the bulk.
Things have changed quite a lot since the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, the last 15 years has not seen a major mass movement even in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the traditional hotbeds of turbulence. I think media—which has emerged as a phenomenal force in precisely these 15 years—suffers from a lack of experience and perspective as far as mass movements and actions are concerned.
In politics as well, a new breed of managerial-technocrat—yuppies and foreign educated—politicians have emerged. They dominate nearly all parties. Let alone mass movements and mass actions, they do not understand mass dynamics. In 2011, they failed terribly in reading the dynamics behind the Anna phenomenon. In 2012, incidents at Manesar and Mumbai leave them speechless.
This is unfortunate. The attitude which sees politics as an entity that can be `managed’—or masses as consumers who can be manipulated into buying poll promises—misses the entire point.
Several 21st Century, fab-india jholawala types—not Leftists but NGO marka activists—also suffer deeply from this malaise. These elements see masses as objects of suffering, passive and bhola-bhala. They commit the fatal mistake of viewing violence or aggression as some outside impulse, brought into a mass action either by vested interests or certain lobbies and so on and forth.
Violence and aggression are part and parcel of mass movements/actions. After an incident of mass violence in Chauri Chaura, Gorakhpur, Mahatama Gandhi withdrew the non-cooperation movement in 1921. But the same Mahatama did not utter a word of condemnation of the massive violence unleashed by the Indian people against the British colonial State in 1942.
After Independence, though violence remained part of mass movements and actions, the art of negotiation and growth of leaders who could talk to—or listen to—masses—minimised to a great degree the role of bloodshed. However since the late 1990s—the art of going deep into the people—entering people’s homes during election campaigns to have a cup of tea—and occurrences of leaders breaking security cordons to shake hands with the people—allowing literally the tearing apart of their kurtas—has vanished.
Especially in the 2000s, political leaders have ceded the middle ground of interacting with the people, going on padyatras and the like. Even when they take such initiatives, it is for a limited period of time. In some cases, it even appears pretentious.
Mumbai violence essentially emerged out of the pent-up rage of Muslim youth. The brutal killings in Assam and Myanmar may have served as a trigger—and yes, some lumpen elements were definitely present to add fuel to fire. But serious issues should not be reduced to mere manifestations—one has to understand the reasons behind incidents of mass violence.
There is something seriously sick with a society that allows 4,00,000 of its own citizens to live like animals in Assam in relief camps—and does not condemn the planned violence unleashed on them by trained anti-national militias. Instead, political leaders are seen harping on the illegal immigration issue—forgetting conveniently that at least 20-30 per cent of the 400,000 people living in camps in Assam are Bengali Hindus, Santhals or Biharis.
A society which looks the other way when haves unleash violence on the have-nots has no business complaining when the have-nots retaliate. In Manesar we saw how while the profits of Maruti Suzuki soared by 2200 per cent, wages of workers stagnated at 5.5 percent.
Violence is written in the script of the new India that emerges following the liberalization process. In Manesar, many workers who took part in the movement are graduates—in Mumbai and other metros, a new generation of Muslims—with university degrees, skills, MBAs up their sleeves—have emerged. The material wealth around them has made their aspirations run high. They want more—and unlike their fathers or grandfathers—they are vocal and aggressive about their wants. But the delivery is poor. Most of the educated Muslims still live in ghettos and slums where basic amenities like electricity, water, health centres are missing. They seldom see the face of their local body representative, MLA or MP. Unlike the old days, there is no one to organize at least a meeting in their locality, to express shame and regret, at say, Assam type killings.
On the other hand, these youths have mobiles and can access the internet. They are tech savvy; when the political class fails to address them, they go by what they see on the screen or what they hear from their mobile phones. Why will they not react with violence?
Right wing bloggers will now say that the combination of education, technology and backwardness is not particular to Muslims. True, this is a general Indian phenomenon. That is why I quoted Manesar where 95 per cent workers are Hindus of different castes. So don’t say that Muslims resort to violence because their ideology or religion says so—try instead, to understand—irrespective of caste or creed—the social roots of contemporary violence in all its shades and complexity.
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Understanding the Mumbai violence
Amaresh Misra14 August 2012, 06:04 PM IST On 10th August 2012, I was sitting with a bureaucrat friend of mine, in a Delhi restaurant. This friend occupies an important position in the government connected with maintaining law and order. We were discussing my blog post - Pune Blasts: The Story Behind the Story”. At one point in the article I elaborate upon the chilling fourth degree torture unleashed allegedly under the overall superintendence of Rakesh Maria—the current Maharashtra ATS chief—way back in 1993—on the kin of the 1993 Mumbai blast.
The alleged torture story is truly horrific and contains unspeakable instances of state-sponsored sadism on men, women and children.
Our conversation drifted to the framing of innocent Muslim youth in terror cases—the most glaring of which remains the 2008 Malegaon blast instance. Here, even after the late Hemant Karkare exposed the hand of right-wing, Sangh Parivar backed terrorism behind the blasts, Muslims initially charged with the crime—in which nearly all victims were Muslims—were not let off till 2012—and that too only on bail.
The said bureaucrat was worried over several Malegaon blast type incidents existing in India—and the deep sense of alienation that Muslim youths are passing through. At one point, I remarked in the usual arm chair discussion mode that “what will happen if 25 crore Indian Muslims decide to revolt?”
My friend replied calmly that forget about crores—the Indian security apparatus will not be able to handle even a 10,000 strong, militant crowd.
Next day, on 11th August 2012, my friend’s words came back to haunt me as I saw the footage of not more than 500-1000 people, thrashing up the police, media and anyone who came their way.
