Showing posts with label Daniel Pipes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Daniel Pipes. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 4, 2011

Is Saudi Arabia Opening Up? by Daniel Pipes

Daniel Pipes, a long time observer/scholar of Middle East affairs, is a committed Zionist and though appears to speak softly on Islam, Muslim and Arab Affairs, he is unabashedly dedicated to the Zionist mission, to study Muslim affairs and sow divisions within the Ummah.
http://www.danielpipes.org/9274/saudi-arabia-opening-up


Is Saudi Arabia Opening Up?

by Daniel Pipes
National Review Online
January 4, 2011

On Jan. 1, 1996, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz became regent and effective ruler of Saudi Arabia. His 15th anniversary this week offers an opportunity to review the kingdom's changes under his leadership and whither it now heads.

The Saudi king, Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz, 86.
His is perhaps the most unusual and opaque country on the planet, a place without a public movie theater, where women may not drive, where men sell women's lingerie, where a single-button self-destruct system can perhaps destroy the oil infrastructure, and where rulers spurn even the patina of democracy. In its place, they have developed some highly original and successful mechanisms to keep power.


Three features define the regime: controlling the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, subscribing to the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, and possessing by far the world's largest petroleum reserve. Islam defines identity, Wahhabism inspires global ambitions, oil wealth funds the enterprise.

More profoundly, wealth beyond avarice permits Saudis to deal with modernity on their own terms. They shun jacket and tie, exclude women from the workspace, and even aspire to replace Greenwich Mean Time with Mecca Mean Time.

Not many years ago, the key debate in the kingdom was that between the monarchical and Taliban versions of Wahhabism – an extreme reading of Islam versus a fanatical one. But today, thanks in large part to Abdullah's efforts to "tame Wahhabi zeal," the most retrograde country has taken some cautious steps to join the modern world. These efforts have many dimensions, from children's education to mechanisms for selecting political leaders, but perhaps the most crucial one is the battle among the ulema, the Islamic men of religion, between reformers and hardliners.

The arcane terms of this dispute make it difficult for outsiders to follow. Fortunately, Roel Meijer, a Dutch Middle East specialist, provides an expert's guide to arguments in the kingdom in his article, "Reform in Saudi Arabia: The Gender-Segregation Debate." He demonstrates how gender mixing (ikhtilat in Arabic) inspires a debate central to the kingdom's future and how that debate has evolved.

Current stringencies about gender separation, he notes, reflect less age-old custom than the success of the Sahwa movement in the aftermath of two traumatic events in 1979 – the Iranian revolution and the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca by Osama bin Laden-style radicals.

When Abdullah formally ascended to the monarchy in mid-2005, he ushered in an easing of what critics call gender apartheid. Two key recent events toward greater ikhtilat took place in 2009: a change of high government personnel in February and the September opening of King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (known as KAUST), with its ostentatiously mixed-gender classes and even dances.
The Saudi crown prince, Sultan bin Abdulaziz, 82.
Debate over ikhtilat ensued, with jousting among royals, political figures, ulema, and intellectuals. "Although the position of women has improved since 9/11, ikhtilat demarcates the battle lines between reformists and conservatives [i.e., hardliners]. Any attempt to diminish its enforcement is regarded as a direct attack on the standing of conservatives and Islam itself."

Meijer concludes his survey of the debate by noting that "it is extremely difficult to determine whether reforms are successful and whether the liberals or conservatives are making gains. Although the general trend is in favor of the reformists, reform is piecemeal, hesitant, equivocal and strongly resisted."

The state under Abdullah has promoted a more open and tolerant Islam but, Meijer argues, "it is obvious from the ikhtilat debate that the battle has not been won. Many Saudis are fed up with the inordinate interference of religious authorities in their lives, and one can even speak of an anti-clerical movement. The liberals, however, speak a language that is alien to the world of official Wahhabism and the majority of Saudis and is therefore hardly likely to influence them."

In brief, Arabians are in mid-debate, with the future course of reform as yet unpredictable. Not only do elite and public opinion play a role, but, complicating matters, much hangs on the quirks of longevity and personality – in particular, how long Abdullah, 86, remains in charge and whether his ailing half-brother crown prince, Sultan bin Abdulaziz, 82, will succeed him.

