Thursday, September 12, 2013

Communalism gains new ground in rural India - Gyan Varma - MINT with Wall Street Journal

http://www.livemint.com/Politics/Lmv1m7PQ9zb9YQlWidPwzO/Communalism-gains-new-ground-in-rural-India.html?ref=dd



Communalism gains new ground in rural India

Incidence of violence grows in scale as rural areas turn into a battleground for communal politics
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First Published: Thu, Sep 12 2013. 07 55 AM IST
Security forces chase rioters, unseen, during a curfew in Muzaffarnagar on Monday. Photo: AP
Security forces chase rioters, unseen, during a curfew in Muzaffarnagar on Monday. Photo: AP
Updated: Thu, Sep 12 2013. 12 46 PM IST

For 29-year-old Kherunisa Qureshi, who lost her husband and two other family members in the Hindu-Muslim riots raging in Muzaffarnagar and its vicinity, returning to her village is no longer an option.

A resident of Shamli district, adjacent to Muzaffarnagar, she managed to escape with her two daughters, aged 5 and 10, and with bullet and stab wounds, took refuge at the local government hospital. She doesn’t want to return home because she fears being attacked once again after security forces deployed in her village are withdrawn.

Qureshi’s predicament captures the new battleground of communal politics: rural India. It is worrying because, in the past, communal violence tended to be concentrated in urban areas. This time, the spectre of Hindu-Muslim violence is also threatening to alter the political landscape in western Uttar Pradesh, a region that last seen riots of such scale, again mostly in urban areas, in the 1980s.

Not only is it causing a cleavage between rural communities, it is, in the run-up to the next general election, likely to further polarize the electorally crucial states of UP and Bihar, both of which have been witness to several low-intensity episodes of communal violence over the last two years. Such violence has grown in scale in recent months.

It is yet unclear whether and how it will alter the electoral arithmetic in UP, which at present is perceived to be a largely four-cornered contest between the state’s ruling Samajwadi Party, Congress, Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). UP sends 80 members to the Lok Sabha, the largest contingent from any single state.

“It is true that such riots are now happening in more rural areas. People in villages are more close knit and everyone knows each other. However, one needs to go deeper to find out why the communal forces are targeting villages,” said Badri Narayan, a professor at the G.B. Pant Social Science Institute, University of Allahabad.

The rural phenomenon

NH 58, a normally busy highway to Muzaffarnagar, an industrial town in western Uttar Pradesh, is almost deserted. There are check posts at regular intervals manned by the army and paramilitary forces. In the city, no shops and business establishments are open because of curfew.

Jats make up around 30% of the population of western Uttar Pradesh, Muslims some 40%, Dalits 10% and Brahmins and Rajputs together the remaining 20%, said Vishesh Gupta, an associate professor and head of the department of sociology at Mahatma Jyotiba Phule Rohilkhand University in Bareilly.

Gupta attributes the spread of violence to rural areas to the involvement of the “new generation” and the growing distance between communities in the hinterland.

“Riots have happened in villages because of the involvement of new generation.
The dialogue and harmony between communities which was present in the earlier times have gone down and the new generation is getting into conflicts with each other,” Gupta said.

According to the city administration, 38 people have died in the violence so far. Ambulances speeding by with their sirens wailing are evidence that the violence in the rural areas and the city hasn’t ended yet.

“The situation in both city and rural areas has improved but it is still tense. We are keeping a close watch and curfew was relaxed twice today so that people could buy essential commodities,” said Arun Kumar, the additional director general of Uttar Pradesh who is in-charge of the law and order situation in the state. “I have served in Muzaffarnagar as superintendent of police in 1995 but never heard of any violence in rural areas. This is a new phenomenon.”

A surgeon at the Muzaffarnagar civil hospital, who did not wish to be identified, said violence had spread to nearby villages in districts like Baghpat and Shamli.

“Violence in villages is not known. This is the first time. We have received 68 injured so far and some have been referred to government hospital in Meerut equipped with better medical facilities,” the surgeon said. “Most of the people coming to the hospital have either have bullet wounds or wounds made by sharp-edged weapons.”

As a consequence of the violent attacks, daily wage labourers, both Hindu and Muslim, have fled. Business associations in Muzaffarnagar are concerned that they may never return.

“Most of the labourers are Hindus or Muslims. There was never any differentiation on the basis of religion,” said Pankaj Aggarwal, chairman of the local paper mills association.

Electoral politics

Most residents are blaming political parties and the state administration for allowing the violence to escalate to such a scale.

“This is a very unfortunate incident which looks like it was sponsored by the ruling Samajwadi Party and Bharatiya Janata Party. BJP can do well in the Lok Sabha election only by polarizing the people. The SP government wants to appease the people of a particular community (Muslims) for vote-bank politics,” said Dinesh Kumar, a retired principal of SD Degree College, the biggest in Muzaffarnagar.

Mulayam Singh wants to be Prime Minister and believes this to be shortest way to success,” said Dinesh Kumar, referring to the president of the Samajwadi Party.

The riots that started on 7 September and went on unchecked for nearly three days have brought back memories of the Hindu-Muslim clashes that erupted in the summer of 1987 in Meerut. Around 350 people died in those clashes, according to a report by the People’s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL).

Some see a pattern underlying the revival in communal violence. The genesis, say analysts, was the overt attempts by both the Congress and the SP to woo the crucial Muslim vote in the state. Sensing a vacuum, fringe Muslim and Hindu groups sought to stoke communal sentiments, Mint reported on 4 December, 2012.

This trend in polarization got a fillip after the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) attempted to revive the demand for building a temple at the disputed site where the Babri Masjid stood before it was demolished in 1992, Mint reported on 25 August. Hindu nationalists say the site is Ram Janmabhoomi—the birthplace of the warrior-god Ram.

This calibrated polarization is now giving way to large-scale communal clashes.

“The poisoning (of relations) between the two communities that took place during the Ram Janambhoomi agitation is the real cause of this violence. What was the need for VHP leader Ashok Singhal to meet Mulayam Singh Yadav,” said Zahoor Siddiqui, a retired historian from Delhi University who now lives in Bhagpat district, which has also seen a face-off between Hindus and Mulsims.

