Saturday, September 7, 2013

Inside Madrasa - By Ebrahim Moosa - Bostonreview.net

Inside Madrasa

A Personal History
 
 
January 01, 2007
 
 
As I walked one morning last spring through the town of Deoband, home to India’s famous Sunni Muslim seminary, a clean-shaven man, his face glowing with sarcasm, called out to me. “Looking for terrorists?” he asked in Urdu. “I have every right to visit my alma mater,” I protested. With a sheepish grin he turned and walked away.
I shouldn’t have been so annoyed. The century-old seminary in Deoband had come under intense scrutiny after the Taliban leadership claimed an ideological affiliation with it via seminaries in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Journalists, politicians, and diplomats have since September 11 descended periodically on this town near Delhi in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh, long considered the intellectual and spiritual heartland of Indian Islam.
Once the Taliban was linked to Bin Laden, every aspect of India’s Muslim seminaries, or madrasas, became stigmatized. Top-level U.S. officials, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and a chorus of journalists, pundits, and scholars have declared all madrasas to be breeding grounds for terrorists, but they have done so without any evidence and without an understanding of the complexity of these networks of schools, which are associated with multiple Muslim sects and ideologies. They have drowned out reasonable voices—for example, Peter Bergen and William Dalrymple—who argue that not all madrasas can be indicted in the war on terror. But even their sympathetic gestures fall short of providing a realistic picture of what happens inside madrasas or humanizing their inhabitants.
Had I not been defensive, I would have told the man from Deoband that I had lived and studied in several Indian madrasas between 1975 and 1981. A quarter century later, I had returned—not in search of terrorists, but to try to create a bridge between the world inside the walls and the outside.
• • •
“Wednesday 23 April 1975: The start of our four months in India. We slept after reading two raka’as (formal Muslim prayers). After fajr (pre-dawn prayers) and ishraq (optional after-sunrise prayers) we slept again. This was at Khar mosque in Bandra, Bombay.” So reads the first entry I made in my diary on my six-year journey in India’s madrasas.
Mumbai, known as Bombay in 1975, was a bewildering city for an 18-year-old kid from Cape Town, South Africa. Nothing prepared me for the intimidating throng of beggars and street urchins outside the airport, the countless people sleeping on sidewalks, and the heavy-laden monsoon air and strong odors. At the time I wasn’t aware of the full impact of the “state of emergency” that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had imposed to silence her critics, but I knew that fear surrounded me: people whispered about danger and secret arrests. I suddenly understood my father’s reluctance to let me go.
Deciding to study in India was its own journey that began with a crisis of faith. I was barely 16 when a classmate, a Jehovah’s Witness, brought some stinging anti-Islamic literature to our class. I still hear Gabriel reading: “Muhammad was an impostor who spread his message by the sword and was unworthy of being a prophet.” And he added, “Actually, Muhammad cribbed his teachings from Jews and Christians whom he met during his travels.” I had learned at the daily religious school sessions—also called madrasa in South Africa—that as a youth the Prophet Muhammad traveled to Syria with his uncle and was even anointed by a Christian monk. But never did I suspect the Prophet of treachery. This first exposure to the hostility some Christians harbor toward Muslims crushed my unchallenged sense of faith. But the encounter also started me thinking critically about Islam: it would change my life.
A trip to the library did little to reassure me. The refined prose of authors like Sir William Muir and Montgomery Watt leveled the same charges against Muhammad and claims to Islam’s authenticity. On reflection, it seems rather odd that as devout Christians and rational Scotsmen, Muir and (perhaps less so) Watt found it plausible that God could be incarnate in a man from Nazareth but incredible that a seventh-century Arab could prophesy as the Jewish prophets did.
I later found comfort with a group called the Tabligh Jamat. The Arabic word tabligh means “to convey or transmit.” The Tabligh Jamat consisted of lay Muslims reminding their co-religionists of their religious duties. I attended their pious circle at my neighborhood mosque in District Six, Cape Town’s multiethnic and defiant cultural center, where I lived during the school week. Several years later, apartheid’s architects would obliterate District Six to remove any evidence that the coexistence of different races was possible and assign us to racially segregated ghettos.
But questions about my faith persisted. My doubts—and my existential anxiety as a person of color in this white-supremacist world—became unbearable. My plans to become an engineer slowly gave way to another obsession. I wanted to go to India to study the faith of my ancestors, to reconcile that faith with reason. My mother was sympathetic to my cause, but my father didn’t want to see his eldest son as a poor cleric dependent on the benevolence of the community. Born and raised in South Africa, he hardly performed the daily rituals or attended Friday prayers, giving priority to his business. He relented, though, when my aunts reminded him of the promise of paradise for learned scholars of Islam and the Qur’an as well as their benefactors.
• • •
In my heart I was following my mother’s prayers. She had come to South Africa as a 19-year-old bride from Gujarat. Far from close relatives and burdened with domestic chores in an extended family with seven children, one of whom died in infancy, she took refuge in religion. In particularly tough times she would share with me, her eldest, the religious lore she learnt in her childhood in the village of Dehgaam, of how the Prophet Muhammad’s daughter, Fatima, endured life’s trials.
My grandiose plan was also an escape from the drudgery of life: South Africa’s third-rate segregated schools, where discipline was violent and dictatorial, and the weekends and vacations working in the family grocery store in a seaside town 30 miles away. I was aware of the country’s segregationist politics; but I knew little of the lives of black South Africans, and I did not see the black unrest that would erupt on June 16, 1976, after I had been in India just more than a year.
When I arrived in Bombay, Tabligh volunteers received me and the rest of our group; I had agreed to spend four months in the Tabligh program before entering a madrasa. The brainchild of an Indian cleric, Muhammad Ilyas, who felt the teachings of Islam were not reaching the grass-roots faithful in British India, the Tabligh has no real bureaucratic administration, but its presence is felt in almost every corner of the globe. Resigning from his teaching position at a prestigious madrasa in the 1920s, Ilyas devoted himself, against tremendous odds, to revival work (da’wa) in the Mewat, a region straddling two states, Rajasthan and Haryana. He used a small mosque, the Banglawali Masjid, as his base in Delhi, where he cultivated his core of loyal associates. On the same site today a Spartan mosque serves as the international center (markaz) of the Tabligh.