This aggressive mass had emerged from a 50,000 strong gathering at Azad Maidan, Mumbai, called by different Muslim groups such as the Raza Academy to protest against Assam ethnic violence and the systematic killing of Rohingiya Muslims in Myanmar.
Now, newspaper reports/commentators are talking about the hidden NCP-Congress fight in Mumbai; how the Raza Academy group of maulavis are close to NCP; and how the Azad Maidan protest was used by Sharad Pawar to shift focus away from the investigations (of corruption charges) against a NCP minister and the like.
As an active participant in several mass movements—some of which I actually led in my capacity as a Left student leader of Allahabad University—a campus famous for anti-establishment student militancy—I could not but express scepticism at the NCP-conspiracy angle. I remember in 1985, the students of Allahabad University had organized a massive movement against fee rise; ordinary students—some of them toppers of their disciplines—fought the police for hours with nothing but stones—so much so that several companies of the famed Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) of Uttar Pradesh had to retreat, not once but twice.
During the 1985 Allahabad movement, several elements who kept hand-made guns (katta) and hand-made bombs in their rooms (a normal practice in Uttar Pradesh campus’ at least till the 1990s), too came out to fight when the PAC started invading hostels and beating up the students mercilessly in the lathi-charge melee.
Bombs were thrown—guns were fired—at PAC jawans. All this was done without exception by senior, upper caste Hindu boys, dominating the hostels, some of whom had clear, but small time, criminal connections.
Yet, guns and bombs constituted less than 5 per cent of the student upsurge. The nature of mass movements is such that all elements of society—including the criminal-lumpen constituent—tend to participate. But ordinary people/students/youngsters always—without exception—form the bulk.
Things have changed quite a lot since the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, the last 15 years has not seen a major mass movement even in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the traditional hotbeds of turbulence. I think media—which has emerged as a phenomenal force in precisely these 15 years—suffers from a lack of experience and perspective as far as mass movements and actions are concerned.
In politics as well, a new breed of managerial-technocrat—yuppies and foreign educated—politicians have emerged. They dominate nearly all parties. Let alone mass movements and mass actions, they do not understand mass dynamics. In 2011, they failed terribly in reading the dynamics behind the Anna phenomenon. In 2012, incidents at Manesar and Mumbai leave them speechless.
This is unfortunate. The attitude which sees politics as an entity that can be `managed’—or masses as consumers who can be manipulated into buying poll promises—misses the entire point.
Several 21st Century, fab-india jholawala types—not Leftists but NGO marka activists—also suffer deeply from this malaise. These elements see masses as objects of suffering, passive and bhola-bhala. They commit the fatal mistake of viewing violence or aggression as some outside impulse, brought into a mass action either by vested interests or certain lobbies and so on and forth.
Violence and aggression are part and parcel of mass movements/actions. After an incident of mass violence in Chauri Chaura, Gorakhpur, Mahatama Gandhi withdrew the non-cooperation movement in 1921. But the same Mahatama did not utter a word of condemnation of the massive violence unleashed by the Indian people against the British colonial State in 1942.
After Independence, though violence remained part of mass movements and actions, the art of negotiation and growth of leaders who could talk to—or listen to—masses—minimised to a great degree the role of bloodshed. However since the late 1990s—the art of going deep into the people—entering people’s homes during election campaigns to have a cup of tea—and occurrences of leaders breaking security cordons to shake hands with the people—allowing literally the tearing apart of their kurtas—has vanished.
Especially in the 2000s, political leaders have ceded the middle ground of interacting with the people, going on padyatras and the like. Even when they take such initiatives, it is for a limited period of time. In some cases, it even appears pretentious.
Mumbai violence essentially emerged out of the pent-up rage of Muslim youth. The brutal killings in Assam and Myanmar may have served as a trigger—and yes, some lumpen elements were definitely present to add fuel to fire. But serious issues should not be reduced to mere manifestations—one has to understand the reasons behind incidents of mass violence.
There is something seriously sick with a society that allows 4,00,000 of its own citizens to live like animals in Assam in relief camps—and does not condemn the planned violence unleashed on them by trained anti-national militias. Instead, political leaders are seen harping on the illegal immigration issue—forgetting conveniently that at least 20-30 per cent of the 400,000 people living in camps in Assam are Bengali Hindus, Santhals or Biharis.
A society which looks the other way when haves unleash violence on the have-nots has no business complaining when the have-nots retaliate. In Manesar we saw how while the profits of Maruti Suzuki soared by 2200 per cent, wages of workers stagnated at 5.5 percent.
Violence is written in the script of the new India that emerges following the liberalization process. In Manesar, many workers who took part in the movement are graduates—in Mumbai and other metros, a new generation of Muslims—with university degrees, skills, MBAs up their sleeves—have emerged. The material wealth around them has made their aspirations run high. They want more—and unlike their fathers or grandfathers—they are vocal and aggressive about their wants. But the delivery is poor. Most of the educated Muslims still live in ghettos and slums where basic amenities like electricity, water, health centres are missing. They seldom see the face of their local body representative, MLA or MP. Unlike the old days, there is no one to organize at least a meeting in their locality, to express shame and regret, at say, Assam type killings.
On the other hand, these youths have mobiles and can access the internet. They are tech savvy; when the political class fails to address them, they go by what they see on the screen or what they hear from their mobile phones. Why will they not react with violence?
Right wing bloggers will now say that the combination of education, technology and backwardness is not particular to Muslims. True, this is a general Indian phenomenon. That is why I quoted Manesar where 95 per cent workers are Hindus of different castes. So don’t say that Muslims resort to violence because their ideology or religion says so—try instead, to understand—irrespective of caste or creed—the social roots of contemporary violence in all its shades and complexity.
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