“The communal clashes in the rural areas are significant because they had never happened in the past. Riots are known to take place in cities and not villages. People have changed,” said Siddiqui, who runs a school for underprivileged children.

Residents of the Muzaffarnagar say the violence is likely to benefit both the ruling Samajwadi Party and the BJP and limit the influence of the Congress party in the entire western Uttar Pradesh region.

The violence erupted after a girl belonging to the dominant Jat community was subjected to street harassment by some young Muslims in Kawal village. The incident led to clashes between Jats and Muslims in the village in which three people died.

“I believe it was premeditated. The SP and BJP have strategically used people to polarise the situation in their favour. We expect more such incidents before the elections because politicians of both the parties will make use of these incidents for election campaigning,” said Ram Kumar Gautam, retired biology teacher in Shri Arvind Inter College.

Anuja contributed to the story
.
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Wednesday, September 11, 2013

SP faces anger within: Give us security, not laptops - Faisal Fareed - The Indian Express

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/sp-faces-anger-within-give-us-security-not-laptops/1167880/0

The Indian Express


SP faces anger within: Give us security, not laptops

Faisal Fareed : Agra, Wed Sep 11 2013, 22:44 hrs


Angry Muslim leaders of the Samajwadi Party Wednesday demanded their government in Uttar Pradesh provide security for their community in the state instead of freebies such as laptops and unemployment allowances while the Muslim face of the party stayed away from its national executive.
They also demanded action against state police chief Devraj Nagar for the communal riots in Muzaffarnagar. Although the opening day of the national executive meeting had taken up the party's political and economic resolution for discussion, the Muslim members chose to focus on Muzaffarnagar.

"Don't give us laptops, unemployment allowance etc. Give us security. All our good deeds have been washed away by these riots," said Abu Asim Azmi, president of the Maharashtra unit of the party, who led the charge against the SP leadership.

Members loudly applauded Azmi as he urged the party to go back to what he said was its Muslim-friendly image when Mulayam Singh Yadav was chief minister.

"We want the old SP where Muslims were safe, we need to change our strategy," Azmi said in the presence of Chief Minister Akhilesh Yadav. Azmi was joined by cabinet minister Ahmed Hasan, among others, who demanded action against those responsible for the violence in Muzaffarnagar.

"Why was the DGP spared when action has been taken against district level officials? He too is equally responsible since he was present there on September 7. The incident has maligned our image," Azmi added. His demand was immediately backed by minister of state for panchayati raj Kamal Akhter and other members.

The outburst by the SP's Muslim leaders came as cabinet minister Azam Khan, who is also the party's national general secretary and is considered the SP's Muslim face, skipped the national executive meeting.

While Khan refused to give reasons for his absence when reached by The Indian Express, his staff said he had a fever.

Over the weekend, Khan had strongly criticised the local administration and the Akhilesh government for the trouble in Muzaffarnagar. The SP's national general secretary Ramgopal Yadav sought to downplay Khan's absence saying it was nothing serious. "There are 106 members and only 80 are present. Some people fail to attend as they are busy elsewhere. It should not be taken seriously," he said. "Don't worry, he is not angry with us."

Khan has been avoiding official events and has not attended eight cabinet meetings since June.
Party sources said the SP's Muslim leaders were especially upset over Muzaffarnagar as there were specific examples to show delay, inaction and failure at several levels of the administration right up to the top leading to the loss of innocent lives in the riots.

Sensing the mood, Mulayam chose to focus on Muzaffarnagar in his speech at the meeting and blamed the BJP and its affiliate organizations for stoking violence. "A political party and its affiliate organizations made efforts to instigate violence in Muzaffarnagar. A BJP MLA even circulated a fake video on social networking sites," he said.

"Such incidents will be repeated if we are not alert. Some people who have lost the people's mandate are seeking political mileage from the incident. We will not let it happen at any cost even if we have to pay any price," Mulayam said.

Ramgopal Yadav later told reporters that the party is committed to restoring peace in Muzaffarnagar. "We have instructed our partymen to visit the area. Bhaichara committees will be formed in every village to heal the wounds of hatred. We controlled the violence within two days and the Army was called immediately," he said. He also claimed that law enforcement in UP is better than in Delhi, Bihar and other states.
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QUESTIONS IN PUBLIC ARENA

 
1. Is Abu Asim Azmi becoming the new Muslim voice in Samajwadi Party's national executive?
2. Why SP risked Muslim votes to go soft with BJP. Is there SP plans a future NDA with BJP support?
 
3. Can Ram Gopal Yadav's hollow promise of peace and rehabilitation of rioted-affected Muslim win back the confidence of entire Muslim community of Uttar Pradesh to forgive and forget the acts of omission and commission of Mulayam Singh Yadav and Akhilesh Singh Yadav?
4. Is Congress leadership in UP capable of deserving Muslim votes while High Command is busy lining its own pockets and can spare only fake promises for the Muslims as in the past, without ever intending to deliver?
Ghulam Muhammed, Mumbai

 

MULAYAM'S DREAMS MAY GET BURIED IN THESE MUZAFFARNAGAR GRAVES

MULAYAM'S DREAMS MAY GET BURIED IN THESE MUZAFFARNAGAR GRAVES!

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Sunday, September 8, 2013

Not just Narendra Modi, Maulvis now against Rahul Gandhi and Congress on the Waqf land issue: Economic Times

My Comments posted on Economic Times Article:

It is a long term planning by Indian National Congress as to how to grab Muslim Waqf Land. Step be step, through stealth and open fraud on Muslim voters, it has got the entire All India Awkaf under its thumb. This is to cover the possibilities that Congress may not be ruling in many states of the union. The centralized plan was sold to Muslim with rosy promise that in a centralized government organization backed by suitable central laws, the Awkaf land will be protected. However, protected for whose benefit? The entire machinery of government managed Awkaf Board is riddled with corruption that goes to party funding. And the new legislation is nothing but a ruse to bring entire Awkaf properties available to be exploited to line the pockets of those appointees. Muslims never had any faith in bureaucracy and politicians that they will ever do any favor to the community and that stand is perennially vindicated and confirmed by constant cases of fraud and land grab and sale of Awkaf properties. In the recent developments, Salman Khurshid and K. Rehman are in the forefront of duping Muslims into creating a mammoth holy cow that will be milked for the benefit of Congress appointees and government bureaucrats. Muslim community will be hapless bystanders. This is daylight robbery; nothing less. All Awkaf must revert to Muslim community, through their own independent organizations, like Muslim Personal Law Board. If Sikhs can independently manage their Wqaf, why Muslim should not?
 