Ilyas had a simple but highly effective evangelical message that he had boiled down to five points to mirror Islam’s five cardinal pillars of practice: grasp the true meaning and implications of the creedal statement that there is no deity except Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger; pray conscientiously five times a day; acquire learning and engage in the frequent remembrance of God; honor fellow believers; and participate in missionary work (da’wa) by spreading awareness of Islam. The Tabligh now hosts some of the largest Muslim gatherings, involving millions of participants on the subcontinent and around the world.
Working with the Tabligh was a grueling ordeal; and overcoming culture shock in India was daunting. We stayed at mosques, ate very basic meals, navigated treacherous roads, and traveled in overcrowded trains. By the lights of my naive faith, eternal damnation awaited these millions of Hindus apparently devoted to idols. In just weeks, India taught me to ask the first and enduring question about the workings of divine justice: how was it possible that a just God could promise me paradise and damn all these people who look like me? Years later, I would discover that many thinkers in the monotheistic tradition were confronted by similar questions, including the 12th-century thinker Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, about whom I would later write a book.
I cut short my four months with the Tabligh to three and headed for the Madrasa Sabilur Rashad in Bangalore along with two other South Africans I met in the Tabligh. At the austere walled campus I found dozens of students apart from the majority South Indians and the few from my home country—young men from Trinidad and Tobago, Malaysia, Indonesia, the United States, and a lone Cuban. I occupied the fourth thin mattress in a sparse and cramped dorm room with a West Indian, an African-American, and the Cuban. The latter two would in pursuit of piety rise at 3 a.m. for optional prayers and liturgy, tormenting the rest of us for not doing the same. I saw this “calculator mentality” often in the Tabligh—the preoccupation with rewards for performing certain acts of piety and an attitude that these roommates celebrated.
Daily madrasa routine would begin at least an hour before sunrise with preparation for the early-morning prayers. Afterward students remained at the mosque to read a portion of the Qur’an. Others used the early morning hours to memorize the Qur’an, known as hifz. Breakfast would follow in the dining hall, called “the mess,” a reminder that the British had ruled India. Breakfast consisted of South Indian idli (lentil-rice patties), a crispy roti (baked bread), and chai. Most foreign students made breakfast in their rooms with a spread of eggs, toast, and chai.
I had arrived at the madrasa only one month before it closed for the long Ramadan break, the end of the academic year. But in that short time I chafed at the highly regimented and pietistic environment and, worst of all, the cafeteria food. I took a class on memorizing portions of the Qur’an for liturgical purposes and perfecting my recitation of the holy book. The six-hour day of memorization was tedious, and students would take frequent bathroom breaks, sip lots of tea, and play surreptitiously to pass the time. The day’s memorized passage, as well as back lessons, were recited to an instructor at least twice daily. It took up to three full years to memorize the entire Qur’an. Not having budgeted such a length of time, I selected chapters, which would be useful in the classroom or in delivering sermons, as well as for liturgy. Since all instruction was in Urdu, I also threw myself into learning both Urdu and Arabic in private lessons.
But after almost four months in India, I had yet to enroll in an alimiyya program, required for gaining the knowledge and skills of an alim, the Arabic word for “a learned person.” (The plural, ulama, is today used to refer to Muslim clerics.) I spent the Ramadan break with my maternal grandfather, visiting my parents’ ancestral villages in Gujarat, near Bharuch, a bustling city on the banks of the Narmada River. On the outskirts of Baruch I discovered a small madrasa, Darul Uloom Matliwala, supported by an affluent South African family and enrolling some 200 students at the time.
The centerpiece of the seminary was a three-level Parsee bungalow. Parsees are followers of Zoroastrianism, an ancient religion of Persia. They straddle Indian and Anglo cultures and often speak both English and Gujarati. The bungalow was large enough to accommodate several classrooms and administrative space. To the side of the sprawling compound on Eidgah Road was a beautiful mosque of pastel greens surrounded by palms and a well-maintained garden. A student dormitory abutted the tilled fields that ran down to the banks of the Narmada.
The pace was relaxed and congenial. I decided to enroll. By coincidence, three other fellow South Africans came to study as a private cohort with a brilliant teacher, Mawlana Ibrahim Patni, who allowed me to join his group. Mawlana Patni’s talents were such that he could have succeeded as a lawyer or businessman. For the first few months we four would spend most of the day at the back of a class with dozens of 12-to-14-year-olds who were taking elementary classes in the pre-alimiyya program. We were on average 18 years old, writing with white chalk on child-sized black slate boards. At first we hardly understood the day classes we were auditing, but as the weeks and months progressed, things became clearer. By year-end I had a good handle on Urdu, and my Arabic was coming along.
As I adjusted to my new life, I also learned that my naive views about madrasas were not immune to contradiction. Puritanism reigned, and sex was taboo. I recall one evening in Bangalore when the Cuban student raised the alarm in the dorms, claiming that he had caught two Indian students in a homosexual embrace in the bathroom. I was scandalized, and the revelation haunted me for weeks. At home and in the madrasa I was taught that heterosexual conduct outside marriage was forbidden (and had life-threatening consequences); homosexuality was an unthinkable abomination.
Within a few months at the Bharuch madrasa I received my second jolt: I learned that it was an open secret that one of the teachers had sexual relations with younger men or perhaps even boys. Disturbed, but less shaken this time, I was getting a reality check. The personal lives of teachers and fellow students would not be my biggest concern. I realized that Bharuch was a provincial city and the madrasa lacked the more robust intellectual environment I sought, which was available in reputable North Indian madrasas.