Saudi Arabia being one of the world's most influential Muslim countries, the stakes involved are high, not just within the kingdom but for Islam and for Muslims generally. This debate deserves our full attention.
Mr. Pipes is director of the Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University.

Friday, December 10, 2010

Daniel Pipes: 'Israel Has No Policy'

Daniel Pipes: 'Israel Has No Policy'

by Dennis Mitzner and Ariel Solomon
Pajamas Media
December 10, 2010
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As recent decades have been plagued by Islamic terrorism and wars in the Middle East, Islam has moved to the center of Western political discourse. And Daniel Pipes has been at the center of this debate, providing tens of millions with his insightful analysis. This analysis has made Dr. Pipes an authority on matters related to Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. In addition to providing analysis through his personal website and the Middle East Forum, which he founded, Pipes travels around the world, speaking at universities, think tanks, and other venues. His appearances often provoke disruptions and angry protests, while simultaneously arousing fervent support.
We sat down with him to talk about Israel, Iran, Barack Obama's presidency, and other timely issues. He also reminisced about a debate — which he calls a highlight of his career — in London in 2007 in which he and a British neo-conservative, Douglas Murray, defeated their opponents, London Mayor Ken Livingstone and Salma Yaqoob, a local Respect-Party politician from Birmingham.
Pipes has tough words for the Israeli political leadership. According to him, Israel is simply trying to cope as crises occur; its leadership lacks a strategic vision or a plan to deal with basic security issues. In Pipes' view, Israel has become a dramatic opposite of what the young country was in the 1950s and after, when it was led by a talented leadership with a vision of Israel's long term interests.
The interview took place in Herzliya, Israel on September 16, 2010.

Israel needs a policy

Q: Has Israel given up on the idea of victory?
Daniel Pipes: I would say that it isn't trying to win; it has no idea what it is doing.
Q: Wouldn't you agree that the international community is preventing Israel from winning?
Daniel Pipes: No. It's an internal problem. From 1948 until 1993 Israel had a policy of deterrence that implied a goal of victory. In 1993 the leaders adopted a policy of appeasement, i.e., give something to your enemy in the hopes it will leave you alone. Appeasement was abandoned in 2000 in favor of unilateral withdrawals which then ended in 2006. Now there is no policy at all.
There is no place where the government of Israel is trying to go; it is simply trying to put out brush fires. What is it trying to do in Gaza, for example? Is it trying to get rid of Hamas? Trying to get Egypt to take over the place? Or trying to get Gilad Shalit released? I discern this to the lack of policy objectives. This is not an issue of outside pressure.
Q: Does Israel need such a rigid policy, a clear vision of the future, considering that its economy is booming?
Daniel Pipes: Israel is booming economically, but it's increasingly under criticism bordering on delegitimation to the point that an economic boycott by Europe could take place, with other countries joining in. Israel could become an isolated state like South Africa. New Zealand doesn't need a strategy; Israel does.
Q: What are the chances of a peace deal between Israel and Syria?
Daniel Pipes: Minimal. I don't see the Syrian leadership wanting to split from Iran, the dynamic force in the Middle East. Being with Iran feels like the winning team. So, a deal with Israel looks unlikely.
Q: What if Iran changed?
Daniel Pipes: Yes, if something happened that caused Iran to be the losing team, the weak horse, then others, like Assad, would have second thoughts.
Q: And if Iran goes nuclear then Syria wouldn't split with Iran.
Daniel Pipes: That would give Damascus all the more reason to stick with Tehran.
Q: You don't see a desire there on the Syrian side to make peace with Israel?
Daniel Pipes: Syrians would be better off with such a deal, so such a deal is commonsensical. But why would Bashar al-Assad want it and leave what he sees as the winning team, the strong horse? Remember, Syria is run for the benefit of its rulers, not its subjects. I see no evidence that he is ready to change sides.
The same argument could be heard a decade ago, that Hafez al-Assad should have signed a peace treaty with Israel to get all the benefits that would accrue. I doubted this because he knew how to run a dictatorship, not a country with a stock exchange, a free press, and an open culture. His much less capable son has cast his lot even more thoroughly with the Iranians. He belongs to their bloc, period.
That said, Netanyahu almost reached a deal with Assad in 1998, stopped only by his foreign minister, Ariel Sharon. I exposed this story in the New Republic a year later. If Netanyahu was willing to give the Golan Heights away twelve years ago, he might do so again.
Q: Netanyahu later denied your account?
Daniel Pipes: He did deny it. During an hour we spent together in 2001, he lambasted me for getting the story wrong. But I stick by my account.