Ghulam Muhammed, Mumbai
<ghulammuhammed3@gmail.com>

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http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/not-just-narendra-modi-maulvis-now-against-rahul-gandhi-and-congress-on-the-waqf-land-issue/articleshow/22427532.cms

The Economic Times

Not just Narendra Modi, Maulvis now against Rahul Gandhi and Congress on the Waqf land issue

By Rohini Singh, ET Bureau | 9 Sep, 2013, 05.00AM IST
Rahul Gandhi or his key aides did not respond to questions from ET.Rahul Gandhi or his key aides did not respond to questions from ET.
NEW DELHI: Think UP politics, think the importance of Muslim vote for Congress (18 per cent-plus of the state's electorate) in an election where Narendra Modi is BJP's poll mascot, and now think of the potential political consequences of a hugely influential UP Muslim cleric promising this: "We will campaign against Rahul Gandhi and other Congress leaders and explain why Muslims shouldn't vote for them." That was Maulana Syed Kalbe Jawad, who leads the Friday prayers at the Shahi Asafi mosque in Lucknow's Imambada and who once mobilised over a million people in a protest against the US and Israel.

Worse, for Congress, he comes from Jais district in Amethi, Rahul Gandhi's constituency. Amethi's Muslim population is around 20 per cent. Rahul Gandhi's victory margin in the last Lok Sabha elections was around 3 lakh; no party had put up a significant candidate against him. Maulana Jawad promises to begin his campaign from September 16.

"Kalbe Jawad is a mass leader. You can ignore him during peace time but not during a time of war. The timing of this agitation is significant given that it's coming six months before general elections," said Saeed Naqvi, commentator and a close observer of Muslim politics. Jawad and several other influential Muslim clerics, some of whom come from other politically crucial states like Bihar and Maharashtra, ET spoke to are all agitated over what they say is the Congress leadership's insufficient efforts at addressing both general complaints about alleged grabbing of Waqf land and the "inadequate" new Waqf law, as well as a specific grievance relating to two plots in Delhi.

The two plots in Delhi, Muslim leaders say, housed a Sunni mosque and a Shia shrine. ET had earlier reported — on August 27 — on Muslim leaders' disaffection on this issue and their negotiations with Congress leaders. "Congress hasn't kept any of its promises," Maulana Jawad told ET. "They can't take us for granted," said Maulana Hafiz Nadeem Siddiqui, a powerful Muslim cleric heading Jamiat Ulema E Hind in Maharashtra. "Congress (in Maharashtra) is involved in 80 per cent of Waqf property destruction," he said.

Rahul Gandhi or his key aides did not respond to questions from ET. Senior Congress leaders like Salman Khurshid said while they acknowledge there are grievances, they do not see how agitating against Congress will help the Muslim cause. "Will an NDA government be more helpful? Has the Samajwadi Party helped Muslims secure substantive gains?" asked Khurshid.

Rahman Khan, UPA-2's minority affairs minister, said while he respects the clerics' views, "everything they say cannot become the norm".

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http://epaper.timesofindia.com/Default/Scripting/ArchiveView.asp?Daily=ETM&AppName=1&login=default&pub=ET&Skin=ETNEW&Enter=true&BaseHref=ETM/2013/09/09&Page=2