After a year in Gujarat, I headed for Darul Uloom Deoband—the most prominent and prestigious madrasa for those affiliated with the Deobandi interpretation of the Sunni sect. Deoband, legend has it, was named after the goddess Durga, who in ancient times lived in the dense forest (van) near a lake (kund). It then became known as the ‘forest of the goddess’ (devi van) or ‘lake of the goddess’ (devi kund), which became corrupted to Deoband.
Today, the small town of Deoband, 98 miles from the Indian capital, Delhi, is typical, with open air markets, bookstores, food stalls, grocers, barbers, Internet cafes, and telephone exchanges. On its congested roads, man, animals, and vehicles vie for space. Locals joke that Deoband is famous for five things starting with the letter m: moulvis (Muslim clerics), masjid (mosque), mandir (temple), matchchar (mosquitoes) and makkhi (flies). But the spacious courtyard of Darul Uloom Deoband, in its serenity and historical grandeur, is reminiscent of Castalia in Hesse’s The Glass Bead Game: a place without family, amusements, poverty, and hunger, but dedicated to learning and hierarchy. Inside the red-brick walls, a large green cupola rises, dominating the landscape. The madrasa is built like a medieval fort, with four main gates and a courtyard marking the administrative and teaching spaces. Enclosing a larger courtyard replete with manicured lawns and simple flower gardens are extremely modest student residences. A majestic white marbled mosque now looms outside Madani Gate of the main campus.
• • •
Deoband was founded in 1867 in the aftermath of the failed Indian rebellion against British rule. With the defeat of the Moghuls, Muslim India divided into two intellectual paths. One saw the future secured in the embrace of modernity; this school established secular universities such as Aligarh Muslim University, founded by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. The other embraced tradition through religious schools, madrasas.
Deoband’s intellectual architect, Muhammad Qasim Nanautvi, a man of ascetic taste, a committed traditionalist, and a tireless anti-imperialist, belonged to the latter group. He and Khan were contemporaries and, as evident in their extensive and at times hostile correspondence, clashed over the meaning and place of Islam in the modern world. According to Khan, modern rationalism and science were compatible with a new interpretation of Islam—his. Older and more established doctrines, he believed, might have to be modified, if not jettisoned. (Khan did have his limits—he never entirely reconciled himself with the role of women in modern society.) Nanautvi was also a rationalist, but for him rationalism did not mean modern Western rationality like Descartes and Spinoza. It was, instead, a very early form of Greco-Arabic rationality consisting of Euclidean geometry and Aristotelian logic in the service of the old theological formulations of faith. Even today, this rationalist framework at Deoband and similar schools effectively exclude modern science.
Despite his anti-imperialism, Nanautvi did find European bureaucratic modernity attractive. He was trained at Delhi College, established by the British East India Company. He institutionalized exams, salaries for faculty, stipends for students, and an administrative system at Deoband modeled in part on Delhi College.
Nanautvi and his descendants controlled the main campus of Deoband until 1981 when rivals ousted Nanautvi’s aging grandson during an extended student strike that led to the closure of the institution. The reasons for the schism remain unclear. Students and their supporters at the time leveled charges of nepotism at the leadership and demanded better living conditions and some modernization of the syllabus. Ironically, the ousted administration had been planning to radically transform the Deoband madrasa with the support of a new hastily formed council that was later deemed to be unconstitutional. Two decades later very little had changed at the main Deoband campus. In fact, a breakaway madrasa, a cloned version of the main Deoband madrasa, has sprung up not far from the original campus. The new facility housed some 1,500 students, whereas the main campus housed over 3,000 students.
Deoband and other madrasas on the Indian subcontinent differed from their counterparts elsewhere in the Muslim world: they were privately funded. In fact, their raison d'ĂȘtre was resisting the state, in particular the influences of British rule and the spread of modernity through westernized Muslim elites. In contrast, Cairo’s al-Azhar and other schools in the Middle East had lost their independence to secular governments, who turned religion and clerics into extensions of the state and coerced modernization in certain areas.
For idealistic young men like me, who landed on the subcontinent in the mid-1970s in search of salvation and identity, the madrasas of India and Pakistan were presented as genuine bastions of tradition. We viewed institutions and scholars throughout the Middle East with disdain: they were feckless, robbed of intellectual vigor by governments that were slavish to foreign powers and uninterested in indigenous talents and history. Despite meager resources (extremely meager compared to the bourgeois comforts to which I had become accustomed), the madrasas had great legitimacy in our hearts and minds.
Being a student at Deoband was for me at first a dizzying experience. I devoured my texts, and they opened up worlds to me. Madrasa education drives home the sacred nature of knowledge. One is taught to show the utmost respect for the bearers of knowledge, teachers, and the instruments of learning, books. Novices quickly learn that some scholars cannot even tolerate the sight of paper lying in the street; carelessly discarded paper is the desecration of knowledge. Texts are not only symbols of learning, but markers of progress, too. So, for instance, if you ask a student what year of the program he is in, he will cite the text he is studying; only an insider could translate the name of that text into a specific year of the curriculum.
We studied books that were written in the tenth century and earlier, as well as those from the 15th to 20th centuries. The beauty of the textual tradition lies precisely in its discordant variety: texts serve as palimpsests of the ancient and the modern world. The best professors not only translated and clarified the text; they made an effort to link the ancient world to contemporary realities.
Law, called fiqh in Arabic, is the mainstay of the madrasa curriculum. Fiqh is actually moral discourse that proposes ethical guidelines for society. Learning the classical fiqh texts was exciting and awesome; after all, learning the practices advanced by tradition confers a certain responsibility and authority. I initially held out the hope that the proper application of fiqh would create an ideal Muslim society, only to find out that it would take more than law. I was disturbed, too, that some of what passes as the execution of Sharia practices involved gruesome amputations and floggings. I believed that if there were other ways to deter murder and theft they would be preferable to the practices of early centuries. There were few teachers to whom one could air such doubts. Most would respond with dire warnings of the spiritual and theological hazards of such thinking.