Would Obama bomb Iran's nuclear facilities?

Q: Do you see Obama using force against Iran?
Daniel Pipes: I think he could strike, for a couple of reasons: he said he won't accept an Iranian nuclear capability and he is doing so poorly at home. On the latter point: if he wants to change the discourse, bombing Iranian nuclear infrastructure works better than anything else.
Also, going back to the 1981 bombing of the Iraqi nuclear plant, the Israelis didn't signal they were going to attack but indicated they could not carry out this operation. Then suddenly, boom, they did it. This suggests that disinformation is always part of the game. Therefore, I don't know what we know.
Q: Do you think a strike on Iran would guarantee Obama a second term?
Daniel Pipes: I wouldn't go that far but it would change the political dynamics in his favor.
Q: Would you agree that president Obama shows particular incompetence?
Daniel Pipes: I am not sure. There are two ways of reading him: either look at the declining poll numbers and at the general incompetence; or see him as an ideologue with specific goals, such as the state taking over one-sixth of the economy, and getting re-elected is not a high priority. I see him as the fourth of Democratic presidents who seeks to alter the relationship of state to society: Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Johnson, and now Obama.
Q: The president is an ideologue, not a pragmatist?
Daniel Pipes: Yes, but he could become pragmatic, and bombing Iran would be pragmatic. By the way, the left in the U.S. — what the White House spokesman calls the "professional left" — has been attacking Obama. Leftist commentary is sometimes even more bitter than that from the right. On the left you find grievous disappointment.

Rising anti-Islamic sentiment in America?

Q: How would you comment on the Cordoba Initiative?
Daniel Pipes: It represents another effort to expand Islamism. More interesting is the reaction against it, which amounts to a push-back against mosques in general, in Tennessee and other places.
Q: But there are no anti-Muslim incidences; there are nine times more anti-Semitic incidences.
Daniel Pipes: Sure, but there are some against Muslims, though fewer anti-Muslim incidences than anti-Jewish ones, as you point out. We see a growth in anti-Islamic, not anti-Islamist, sentiment. I don't endorse that. I want the resistance to be constrained and careful.
Q: The Muslim minority in America is more successful than any other Muslim minority in any other Western country. Is anti-Islamic sentiment really an issue in the American context?
Daniel Pipes: Yes, it is. It is growing.
Q: But there are no zealots who are encouraging people to go out in the streets and act against Muslims.
Daniel Pipes: No, it is not organized, but there is a sense that those who don't like Islamization and those who don't like Muslims have found a voice and an issue. In some ways I am glad and in others I am worried. I am pleased Americans are rejecting Islamization but they should accept moderate Islam.
Q: What is your view of the man behind the mosque, Imam Abdul Rauf?
Daniel Pipes: He is an opportunist and a publicity hound. He calls himself an imam but he doesn't even have a degree. The Islamist establishment is not happy about him because he brought this upon them. I don't mind his mosque being built because it damages Islamism.
Q: Either way Americans win.
Daniel Pipes: Yes.