Saturday, September 7, 2013

Inside Madrasa - By Ebrahim Moosa - Bostonreview.net

Inside Madrasa

A Personal History
 
 
January 01, 2007
 
 
As I walked one morning last spring through the town of Deoband, home to India’s famous Sunni Muslim seminary, a clean-shaven man, his face glowing with sarcasm, called out to me. “Looking for terrorists?” he asked in Urdu. “I have every right to visit my alma mater,” I protested. With a sheepish grin he turned and walked away.
I shouldn’t have been so annoyed. The century-old seminary in Deoband had come under intense scrutiny after the Taliban leadership claimed an ideological affiliation with it via seminaries in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Journalists, politicians, and diplomats have since September 11 descended periodically on this town near Delhi in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh, long considered the intellectual and spiritual heartland of Indian Islam.
Once the Taliban was linked to Bin Laden, every aspect of India’s Muslim seminaries, or madrasas, became stigmatized. Top-level U.S. officials, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and a chorus of journalists, pundits, and scholars have declared all madrasas to be breeding grounds for terrorists, but they have done so without any evidence and without an understanding of the complexity of these networks of schools, which are associated with multiple Muslim sects and ideologies. They have drowned out reasonable voices—for example, Peter Bergen and William Dalrymple—who argue that not all madrasas can be indicted in the war on terror. But even their sympathetic gestures fall short of providing a realistic picture of what happens inside madrasas or humanizing their inhabitants.
Had I not been defensive, I would have told the man from Deoband that I had lived and studied in several Indian madrasas between 1975 and 1981. A quarter century later, I had returned—not in search of terrorists, but to try to create a bridge between the world inside the walls and the outside.
• • •
“Wednesday 23 April 1975: The start of our four months in India. We slept after reading two raka’as (formal Muslim prayers). After fajr (pre-dawn prayers) and ishraq (optional after-sunrise prayers) we slept again. This was at Khar mosque in Bandra, Bombay.” So reads the first entry I made in my diary on my six-year journey in India’s madrasas.
Mumbai, known as Bombay in 1975, was a bewildering city for an 18-year-old kid from Cape Town, South Africa. Nothing prepared me for the intimidating throng of beggars and street urchins outside the airport, the countless people sleeping on sidewalks, and the heavy-laden monsoon air and strong odors. At the time I wasn’t aware of the full impact of the “state of emergency” that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had imposed to silence her critics, but I knew that fear surrounded me: people whispered about danger and secret arrests. I suddenly understood my father’s reluctance to let me go.
Deciding to study in India was its own journey that began with a crisis of faith. I was barely 16 when a classmate, a Jehovah’s Witness, brought some stinging anti-Islamic literature to our class. I still hear Gabriel reading: “Muhammad was an impostor who spread his message by the sword and was unworthy of being a prophet.” And he added, “Actually, Muhammad cribbed his teachings from Jews and Christians whom he met during his travels.” I had learned at the daily religious school sessions—also called madrasa in South Africa—that as a youth the Prophet Muhammad traveled to Syria with his uncle and was even anointed by a Christian monk. But never did I suspect the Prophet of treachery. This first exposure to the hostility some Christians harbor toward Muslims crushed my unchallenged sense of faith. But the encounter also started me thinking critically about Islam: it would change my life.
A trip to the library did little to reassure me. The refined prose of authors like Sir William Muir and Montgomery Watt leveled the same charges against Muhammad and claims to Islam’s authenticity. On reflection, it seems rather odd that as devout Christians and rational Scotsmen, Muir and (perhaps less so) Watt found it plausible that God could be incarnate in a man from Nazareth but incredible that a seventh-century Arab could prophesy as the Jewish prophets did.
I later found comfort with a group called the Tabligh Jamat. The Arabic word tabligh means “to convey or transmit.” The Tabligh Jamat consisted of lay Muslims reminding their co-religionists of their religious duties. I attended their pious circle at my neighborhood mosque in District Six, Cape Town’s multiethnic and defiant cultural center, where I lived during the school week. Several years later, apartheid’s architects would obliterate District Six to remove any evidence that the coexistence of different races was possible and assign us to racially segregated ghettos.
But questions about my faith persisted. My doubts—and my existential anxiety as a person of color in this white-supremacist world—became unbearable. My plans to become an engineer slowly gave way to another obsession. I wanted to go to India to study the faith of my ancestors, to reconcile that faith with reason. My mother was sympathetic to my cause, but my father didn’t want to see his eldest son as a poor cleric dependent on the benevolence of the community. Born and raised in South Africa, he hardly performed the daily rituals or attended Friday prayers, giving priority to his business. He relented, though, when my aunts reminded him of the promise of paradise for learned scholars of Islam and the Qur’an as well as their benefactors.
• • •
In my heart I was following my mother’s prayers. She had come to South Africa as a 19-year-old bride from Gujarat. Far from close relatives and burdened with domestic chores in an extended family with seven children, one of whom died in infancy, she took refuge in religion. In particularly tough times she would share with me, her eldest, the religious lore she learnt in her childhood in the village of Dehgaam, of how the Prophet Muhammad’s daughter, Fatima, endured life’s trials.
My grandiose plan was also an escape from the drudgery of life: South Africa’s third-rate segregated schools, where discipline was violent and dictatorial, and the weekends and vacations working in the family grocery store in a seaside town 30 miles away. I was aware of the country’s segregationist politics; but I knew little of the lives of black South Africans, and I did not see the black unrest that would erupt on June 16, 1976, after I had been in India just more than a year.
When I arrived in Bombay, Tabligh volunteers received me and the rest of our group; I had agreed to spend four months in the Tabligh program before entering a madrasa. The brainchild of an Indian cleric, Muhammad Ilyas, who felt the teachings of Islam were not reaching the grass-roots faithful in British India, the Tabligh has no real bureaucratic administration, but its presence is felt in almost every corner of the globe. Resigning from his teaching position at a prestigious madrasa in the 1920s, Ilyas devoted himself, against tremendous odds, to revival work (da’wa) in the Mewat, a region straddling two states, Rajasthan and Haryana. He used a small mosque, the Banglawali Masjid, as his base in Delhi, where he cultivated his core of loyal associates. On the same site today a Spartan mosque serves as the international center (markaz) of the Tabligh.
Ilyas had a simple but highly effective evangelical message that he had boiled down to five points to mirror Islam’s five cardinal pillars of practice: grasp the true meaning and implications of the creedal statement that there is no deity except Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger; pray conscientiously five times a day; acquire learning and engage in the frequent remembrance of God; honor fellow believers; and participate in missionary work (da’wa) by spreading awareness of Islam. The Tabligh now hosts some of the largest Muslim gatherings, involving millions of participants on the subcontinent and around the world.
Working with the Tabligh was a grueling ordeal; and overcoming culture shock in India was daunting. We stayed at mosques, ate very basic meals, navigated treacherous roads, and traveled in overcrowded trains. By the lights of my naive faith, eternal damnation awaited these millions of Hindus apparently devoted to idols. In just weeks, India taught me to ask the first and enduring question about the workings of divine justice: how was it possible that a just God could promise me paradise and damn all these people who look like me? Years later, I would discover that many thinkers in the monotheistic tradition were confronted by similar questions, including the 12th-century thinker Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, about whom I would later write a book.