Even as students we would lampoon some of what we were taught, questioning its utility. For instance, in the fiqh class there were endless discussions about seven types of water usable to secure ritual purity: rain, sea, river, and well water, followed by water melted from snow and ice, and, finally spring water. Most of us had only seen water from the taps and wells, and few students from rural India would have had seen snow or the sea, except for in pictures—and pictures were rare, since images of animate objects were taboo. But thoughtful professors would transform arcane lessons into broader discussions, for example about the validity of recycled water for ritual purposes, a possibility unimaginable to the medieval authors of our texts.
• • •
Critics often charge the madrasa system of anachronism, a charge that is partly true. Defenders of the traditional curriculum, which was devised by the 18th-century scholar Mulla Nizamuddin, insist on the supreme pedagogical value of the old texts. They believe that, apart from connecting students to the canonical tradition, the “Nizami curriculum” enhances one’s mastery of every discipline and enables scholars to solve any contemporary problem. But few have been able to rebut the charge that the texts used are redundant and at times impenetrable, save to a few scholars who have spent their lives mastering them. Indeed most texts are frustratingly terse, forcing teachers and students to scour commentaries and super-commentaries for help. The multiple levels of calligraphic marginalia on each textbook page were decorative, but they were taxing to the eyes and mind. For decades critics have petitioned for more lucid texts. But inertia has turned the texts and syllabus into inviolable monuments to the past. The result is that students are poorly prepared and lack the confidence to engage the tradition critically to meet the needs of a changing world. At its worst the system recycles intellectual mediocrity as piety.
After three years in India I started asking questions about the relevance of the texts and how to apply their insights in the modern world and, especially, in South Africa. By now I had become acutely aware of the political challenges of my home country: racism, and the intransigence of the Muslim clergy there to speak out against the evil of apartheid. Reading the uncensored Indian press and following political developments at home through the literature of Nelson Mandela’s banned African National Congress, all impressed upon me the challenges I would face in South Africa. My restlessness drove me to read widely and independently—especially literature written by more contemporary authors. One such author was Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi, whom most teachers in Deoband reviled and for whom only the bravest expressed guarded admiration. Mawdudi was the gadfly among clerics who pushed for what is called “political Islam.”
Mawdudi rose to prominence during the dying years of British colonialism and after partition moved to the new state of Pakistan. While he had the credentials, he was not a member of the clerical elite, being for most of his life an autodidact, a gifted writer and founder of a continent-wide social movement known as the Jamat-e Islami. Mawdudi’s prolific writings guaranteed him audiences among modern educated Muslims. As the traditionalist ulama bickered with him on petty issues, Mawdudi emphasized the social dimensions of Islam as an ideology. If Muslims conceived of Islam as a social teaching then they could build new societies. Establishing an Islamic state, fully backed by Islamic laws and institutions, was one of Mawdudi’s ideals. Mawdudi was an ideologue with a vision, a political program, and international influence. Sayyid Qutb, the prominent Egyptian writer and ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood was persuaded by Mawdudi’s analysis that secular materialism was akin to the days of ignorance, jahiliyya, at the birth of Islam.
I thus discovered an interpretation of Islam outside the walls of the madrasa where I could find inspiration and guidance for building society from an Islamic platform. The ancient texts I was studying suddenly seemed musty and stale.
An overbearing government clerk who told my father that my expired passport could not be renewed unless I returned home changed everything. During mysubsequent—and, as it turned out, unecessary—three-month trip to South Africa in 1978, I realized I had been living in a cloistered world. Just seeing the people of Cape Town made me begin to question everything: my lifestyle, attire, ideas about my future. Up to that point, I had hardly spent time in Indian cities; nor did I watch television, go to movies, or listen to music because of the strict moral code I had followed for three years. I had given away all my Western clothes, vowing to wear only what I then believed was “Islamic dress”: the typical loose-fitting knee-length tunic, called a kurta, and loose-fitting pants.
I now knew that if I were to follow the rules of Deoband, not only would my life in South Africa be restricted—I had come to the madrasa to escape such confinement—but so too would be my emotional and intellectual development.
On my return to India I stepped into the precincts of Deoband wearing a T-shirt and jeans, a cavalier affront to my immediate friends. Even though the act was largely symbolic—I would continue to wear the conventional attire—I spurred a debate among close friends about what I thought were the deficiencies in the madrasas. Fellow students and a few teachers predictably labeled me a “modernist,” an insult. Some of my younger teachers who often gently challenged my views, helped me realize how self-righteous I had been in the past about an Islamic dress code and the superiority of the interpretations of madrasa authorities on virtually every matter.
It was time to move on. I was still determined to complete the alimiyya program, but I needed to find a madrasa with less emphasis on texts. I explored opportunities to study in Libya, Iraq, and Egypt to little avail. I was less of an idealist by now, and the burden of becoming independent started to weigh on me as I approached 21. Taking over the family business was certainly not an option; I needed to find a vocation.
I decided to transfer to Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama, a madrasa in the capital of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow. Nadwa was located on the banks of the Gomti River, which flows through this historic Mughal city, reputed for its refined culture, food, and aesthetic taste and a place where people still feel nostalgia for the days of nobility. In Mughal times this region was known as Oudh, and its rulers were mostly those who followed the Shia rite. In my student days there were occasional Sunni–Shia tensions around the beginning of the Islamic month of Muharram, signaling the Muslim New Year, when public exhibitions of Shia passion plays rekindled ancient grievances underlying the sectarian split within Islam more than a millennium ago. Yet Lucknow was a city that took pride in civility.