The complex nature of the Arab world

Q: Back to the Arab world. Do you think that tribalism is more pervasive than Islam in the Arab world?
Daniel Pipes: Islam has absorbed a tribal ethos and brings with it tribal features. Tribalism is not the feature — Egypt is not a tribal society — but it is endemic, a lens that explains many features.
Q: Is Islamism here to stay?
Daniel Pipes: The Islamist movement is dominant right now but it's temporary. We can already see an increase in Muslims who reject Islamism and who are drawing inspiration from the Western liberal model. They are not in a position of power but there is a ferment of ideas among brave dissidents, intellectuals, and organizers spreading these ideas. They could well succeed but it is not going to be very soon.
Q: What about Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who has all this power in the Muslim world and he is considered a moderate within the Muslim community?
Daniel Pipes: He is a moderate Islamist, which means about the same as a moderate Nazi.
Q: Would you agree that Qaradawi represents the Arab street?
Daniel Pipes: He is a leading Islamist figure and intellectual who has great reach with his books, television shows, organizations, and diplomacy, but I do not concede that most Muslims are Islamists.
Q: Isn't Islamism part of a historic continuum in Islamic history? It didn't appear in a vacuum.
Daniel Pipes: For sure, there are antecedents to modern Islamists, for example Ibn Taymiyya. But it is a modern ideological elaboration on an old theme.
Q: How do you explain the inability for collective self-criticism in the Arab world? For example, a recent article in the London-based daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat argues that there needs to be further investigation into what really happened on 9/11.
Daniel Pipes: I wrote a whole book on this called The Hidden Hand, about conspiracy theories in the Middle East. The mental dependence on conspiracy theories in Arabic-speaking countries is quite extraordinary. Ironically, it is not an inherently Muslim phenomenon but derives from the West. One proof of this lies in the fact that Muslims have the same two conspiratorial enemies as do Europeans: Jews and secret societies like the Freemasons. Contrarily, they hardly ever blame Hindus, Russians, Germans, Chinese, and Japanese.
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Thursday, April 15, 2010


Thursday, April 15, 2010

Comments posted on Daniel Pipes website over his Book Review of Jeffery Herb’s “Nazi propaganda for the Arab World”.

“More has been done by the Zionist occupation after 1948 to hurt and antagonize not only the Palestinians but the entire Arab and Muslim world than any propaganda by the Nazis. Writers and propagandists have to earn their bread and butter to whip up fresh line of Islamic phobias merely to detract the world attention from the atrocities and war crimes committed by IDF in occupied lands. The world is not blind to the virulent nature of Israeli policies to wipe out Palestinians from the lands that they rightly or wrongly claim as their own. Those middle age brutalities are no longer tenable in modern times of globalization and free democracies. While time has come to focus on the peace moves to solve the problem, it is sad to find that propagandists are hard at work to prolong the enmity between Israeland the Muslim world at large. Nobody knows how the events unfold in the near future. If peace arrives, all such bogus propaganda will be thrown in the dust bins.”

Ghulam Muhammed, Mumbai



Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World

by Jeffrey Herf
Yale University Press, 2009, 352 pages
Reviewed by Daniel Pipes
Commentary
April 2010

[Differs slightly from the published version]

The impact of National Socialism in the Middle East used to appear brief and superficial. Unlike with Communism, whose local parties and outside influence through the Soviet bloc lasted over many decades, the Nazis' moment lasted about six years, 1939-45, and they had little regional presence beyond Rommel's armies in North Africa and a fleeting pro-Nazi regime in Iraq.


But two powerful, important books have set the record straight. Djihad und Judenhass (2002) by Matthias Küntzel, translated into English in 2007 as Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11, shows the continuing influence of Nazi ideas on Islamists. Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World by Jeffrey Herf focuses on an earlier time, the 1930s-40s, and the major effort by Hitler and his minions to transmit their ideas to the Middle East. After reading Küntzel and Herf, I realize that my education about the modern Middle East was lacking a vital ingredient, the Nazi one.


A specialist in modern German history at the University of Maryland, Herf brings a new corpus of information to light: summary accounts of Nazi shortwave radio broadcasts in the Arabic language that were generated over three years by the U.S. embassy in Cairo. This cache reveals fully, for the first time, what Berlin told the Arabs (and to a lesser extent, the Iranians). As page after page of Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World establishes in mind-numbing but necessary detail, the Germans above all pursued two themes: stopping Zionism and promoting Islamism. Each deserves close consideration.