I cut short my four months with the Tabligh to three and headed for the Madrasa Sabilur Rashad in Bangalore along with two other South Africans I met in the Tabligh. At the austere walled campus I found dozens of students apart from the majority South Indians and the few from my home country—young men from Trinidad and Tobago, Malaysia, Indonesia, the United States, and a lone Cuban. I occupied the fourth thin mattress in a sparse and cramped dorm room with a West Indian, an African-American, and the Cuban. The latter two would in pursuit of piety rise at 3 a.m. for optional prayers and liturgy, tormenting the rest of us for not doing the same. I saw this “calculator mentality” often in the Tabligh—the preoccupation with rewards for performing certain acts of piety and an attitude that these roommates celebrated.
Daily madrasa routine would begin at least an hour before sunrise with preparation for the early-morning prayers. Afterward students remained at the mosque to read a portion of the Qur’an. Others used the early morning hours to memorize the Qur’an, known as hifz. Breakfast would follow in the dining hall, called “the mess,” a reminder that the British had ruled India. Breakfast consisted of South Indian idli (lentil-rice patties), a crispy roti (baked bread), and chai. Most foreign students made breakfast in their rooms with a spread of eggs, toast, and chai.
I had arrived at the madrasa only one month before it closed for the long Ramadan break, the end of the academic year. But in that short time I chafed at the highly regimented and pietistic environment and, worst of all, the cafeteria food. I took a class on memorizing portions of the Qur’an for liturgical purposes and perfecting my recitation of the holy book. The six-hour day of memorization was tedious, and students would take frequent bathroom breaks, sip lots of tea, and play surreptitiously to pass the time. The day’s memorized passage, as well as back lessons, were recited to an instructor at least twice daily. It took up to three full years to memorize the entire Qur’an. Not having budgeted such a length of time, I selected chapters, which would be useful in the classroom or in delivering sermons, as well as for liturgy. Since all instruction was in Urdu, I also threw myself into learning both Urdu and Arabic in private lessons.
But after almost four months in India, I had yet to enroll in an alimiyya program, required for gaining the knowledge and skills of an alim, the Arabic word for “a learned person.” (The plural, ulama, is today used to refer to Muslim clerics.) I spent the Ramadan break with my maternal grandfather, visiting my parents’ ancestral villages in Gujarat, near Bharuch, a bustling city on the banks of the Narmada River. On the outskirts of Baruch I discovered a small madrasa, Darul Uloom Matliwala, supported by an affluent South African family and enrolling some 200 students at the time.
The centerpiece of the seminary was a three-level Parsee bungalow. Parsees are followers of Zoroastrianism, an ancient religion of Persia. They straddle Indian and Anglo cultures and often speak both English and Gujarati. The bungalow was large enough to accommodate several classrooms and administrative space. To the side of the sprawling compound on Eidgah Road was a beautiful mosque of pastel greens surrounded by palms and a well-maintained garden. A student dormitory abutted the tilled fields that ran down to the banks of the Narmada.
The pace was relaxed and congenial. I decided to enroll. By coincidence, three other fellow South Africans came to study as a private cohort with a brilliant teacher, Mawlana Ibrahim Patni, who allowed me to join his group. Mawlana Patni’s talents were such that he could have succeeded as a lawyer or businessman. For the first few months we four would spend most of the day at the back of a class with dozens of 12-to-14-year-olds who were taking elementary classes in the pre-alimiyya program. We were on average 18 years old, writing with white chalk on child-sized black slate boards. At first we hardly understood the day classes we were auditing, but as the weeks and months progressed, things became clearer. By year-end I had a good handle on Urdu, and my Arabic was coming along.
As I adjusted to my new life, I also learned that my naive views about madrasas were not immune to contradiction. Puritanism reigned, and sex was taboo. I recall one evening in Bangalore when the Cuban student raised the alarm in the dorms, claiming that he had caught two Indian students in a homosexual embrace in the bathroom. I was scandalized, and the revelation haunted me for weeks. At home and in the madrasa I was taught that heterosexual conduct outside marriage was forbidden (and had life-threatening consequences); homosexuality was an unthinkable abomination.
Within a few months at the Bharuch madrasa I received my second jolt: I learned that it was an open secret that one of the teachers had sexual relations with younger men or perhaps even boys. Disturbed, but less shaken this time, I was getting a reality check. The personal lives of teachers and fellow students would not be my biggest concern. I realized that Bharuch was a provincial city and the madrasa lacked the more robust intellectual environment I sought, which was available in reputable North Indian madrasas.
After a year in Gujarat, I headed for Darul Uloom Deoband—the most prominent and prestigious madrasa for those affiliated with the Deobandi interpretation of the Sunni sect. Deoband, legend has it, was named after the goddess Durga, who in ancient times lived in the dense forest (van) near a lake (kund). It then became known as the ‘forest of the goddess’ (devi van) or ‘lake of the goddess’ (devi kund), which became corrupted to Deoband.
Today, the small town of Deoband, 98 miles from the Indian capital, Delhi, is typical, with open air markets, bookstores, food stalls, grocers, barbers, Internet cafes, and telephone exchanges. On its congested roads, man, animals, and vehicles vie for space. Locals joke that Deoband is famous for five things starting with the letter m: moulvis (Muslim clerics), masjid (mosque), mandir (temple), matchchar (mosquitoes) and makkhi (flies). But the spacious courtyard of Darul Uloom Deoband, in its serenity and historical grandeur, is reminiscent of Castalia in Hesse’s The Glass Bead Game: a place without family, amusements, poverty, and hunger, but dedicated to learning and hierarchy. Inside the red-brick walls, a large green cupola rises, dominating the landscape. The madrasa is built like a medieval fort, with four main gates and a courtyard marking the administrative and teaching spaces. Enclosing a larger courtyard replete with manicured lawns and simple flower gardens are extremely modest student residences. A majestic white marbled mosque now looms outside Madani Gate of the main campus.
• • •
Deoband was founded in 1867 in the aftermath of the failed Indian rebellion against British rule. With the defeat of the Moghuls, Muslim India divided into two intellectual paths. One saw the future secured in the embrace of modernity; this school established secular universities such as Aligarh Muslim University, founded by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. The other embraced tradition through religious schools, madrasas.
Deoband’s intellectual architect, Muhammad Qasim Nanautvi, a man of ascetic taste, a committed traditionalist, and a tireless anti-imperialist, belonged to the latter group. He and Khan were contemporaries and, as evident in their extensive and at times hostile correspondence, clashed over the meaning and place of Islam in the modern world. According to Khan, modern rationalism and science were compatible with a new interpretation of Islam—his. Older and more established doctrines, he believed, might have to be modified, if not jettisoned. (Khan did have his limits—he never entirely reconciled himself with the role of women in modern society.) Nanautvi was also a rationalist, but for him rationalism did not mean modern Western rationality like Descartes and Spinoza. It was, instead, a very early form of Greco-Arabic rationality consisting of Euclidean geometry and Aristotelian logic in the service of the old theological formulations of faith. Even today, this rationalist framework at Deoband and similar schools effectively exclude modern science.
Despite his anti-imperialism, Nanautvi did find European bureaucratic modernity attractive. He was trained at Delhi College, established by the British East India Company. He institutionalized exams, salaries for faculty, stipends for students, and an administrative system at Deoband modeled in part on Delhi College.