• • •
Moving from Deoband to Nadwa is in effect like transferring from the Vatican to a liberal divinity school. Deobandis look askance at Nadwa: in addition to being too modern and too liberal for the Deoband temper, it is more internationalist in outlook. Its former president, the late Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, was internationally reputed in the Muslim world. A one-time colleague of Mawdudi, with whom he would later had differences, he was clearly enchanted by Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood. He wrote extensively on the plight of Muslims in the 20th century and mobilized for their welfare and advancement. Nadwa received a great deal of support from foundations and individuals in the Arabian Gulf, and the campus boasts significant upgrades over the last three decades. Ali Nadwi was a descendent of the Prophet’s family and was therefore known as a sayyid. He wrote mainly in Arabic and strongly believed that a renaissance among the Arabs would have a salutary influence on the rest of the Muslim world. I think that toward the end of his life he was less sanguine about such an outcome.
Nadwatul Ulama was launched in 1898 by a broad spectrum of ulama, traditionalists to modernists, who all believed that the Deoband-type madrasa education did not equip students for the challenges of modern life. Placing a greater emphasis on the liberating message of the Qur’an, Nadwa favored certain departures from the traditional curriculum and emphasized the study of history. Nadwa’s motto was “Synthesizing the profitable past with the useful modern.” Nadwa’s tolerance to intra-Sunni differences made it attractive. Students adhering to the Barelwi school of thought, a more Platonic interpretation of Islam that accepts elements of popular religion, and Salafis, those who follow a scripturalist interpretation, both rivals to Deoband, enroll at Nadwa to pursue different degrees. Students are allowed to attend class wearing Western dress, although the majority wear kurtas.
But while Nadwa offered me space to pursue my own interests, the curriculum was in the end not that different from Deoband. (On a recent visit to both places I was unable to tell the difference.) By now, too, the Nizami curriculum seemed largely redundant. Classes at Nadwa were not very demanding. And I was completely put off by the lifeless study of Islamic law, even though the philosophy and sociology animating law and ethics intruigues me to this day. On my own I frequented the British Library in the Hazratganj area of Lucknow and borrowed widely from Nadwa’s excellent library collection to read new subjects—political science, economics, and English literature. I found Alex Haley’s biography of Malcolm X inspirational and became totally enchanted by Muhammad Asad (Leopold Weiss), the author of The Road to Mecca, an account of an Austrian Jew’s discovery of Islam and his life as an explorer, a confidante of kings and rulers, a scholar and a diplomat. Asad and Malcolm X kindled in me the desire to write. I published an essay in Arabic in Nadwa’s monthly newspaper and submitted op-ed pieces to the daily Northern India Patrika on politics and Islam.
In 1980 several international speakers attended a conference on Arabic literature held at Nadwa. A tall and imposing Egyptian lawyer and Princeton postgraduate, Mohammed Fathi Osman impressed me. We had several animated conversations about the Iranian revolution that had just occurred. Later, when I was about to graduate, I wrote Osman seeking advice. I received no reply, and decided to visit Egypt and explore a master’s degree at al-Azhar in Cairo. By now I was thoroughly disabused of my earlier, negative views of Islamic education in the Middle East. But just weeks before I was to leave, Osman sent a message inviting me to join the staff of a promising new magazine, sponsored by liberal Saudis, that he was launching in London. The choice between studies in Egypt and journalism in the United Kingdom was a no-brainer. I grabbed the offer and set off for London. Arabia: The Islamic World Review turned out to be the beginning of my career as a journalist. Even though I moved on from Arabia after 18 months, its closure a decade later was a great loss to the world of progressive Islamic ideas.
• • •
Spending six years inside India’s madrasas left deep imprints that over time have become only more significant as I have grown further from my youthful indignation. If given a choice once again at age 18 between a madrasa and a university, I suspect I would opt for a madrasa.
I remain a critic of madrasa education—its inability to provide the big picture of Islamic ideas, its failure to effect the transformation of Muslim societies. Yet madrasas offer something of enormous value. Properly harnessed, they are repositories of classical learning and seed intellectual sophistication that might challenge the shallow discourses of fundamentalism and revivalism that often pass as Islam today. Madrasas are environments of Islamic cultivation of the self, culture, civility, wisdom, and life.
While madrasas are growing in number on the subcontinent, the cherished world of the madrasas of my youth is rapidly disappearing. Shrill rhetoric substitutes for critical and sober reflection as the battle lines are drawn between a triumphant West and the madrasas who believe it is out to destroy them. This atmosphere breeds a debilitating defensiveness and a victim’s mindset. Madrasas of the 21st century will continue to change. I fear that the West’s insistence on casting madrasas as redoubts of terror and proposing invasive surveillance techniques and unilateral curriculum reforms will only force madrasas to retreat into more unpredictable modes of resistance. Madrasas may be forced to defend themselves by more militant means as the political rapids in countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh become more turbulent.
My experience in the madrasas is an atypical one: I crafted my own program and selected from what was on offer, whereas most conform to the prescribed syllabus and ideology. Yet as I continued in my work as a journalist, social activist, and then academic in South Africa and now in the United States, I have been able to recover the palimpsest of my madrasa education. I now appreciate these resources in ways madrasa authorities would not approve. Now, as I write about human rights, bioethics, Islamic law, and the ethical interpretation of the tradition, I can do so with confidence and argue that tradition is open to abuse and open to change. In my own thinking, writing, and activism I can push back against the many retrogressive forces and form productive associations with progressive ones. I doubt I would have had the courage to undertake some of this work otherwise.