Nazi propaganda in Arabic portrayed World War II, history's largest and most destructive war, as focused primarily on the sliver of land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. This interpretation both flattered Arabs and extended Hitler's grand theory that Jews wanted to take over the Arab countries and eventually the whole world, that the Allied powers were but pawns in this Zionist conspiracy, and that Germany was leading the resistance to them.
Palestine was the key, according to these broadcasts. If Zionists took it over, they would "control the three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. Thus they will be able to rule the whole world and spread Jewish capitalism." Such an eventuality would lead to Arabs oppressed and Islam defunct. "Should Bolshevism and Democracy be victorious," announced Nazi radio, "the Arabs will be dominated forever and all traces of Islam will be wiped out." To avoid this fate, Arabs had to join with the Axis.


As the war progressed, Berlin's incitement became ever more furious. "You must kill the Jews before they open fire on you. Kill the Jews" went a July 1942 broadcast. Herf notes the bitter irony: "At this moment of complete Jewish powerlessness, the Arabic broadcasts from Berlin skillfully adapted the general Nazi propaganda line about Jewish domination of the anti-Hitler coalition to a radical Arab and Islamic view."


At the same time, the Nazi regime developed an approach to Muslims that largely ignored the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Mein Kampf, and other European sources in favor of selected passages from the Koran.


Hitler's propagandists assured Muslims, first, that Axis countries "respect the Koran, sanctify the mosques, and glorify the prophet of Islam." It cited the respectful work of German Orientalists as an important sign of goodwill. Second, it argued for what Heinrich Himmler called the "shared goals and shared ideals" of Islam and National Socialism. These included monotheism, piety, obedience, discipline, self-sacrifice, courage, honor, generosity, community, unity, anti-capitalism, and a celebration of labor and warfare.


In addition, Muslims were told that they and the Nazis were purportedly both fighting a "great struggle for freedom" against the British, the most important colonial power in the Middle East. The regime drew a parallel between Muhammad and Hitler and presented the umma as roughly analogous to its own notion of a totalitarian Volksgemeinschaft ("people's community").


Nazis portrayed Islam as an ally and, accordingly, called for its revival while urging Muslims to act piously and emulate Muhammad. Radio Berlin in Arabic went so far as to declare "Allahu akbar! Glory to the Arabs, Glory to Islam." The Germans held that Muslims who were not righteous enough (i.e., not following the Nazi ideological model) were causing the umma to languish: "Muslims, you are now backward because you have not shown God the proper piety and do not fear him." And not just backward, but also "invaded by merciless tyrants." Specifically for Shi'ites, the Nazis hinted at Hitler being the awaited Twelfth Imam or the Muslim eschatological figure of Jesus, who will fight the anti-Christ (namely, the Jews) and bring on the end of days.


The Nazis noted the parallel between sayings from the Koran (Sura 5:82, "You will meet no greater enemy of the believers than the Jews") and the words of Hitler ("By resisting the Jews everywhere, I am fighting for the Lord's work") and turned the Koran into an anti-Semitic tract whose primary purpose was to call for eternal hatred of Jews. They even falsely claimed that Muhammad ordered Muslims to fight the Jews "until they are extinct."


In the Nazi telling, Jewish-Muslim enmity dated back to the 7th century. "Since the days of Mohamed, the Jews have been hostile to Islam" went one broadcast. "Every Moslem knows that Jewish animosity to the Arabs dates back to the dawn of Islam" declared another. "Enmity has always existed between Arab and Jew since ancient times" insisted a third. The Nazis built on this premise to establish the basis for a Final Solution in the Middle East, instructing Arabs to "make every effort possible so that not a single Jew … remains in Arab countries."


Herf emphasizes the remarkable symbiosis of German and Middle Eastern elements: "As a result of their shared passions and interests, they produced texts and broadcasts that each group could not have produced on its own." Specifically, Arabs learned "the finer points of anti-Semitic conspiracy thinking," while Nazis learned the value of focusing on Palestine. He describes the coming together of Nazi and Islamic themes in Berlin as "one of the most important cultural exchanges of the twentieth century."