Nanautvi and his descendants controlled the main campus of Deoband until 1981 when rivals ousted Nanautvi’s aging grandson during an extended student strike that led to the closure of the institution. The reasons for the schism remain unclear. Students and their supporters at the time leveled charges of nepotism at the leadership and demanded better living conditions and some modernization of the syllabus. Ironically, the ousted administration had been planning to radically transform the Deoband madrasa with the support of a new hastily formed council that was later deemed to be unconstitutional. Two decades later very little had changed at the main Deoband campus. In fact, a breakaway madrasa, a cloned version of the main Deoband madrasa, has sprung up not far from the original campus. The new facility housed some 1,500 students, whereas the main campus housed over 3,000 students.
Deoband and other madrasas on the Indian subcontinent differed from their counterparts elsewhere in the Muslim world: they were privately funded. In fact, their raison d'être was resisting the state, in particular the influences of British rule and the spread of modernity through westernized Muslim elites. In contrast, Cairo’s al-Azhar and other schools in the Middle East had lost their independence to secular governments, who turned religion and clerics into extensions of the state and coerced modernization in certain areas.
For idealistic young men like me, who landed on the subcontinent in the mid-1970s in search of salvation and identity, the madrasas of India and Pakistan were presented as genuine bastions of tradition. We viewed institutions and scholars throughout the Middle East with disdain: they were feckless, robbed of intellectual vigor by governments that were slavish to foreign powers and uninterested in indigenous talents and history. Despite meager resources (extremely meager compared to the bourgeois comforts to which I had become accustomed), the madrasas had great legitimacy in our hearts and minds.
Being a student at Deoband was for me at first a dizzying experience. I devoured my texts, and they opened up worlds to me. Madrasa education drives home the sacred nature of knowledge. One is taught to show the utmost respect for the bearers of knowledge, teachers, and the instruments of learning, books. Novices quickly learn that some scholars cannot even tolerate the sight of paper lying in the street; carelessly discarded paper is the desecration of knowledge. Texts are not only symbols of learning, but markers of progress, too. So, for instance, if you ask a student what year of the program he is in, he will cite the text he is studying; only an insider could translate the name of that text into a specific year of the curriculum.
We studied books that were written in the tenth century and earlier, as well as those from the 15th to 20th centuries. The beauty of the textual tradition lies precisely in its discordant variety: texts serve as palimpsests of the ancient and the modern world. The best professors not only translated and clarified the text; they made an effort to link the ancient world to contemporary realities.
Law, called fiqh in Arabic, is the mainstay of the madrasa curriculum. Fiqh is actually moral discourse that proposes ethical guidelines for society. Learning the classical fiqh texts was exciting and awesome; after all, learning the practices advanced by tradition confers a certain responsibility and authority. I initially held out the hope that the proper application of fiqh would create an ideal Muslim society, only to find out that it would take more than law. I was disturbed, too, that some of what passes as the execution of Sharia practices involved gruesome amputations and floggings. I believed that if there were other ways to deter murder and theft they would be preferable to the practices of early centuries. There were few teachers to whom one could air such doubts. Most would respond with dire warnings of the spiritual and theological hazards of such thinking.
Even as students we would lampoon some of what we were taught, questioning its utility. For instance, in the fiqh class there were endless discussions about seven types of water usable to secure ritual purity: rain, sea, river, and well water, followed by water melted from snow and ice, and, finally spring water. Most of us had only seen water from the taps and wells, and few students from rural India would have had seen snow or the sea, except for in pictures—and pictures were rare, since images of animate objects were taboo. But thoughtful professors would transform arcane lessons into broader discussions, for example about the validity of recycled water for ritual purposes, a possibility unimaginable to the medieval authors of our texts.
• • •
Critics often charge the madrasa system of anachronism, a charge that is partly true. Defenders of the traditional curriculum, which was devised by the 18th-century scholar Mulla Nizamuddin, insist on the supreme pedagogical value of the old texts. They believe that, apart from connecting students to the canonical tradition, the “Nizami curriculum” enhances one’s mastery of every discipline and enables scholars to solve any contemporary problem. But few have been able to rebut the charge that the texts used are redundant and at times impenetrable, save to a few scholars who have spent their lives mastering them. Indeed most texts are frustratingly terse, forcing teachers and students to scour commentaries and super-commentaries for help. The multiple levels of calligraphic marginalia on each textbook page were decorative, but they were taxing to the eyes and mind. For decades critics have petitioned for more lucid texts. But inertia has turned the texts and syllabus into inviolable monuments to the past. The result is that students are poorly prepared and lack the confidence to engage the tradition critically to meet the needs of a changing world. At its worst the system recycles intellectual mediocrity as piety.
After three years in India I started asking questions about the relevance of the texts and how to apply their insights in the modern world and, especially, in South Africa. By now I had become acutely aware of the political challenges of my home country: racism, and the intransigence of the Muslim clergy there to speak out against the evil of apartheid. Reading the uncensored Indian press and following political developments at home through the literature of Nelson Mandela’s banned African National Congress, all impressed upon me the challenges I would face in South Africa. My restlessness drove me to read widely and independently—especially literature written by more contemporary authors. One such author was Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi, whom most teachers in Deoband reviled and for whom only the bravest expressed guarded admiration. Mawdudi was the gadfly among clerics who pushed for what is called “political Islam.”
Mawdudi rose to prominence during the dying years of British colonialism and after partition moved to the new state of Pakistan. While he had the credentials, he was not a member of the clerical elite, being for most of his life an autodidact, a gifted writer and founder of a continent-wide social movement known as the Jamat-e Islami. Mawdudi’s prolific writings guaranteed him audiences among modern educated Muslims. As the traditionalist ulama bickered with him on petty issues, Mawdudi emphasized the social dimensions of Islam as an ideology. If Muslims conceived of Islam as a social teaching then they could build new societies. Establishing an Islamic state, fully backed by Islamic laws and institutions, was one of Mawdudi’s ideals. Mawdudi was an ideologue with a vision, a political program, and international influence. Sayyid Qutb, the prominent Egyptian writer and ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood was persuaded by Mawdudi’s analysis that secular materialism was akin to the days of ignorance, jahiliyya, at the birth of Islam.
I thus discovered an interpretation of Islam outside the walls of the madrasa where I could find inspiration and guidance for building society from an Islamic platform. The ancient texts I was studying suddenly seemed musty and stale.
An overbearing government clerk who told my father that my expired passport could not be renewed unless I returned home changed everything. During mysubsequent—and, as it turned out, unecessary—three-month trip to South Africa in 1978, I realized I had been living in a cloistered world. Just seeing the people of Cape Town made me begin to question everything: my lifestyle, attire, ideas about my future. Up to that point, I had hardly spent time in Indian cities; nor did I watch television, go to movies, or listen to music because of the strict moral code I had followed for three years. I had given away all my Western clothes, vowing to wear only what I then believed was “Islamic dress”: the typical loose-fitting knee-length tunic, called a kurta, and loose-fitting pants.