Friday, September 6, 2013

Janab Asaduddin Owaisi In Parliament (Wakf Amendment Bill) 05-09-2013

In defense of Kamal Faruqui who questioned the instant Media trial, witch-hunt and condemnation of accused - Ghulam Muhammed

My comments posted on Hindustan Times newstory: SP sacks Kamaal Faruqui

Without going into Hindu vote bank and/or Muslim vote bank, Kamaal Faruqui's stand on the media blitzkrieg is right on target. Media is being used by vested interests to create an atmosphere of demonizing of Muslims, as and when it suits them. If an alleged criminal is charged, our legal position as explained by Kamaal Faruqui is very correct and unshakeable. Nobody, but nobody, Hindu, Muslim, Parsi, Sikh, Jew or Christian should be subjected to a mass media trial and condemned as guilty. This is Kangaroo court way of dispensing justice and Indian Judiciary has been too busy to take note of this absurdity, through which a large number of innocents, particularly from Muslim community, are arrested and paraded before the people of India, without any care or diligence over the rights of the person accused. All legal luminaries are silent over a clear verdict of law. The result is that an atmosphere of permissiveness is prevailing that makes a blood sport of targeting innocent Muslims. 'Innocent Muslims' is most relevant term as  more and more Muslims arrested as 'terrorists' or terror suspects or accessory to crimes are being let off by courts, sadly without any word of solace or compensation for their illegal incarceration.  Kamal Faruqui is the first 'progressive' Muslim leader to have dared to raise a voice against the political witch-hunting and demonization of entire community, the supposed vote-bank, by black-mailing and  brow-beating them into voting for one or another political parties. The concerted propaganda against Kamaal Faruqui in media is expected as it hurts their business of holding on to their readership with such scare-mongering, or their TRP for hours an end. More and more sane people should come forward against this media circus to rid the society of such communal elements, that threaten the peace and communal harmony of the nation.
Ghulam Muhammed, Mumbai
<ghulammuhammed3@gmail.com>

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SP sacks Kamaal Farooqi over Bhatkal comment

HT Correspondent, Hindustan Times  New Delhi, September 05, 2013

The Samajwadi Party on Thursday sacked Kamaal Farooqui from the post of party secretary in the wake of his controversial remarks on the August 29 arrest of Indian Mujhadeen (IM) co-founder Yasin Bhatkal.

Farooqui kicked up a political storm on August 30 when he asked on national television whether Bhatkal was arrested because he was a Muslim.
Although Farooqui apologised for the comment, opposition BJP and the Congress bayed for his blood and, on Thursday, senior party leader Ram Gopal Yadav shot off a letter informing him that party chief Mulayam Singh Yadav had removed him as the secretary of the SP national executive with immediate effect.
Rivals were quick to correlate Farooqui’s statement with SP’s minority appeasement bid ahead of the 2014 Lok Sabha elections and with the 2012 assembly poll manifesto promise of “trying to release those Muslim youths who were falsely accused in the name of anti-terror action”. Akhilesh Yadav government had moved court for release of several terror-accused Muslim youth, but the court had taken a strong objection to it.
“Anyone who goes against the party would face disciplinary action. He won’t be spared,” SP’s state spokesperson Rajendra Chowdhary told HT on Thursday.
Farooqui, however, told HT over phone that he had not received any written or verbal communication about it. “I never spoke as the spokesman of the party at the channels,” he said. He added that he would soon meet SP president Mulayam Singh Yadav to explain the situation.

Tuesday, September 3, 2013

Gujarat encounter cops followed Modi and Amit Shah’s policy: DG Vanzara : TOI FRONT PAGE TOP NEWS

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Gujarat-encounter-cops-followed-Modi-and-Amit-Shahs-policy-DG-Vanzara/articleshow/22269523.cms

The Times of India

Gujarat encounter cops followed Modi and Amit Shah’s policy: DG Vanzara

TNN | Sep 4, 2013, 12.52 AM IST

Suspended Gujarat IPS officer DG Vanzara quits
Suspended Gujarat IPS officer DG Vanzara quits
AHMEDABAD: Jailed DIG DG Vanzara, the man who allegedly carried out successive fake encounters in post-Godhra Gujarat, resigned from the Indian Police Service on Tuesday, accusing the Modi government of betraying its loyal officers "to save its own skin from the CBI" as well as to "gain political benefits".