Having detailed Nazi propaganda in Arabic, Herf then traces its impact. He begins by documenting the great energy and expense devoted to these messages—the quality of the personnel devoted to it, their high-level Nazi patronage, the thousands of hours of radio transmissions, and the millions of pamphlets.
He then rounds up assessments of the Axis impact, all pointing to its success. Allied estimates from 1942, for example, found that "the people were saturated with Axis talk," that "upwards of three-fourths of the Moslem world are in favor of the Axis" and that "90% of the Egyptians, including their government, believe that the Jews are mainly responsible for shortages and high prices of essentials." A report from 1944 found that "practically all Arabs who have radios … listen to Berlin."
Allied reluctance to contradict Nazi propaganda also points to Axis success.


Fearful of alienating Middle Easterners, the Allies stayed humiliatingly silent about the genocide taking place against the Jews; failed to refute allegations about Jews dominating London, Washington, and Moscow; did not dispute the distorted Koranic interpretations; and shied away from endorsing Zionism. Merely to dispute Nazi accusations, the Allies worried, would only confirm Nazi claims about Britain, America, and Russia being stooges of Jewish power. An internal U.S. directive in late 1942 acknowledged that "the subject of Zionist aspirations cannot be mentioned, inasmuch as … [this] would jeopardize our strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean."


Thus, when two leading U.S. senators, Robert Taft of Ohio and Robert Wagner of New York, proposed a resolution in 1944 endorsing a Jewish national home in Palestine, Berlin radio in Arabic called this an attempt "to erase Islamic civilization" and "to eradicate the Koran." Panicked, the entire weight of the Executive Branch came down on the senators, who felt compelled to withdraw their resolution. Clearly, Nazi offerings resonated deeply in the Middle East.


They continued to do well after the Nazi collapse and the war's conclusion. The defeat of Nazi General Erwin Rommel's aggressive push into North Africa meant that Nazi ambitions in the Middle East, in particular the Final Solution to annihilate its million or so Jews, were never implemented. But years of hate from radio and pamphlets and the repetitive, grotesque, ambitious, anti-Semitic, and Islam-based message detailed by Herf had taken root. Not only did the Middle East's Nazis emerge nearly invulnerable to prosecution, but they also prospered and were feted. An example: in 1946, Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brethren, lavished praise on Hitler's favorite Arab, Haj Amin el-Husseini, calling him "a hero … a miracle of a man." Banna added for good measure: "Germany and Hitler are gone, but Amin el-Husseini will continue the struggle." Acknowledging el-Husseini's exalted status, a British officer in 1948 described him as "the one hero in the Arab world."


Ideas the Nazis spread in the Middle East have had an enduring twofold legacy. First, as in Europe, they built on existing prejudices against Jews to transform that prejudice into something far more paranoid, aggressive, and murderous. One U.S. intelligence report from 1944 estimated that anti-Jewish materials constituted fully half of German propaganda directed to the Middle East. The Nazis saw virtually all developments in the region through the Jewish prism and exported this obsession.
The fruits of this effort are seen not only in decades of furious Muslim anti-Zionism, personified by Arafat and Ahmadinejad, but also in the persecution of ancient Jewish communities in countries like Egypt and Iraq, which have now shriveled to near-extinction, plus the employment of Nazis such as Johann van Leers and Aloïs Brunner in important government positions. Thus did the Nazi legacy oppress Jewry in the Middle East post-1945.


Second, Islamism took on a Nazi quality. As someone who has criticized the term Islamofascism on the grounds that it gratuitously conflates two distinct phenomena, I have to report that Herf's evidence now leads me to acknowledge deep fascist influences on Islamism. This includes the Islamist hatred of democracy and liberalism and its contempt for multiple political parties, preference for unity over division, cult of youth and militarism, authoritarian moralism, cultural repression, and illiberal economics.


Beyond specifics, that influence extends to what Herf calls an "ability to introduce a radical message in ways that resonated with, yet deepened and radicalized, already existing sentiments." Although a scholar of Europe by training, Herf's detective work in the U.S. archives has opened a new vista on the Arab-Israeli conflict and Islamism, as well as made a landmark contribution more broadly to an understanding of the modern Middle East.