I now knew that if I were to follow the rules of Deoband, not only would my life in South Africa be restricted—I had come to the madrasa to escape such confinement—but so too would be my emotional and intellectual development.
On my return to India I stepped into the precincts of Deoband wearing a T-shirt and jeans, a cavalier affront to my immediate friends. Even though the act was largely symbolic—I would continue to wear the conventional attire—I spurred a debate among close friends about what I thought were the deficiencies in the madrasas. Fellow students and a few teachers predictably labeled me a “modernist,” an insult. Some of my younger teachers who often gently challenged my views, helped me realize how self-righteous I had been in the past about an Islamic dress code and the superiority of the interpretations of madrasa authorities on virtually every matter.
It was time to move on. I was still determined to complete the alimiyya program, but I needed to find a madrasa with less emphasis on texts. I explored opportunities to study in Libya, Iraq, and Egypt to little avail. I was less of an idealist by now, and the burden of becoming independent started to weigh on me as I approached 21. Taking over the family business was certainly not an option; I needed to find a vocation.
I decided to transfer to Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama, a madrasa in the capital of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow. Nadwa was located on the banks of the Gomti River, which flows through this historic Mughal city, reputed for its refined culture, food, and aesthetic taste and a place where people still feel nostalgia for the days of nobility. In Mughal times this region was known as Oudh, and its rulers were mostly those who followed the Shia rite. In my student days there were occasional Sunni–Shia tensions around the beginning of the Islamic month of Muharram, signaling the Muslim New Year, when public exhibitions of Shia passion plays rekindled ancient grievances underlying the sectarian split within Islam more than a millennium ago. Yet Lucknow was a city that took pride in civility.
• • •
Moving from Deoband to Nadwa is in effect like transferring from the Vatican to a liberal divinity school. Deobandis look askance at Nadwa: in addition to being too modern and too liberal for the Deoband temper, it is more internationalist in outlook. Its former president, the late Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, was internationally reputed in the Muslim world. A one-time colleague of Mawdudi, with whom he would later had differences, he was clearly enchanted by Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood. He wrote extensively on the plight of Muslims in the 20th century and mobilized for their welfare and advancement. Nadwa received a great deal of support from foundations and individuals in the Arabian Gulf, and the campus boasts significant upgrades over the last three decades. Ali Nadwi was a descendent of the Prophet’s family and was therefore known as a sayyid. He wrote mainly in Arabic and strongly believed that a renaissance among the Arabs would have a salutary influence on the rest of the Muslim world. I think that toward the end of his life he was less sanguine about such an outcome.
Nadwatul Ulama was launched in 1898 by a broad spectrum of ulama, traditionalists to modernists, who all believed that the Deoband-type madrasa education did not equip students for the challenges of modern life. Placing a greater emphasis on the liberating message of the Qur’an, Nadwa favored certain departures from the traditional curriculum and emphasized the study of history. Nadwa’s motto was “Synthesizing the profitable past with the useful modern.” Nadwa’s tolerance to intra-Sunni differences made it attractive. Students adhering to the Barelwi school of thought, a more Platonic interpretation of Islam that accepts elements of popular religion, and Salafis, those who follow a scripturalist interpretation, both rivals to Deoband, enroll at Nadwa to pursue different degrees. Students are allowed to attend class wearing Western dress, although the majority wear kurtas.
But while Nadwa offered me space to pursue my own interests, the curriculum was in the end not that different from Deoband. (On a recent visit to both places I was unable to tell the difference.) By now, too, the Nizami curriculum seemed largely redundant. Classes at Nadwa were not very demanding. And I was completely put off by the lifeless study of Islamic law, even though the philosophy and sociology animating law and ethics intruigues me to this day. On my own I frequented the British Library in the Hazratganj area of Lucknow and borrowed widely from Nadwa’s excellent library collection to read new subjects—political science, economics, and English literature. I found Alex Haley’s biography of Malcolm X inspirational and became totally enchanted by Muhammad Asad (Leopold Weiss), the author of The Road to Mecca, an account of an Austrian Jew’s discovery of Islam and his life as an explorer, a confidante of kings and rulers, a scholar and a diplomat. Asad and Malcolm X kindled in me the desire to write. I published an essay in Arabic in Nadwa’s monthly newspaper and submitted op-ed pieces to the daily Northern India Patrika on politics and Islam.
In 1980 several international speakers attended a conference on Arabic literature held at Nadwa. A tall and imposing Egyptian lawyer and Princeton postgraduate, Mohammed Fathi Osman impressed me. We had several animated conversations about the Iranian revolution that had just occurred. Later, when I was about to graduate, I wrote Osman seeking advice. I received no reply, and decided to visit Egypt and explore a master’s degree at al-Azhar in Cairo. By now I was thoroughly disabused of my earlier, negative views of Islamic education in the Middle East. But just weeks before I was to leave, Osman sent a message inviting me to join the staff of a promising new magazine, sponsored by liberal Saudis, that he was launching in London. The choice between studies in Egypt and journalism in the United Kingdom was a no-brainer. I grabbed the offer and set off for London. Arabia: The Islamic World Review turned out to be the beginning of my career as a journalist. Even though I moved on from Arabia after 18 months, its closure a decade later was a great loss to the world of progressive Islamic ideas.
• • •
Spending six years inside India’s madrasas left deep imprints that over time have become only more significant as I have grown further from my youthful indignation. If given a choice once again at age 18 between a madrasa and a university, I suspect I would opt for a madrasa.
I remain a critic of madrasa education—its inability to provide the big picture of Islamic ideas, its failure to effect the transformation of Muslim societies. Yet madrasas offer something of enormous value. Properly harnessed, they are repositories of classical learning and seed intellectual sophistication that might challenge the shallow discourses of fundamentalism and revivalism that often pass as Islam today. Madrasas are environments of Islamic cultivation of the self, culture, civility, wisdom, and life.
While madrasas are growing in number on the subcontinent, the cherished world of the madrasas of my youth is rapidly disappearing. Shrill rhetoric substitutes for critical and sober reflection as the battle lines are drawn between a triumphant West and the madrasas who believe it is out to destroy them. This atmosphere breeds a debilitating defensiveness and a victim’s mindset. Madrasas of the 21st century will continue to change. I fear that the West’s insistence on casting madrasas as redoubts of terror and proposing invasive surveillance techniques and unilateral curriculum reforms will only force madrasas to retreat into more unpredictable modes of resistance. Madrasas may be forced to defend themselves by more militant means as the political rapids in countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh become more turbulent.
My experience in the madrasas is an atypical one: I crafted my own program and selected from what was on offer, whereas most conform to the prescribed syllabus and ideology. Yet as I continued in my work as a journalist, social activist, and then academic in South Africa and now in the United States, I have been able to recover the palimpsest of my madrasa education. I now appreciate these resources in ways madrasa authorities would not approve. Now, as I write about human rights, bioethics, Islamic law, and the ethical interpretation of the tradition, I can do so with confidence and argue that tradition is open to abuse and open to change. In my own thinking, writing, and activism I can push back against the many retrogressive forces and form productive associations with progressive ones. I doubt I would have had the courage to undertake some of this work otherwise.