Vanzara's explosive 10-page resignation letter describes the jailed officers as those who carried out the "proactive policy of zero tolerance for terrorism" which was adopted "at the highest level of its (Gujarat's) hierarchy". He targets Gujarat's former junior home minister Amit Shah for "betrayal and treachery", but also warns CM Narendra Modi that since the loyal officers were not protected, there was no "one-sided obligation" on Vanzara's part to protect the "traitors sitting in the government".

Read full text of DG Vanzara's letter

Read DG Vanzara's letter (PDF)


Vanzara clearly indicates that what he did to counter the jihadi menace was done with the explicit sanction and encouragement of the Gujarat government. In fact, he says the trumpeted success of the "Gujarat model of development" was possible only because of the "sacrifices made by me and my officers in thwarting the onslaught of initial disorder in the state".

He said the CBI would "have to arrest the policy formulators also as we, being field officers, have simply implemented the conscious policy of this government which was inspiring, guiding and monitoring our actions from very close quarters. By this reasoning, I am of the firm opinion that the place of this government, instead of being in Gandhinagar, should either be in Taloja Central Prison at Navi Mumbai or Sabarmati Central Prison at Ahmedabad".


Painting Amit Shah as the main villain, Vanzara wrote that he once adored Modi like a "god", but the CM failed "to rise to the occasion under the evil influence of Amit Shah who usurped his eyes and ears and has been successfully misguiding him".

He says: "I would like to state in the most unambiguous words that this government, thorough the dirty tactics of Amitbhai Shah, is unfortunately managing only for its own self so as to swim and continue to prosper in all directions, while ditching the police officers so as to sink and allow them to die unnatural death by drowning. By adopting such a suicidal path, this government, I am sure, is doing nothing else but is hastening and facilitating its own death by drowning."

He adds: "Apprehending the arrest of political leaders of Gujarat by CBI, all efforts, legal and political, were made by this government to ensure that none of us was released on bail so as to prevent the investigation going from the hands of Gujarat CID to Union CBI. The most heartless and shameful act of betrayal on the part of this government was that when Dinesh M N, and Narendra Amin got released by their own individual efforts, it got their bails cancelled at the earliest opportunity and pushed them back behind the bars of Sabarmati jail."



He goes on to say, "But for the legal and political intrigues, machinations and maneuverings of Amitbhai Shah, the trial of Shohrabuddin encounter case, followed by that of Tulsiram encounter case, would not have gone out of the state of Gujarat." Vanzara further added that "the crux of whole matter is that it was just to facilitate his trivial personal interest of fighting assembly election of 2012 that Shri Amitbhai Shah got the trial transferred and betrayed our trust."

In what seems a warning to Modi, Vanzara says, "As the government has miserably failed in protecting its encounter police, there remains no one-sided obligation on part of me to protect the traitors sitting in this government who almost have pushed patriotic and nationalist police officers into the jaws of death."

Asking Modi not to dump his officers in the quest for power in Delhi, Vanzara says the chief minister "has very rightly been talking of repaying his debt which he owes to Mother India... But, it would not be out of context to remind him that he, in the hurry of marching towards Delhi, may kindly not forget to repay the debt which he owes to jailed police officers who endowed him with the halo of Brave Chief Minister among the galaxy of other Chief Ministers who do not bear the same adjective before their names. This, as per my humble opinion, is also a part of the repayment of debt to Mother India."



Wed, Sep 04, 2013 | Updated 08.20AM IST

Tuesday, August 27, 2013

Delhi Wakf Landgrab builds worry in Sonia By Rohini Singh, The Economic Times, New Delhi, INDIA

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/eye-on-2014-elections-congress-to-resolve-incidents-of-encroachment-of-delhi-wakf-property/articleshow/22080997.cms

The Economic Times

Eye on 2014 elections, Congress to resolve incidents of encroachment of Delhi Wakf property

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PRINT HEADLINE: Delhi Wakf Landgrab builds worry in Sonia
By Rohini Singh, ET Bureau | 27 Aug, 2013, 10.25AM IST

48 comments

At the heart of the controversy are two plots of land, which a number of prominent Muslim clerics alleged have been encroached upon by the land mafia. (Pic by AFP)

At the heart of the controversy are two plots of land, which a number of prominent Muslim clerics alleged have been encroached upon by the land mafia. (Pic by AFP)-----


NEW DELHI: Two instances of alleged encroachment on Wakf property in the national capital, both seemingly anodyne, have prompted a damage-control effort by the top Congress leadership, including party president Sonia Gandhi and her influential political secretary Ahmad Patel. The episode illustrates the ruling party's concern over the possible fallout of the alleged landgrab on the 2014 elections.

At the heart of the controversy are two plots of land, which a number of prominent Muslim clerics alleged have been encroached upon by the land mafia. One is an eight-acre plot in the tony Jor Bagh area, which also happens to be the constituency of Delhi Chief Minister Sheila Dikshit. The second is a two-acre plot in Mehrauli in South Delhi. The approximate value of both the land parcels is over Rs 3,000 crore.

Delhi Wakf Board has Filed Complaint

But the reason for the protests by community leaders is the religious significance of the two plots. The Jor Bagh land has the oldest "Karbala" in the country - a religious shrine for the Shia community, and the Mehrauli plot is supposed to house the 500-year-old Ghausia mosque - a shrine for the Sunnis.

The Delhi Wakf Board, a government body, filed a complaint in April this year, asking the police to investigate and register a case of cheating, fraud and misappropriation against persons involved in the alleged landgrabbing in Mehrauli. An FIR on the matter was registered two-and-a-half months later, on June 23.