Friday, September 6, 2013

Janab Asaduddin Owaisi In Parliament (Wakf Amendment Bill) 05-09-2013

In defense of Kamal Faruqui who questioned the instant Media trial, witch-hunt and condemnation of accused - Ghulam Muhammed

My comments posted on Hindustan Times newstory: SP sacks Kamaal Faruqui

Without going into Hindu vote bank and/or Muslim vote bank, Kamaal Faruqui's stand on the media blitzkrieg is right on target. Media is being used by vested interests to create an atmosphere of demonizing of Muslims, as and when it suits them. If an alleged criminal is charged, our legal position as explained by Kamaal Faruqui is very correct and unshakeable. Nobody, but nobody, Hindu, Muslim, Parsi, Sikh, Jew or Christian should be subjected to a mass media trial and condemned as guilty. This is Kangaroo court way of dispensing justice and Indian Judiciary has been too busy to take note of this absurdity, through which a large number of innocents, particularly from Muslim community, are arrested and paraded before the people of India, without any care or diligence over the rights of the person accused. All legal luminaries are silent over a clear verdict of law. The result is that an atmosphere of permissiveness is prevailing that makes a blood sport of targeting innocent Muslims. 'Innocent Muslims' is most relevant term as  more and more Muslims arrested as 'terrorists' or terror suspects or accessory to crimes are being let off by courts, sadly without any word of solace or compensation for their illegal incarceration.  Kamal Faruqui is the first 'progressive' Muslim leader to have dared to raise a voice against the political witch-hunting and demonization of entire community, the supposed vote-bank, by black-mailing and  brow-beating them into voting for one or another political parties. The concerted propaganda against Kamaal Faruqui in media is expected as it hurts their business of holding on to their readership with such scare-mongering, or their TRP for hours an end. More and more sane people should come forward against this media circus to rid the society of such communal elements, that threaten the peace and communal harmony of the nation.
Ghulam Muhammed, Mumbai
<ghulammuhammed3@gmail.com>

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SP sacks Kamaal Farooqi over Bhatkal comment

HT Correspondent, Hindustan Times  New Delhi, September 05, 2013

The Samajwadi Party on Thursday sacked Kamaal Farooqui from the post of party secretary in the wake of his controversial remarks on the August 29 arrest of Indian Mujhadeen (IM) co-founder Yasin Bhatkal.

Farooqui kicked up a political storm on August 30 when he asked on national television whether Bhatkal was arrested because he was a Muslim.
Although Farooqui apologised for the comment, opposition BJP and the Congress bayed for his blood and, on Thursday, senior party leader Ram Gopal Yadav shot off a letter informing him that party chief Mulayam Singh Yadav had removed him as the secretary of the SP national executive with immediate effect.
Rivals were quick to correlate Farooqui’s statement with SP’s minority appeasement bid ahead of the 2014 Lok Sabha elections and with the 2012 assembly poll manifesto promise of “trying to release those Muslim youths who were falsely accused in the name of anti-terror action”. Akhilesh Yadav government had moved court for release of several terror-accused Muslim youth, but the court had taken a strong objection to it.
“Anyone who goes against the party would face disciplinary action. He won’t be spared,” SP’s state spokesperson Rajendra Chowdhary told HT on Thursday.
Farooqui, however, told HT over phone that he had not received any written or verbal communication about it. “I never spoke as the spokesman of the party at the channels,” he said. He added that he would soon meet SP president Mulayam Singh Yadav to explain the situation.