The complaint - the result of a representation the body received from those agitating against the alleged landgrab - named two officials in the office of the then lieutenant-governor of Delhi, Tejinder Khanna, and another official in the office of Urban Development Minister Kamal Nath. The FIR filed in June does not name the officials. ET is not naming the officials pending the outcome of the inquiry by the Delhi Police.

Delhi Police Commissioner BS Bassi confirmed that a FIR has been registered, but declined to share the status of the investigation. MA Usmani, the official who sent the complaint on behalf of the Delhi Wakf Board, confirmed that the board approached the police on the instructions of its then chairman. While the episode has so far attracted little national attention, the Congress leadership is clearly taking it seriously.



Eye on 2014 elections, Congress to resolve incidents of encroachment of Delhi Wakf property

Congress President Sonia Gandhi has personally intervened in the matter and has had two meetings to resolve the issue. On her directive, a committee was set up comprising Delhi Chief Minister Sheila Dikshit and Minority Affairs Minister Rahman Khan along with representatives of the Muslim community. But Maulana Kalbe Jawad, a Lucknow-based Shia leader, said the committee hasn't met.

The community leaders said they have held more than 20 meetings with Ahmad Patel on the matter. Patel had also organised two meetings on the issue with Pulok Chatterjee, the principal secretary to the prime minister. However, the clerics said Chatterjee was also unable to resolve the problem. Patel declined comment on the issue.

Muslim clerics said this isn't the only instance of alleged misappropriation of Wakf land, but with elections round the corner, the two instances will become major a major poll issue.


On Sunday, a day-long protest meeting was held by community leaders in Raebareli, the constituency of Sonia Gandhi. On Tuesday, a massive road show to showcase Congress' alleged "double speak" would start from Lucknow and travel to Raebareli and Amethi, the latter being the constituency of Rahul Gandhi, the Congress vice-president.

"Four months ago, Sonia Gandhi met us and assured that the issue will be resolved in four-to-five days. We have had several meetings with her political secretary Ahmad Patel, but have only got assurances. These are very sacred shrines, and not only has Congress shown scant regard for our sentiments, it has also insulted our clerics who were protesting, and registered false cases against them.

Congress representatives such as Rahman Khan have been beseeching us again to not protest and resolve the issue through dialogue, but that is what we have been doing over the past year-and-a-half.

The time for dialogue is over and we will now be launching massive protests, which will start from the heart of Congress in Uttar Pradesh - Amethi and Raebareli - and move to the rest of UP and Delhi," said Maulana Jawad. Other influential religious leaders, including Maulana Wali Rahmani, a Bihar-based cleric, and Maulana Arshad Madni from Deoband have also raised the issue with the Congress leadership.

Congress General Secretary Digvijaya Singh had also intervened in the matter on behalf of Rahul Gandhi, and given a written assurance that the matter would be resolved at the time of elections in Uttar Pradesh in early 2012. But Maulana Jawad said the promise was made only to thwart protests by Muslims against Congress during the state elections.

Rahul Gandhi's intervention, however, had resulted in an FIR being filed in the Jor Bagh land matter February last year. Dikshit told ET that the matter is "complicated" and was being examined by the minority commission.

V Narayanswamy, minister of state in the Prime Minister's Office, who also looks after the department of personnel - the administrative ministry for Central Bureau of Investigation - told ET that he had forwarded the complaints against government officials allegedly hand-in-glove with the land mafia for "appropriate action".










Monday, August 26, 2013

Other Nations Offer a Lesson to Egypt’s Military Leaders - The New York Times

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/world/middleeast/other-nations-offer-a-lesson-to-egypts-military-leaders.html?src=recg&pagewanted=all

New York Times

Global Edition

News Analysis

Other Nations Offer a Lesson to Egypt’s Military Leaders

By
Published: August 24, 2013
LONDON — Is the era of the military big man back? In Egypt, where Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi led a populist putsch against the elected president, prison doors are swinging.
Daniel Berehulak/Getty Images
A portrait of Gen. Pervez Musharraf at a news conference in March in Dubai before his return to Pakistan from exile.
 
Enlarge This Image
Ozan Kose/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
A protester near Istanbul this month with a flag depicting Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, modern Turkey’s founder.

Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood leader and freshly ousted president, languishes in one jail cell, while Hosni Mubarak, the despised autocrat who led Egypt for 30 years, has just been released from another.

The turmoil highlights the central role of the military in some postcolonial Muslim countries, where at least in the fitful early stages of democracy, it forcefully imposes itself as the self-appointed arbiter of power and the guardian of national identity.

But a look at other Muslim countries that have struggled with democratic transitions, including two other polestars of the Muslim world, Pakistan and Turkey, should provide a kind of warning to General Sisi. There it is the generals who are now facing charges.

Last week, a Pakistani court indicted the former military leader Gen. Pervez Musharraf in the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto — the first time in Pakistan’s coup-strewn history that a leading general has faced criminal prosecution. In Turkey, a court recently imprisoned dozens of senior military officers on charges of plotting to overthrow the government, a punitive reminder to a military once accustomed to reasserting its authority through coups.

Though General Sisi is riding a wave of popularity among some Egyptians and neighboring countries, notably Saudi Arabia and Israel, for cracking down on Islamists, the events in Turkey and Pakistan have shown the limits of military power. And in Egypt, that may ultimately mean allowing the Islamists a genuine role in public life.

“General Sisi needs an exit plan, now,” said Vali Nasr, the dean of the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and a former senior State Department adviser. “Without one, he could end up like Musharraf. And his country, too, could be left worse off at the end of his military rule.”

Military and civilian leaders have been competing for power in Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt for decades. The military has exercised muscular influence in all three countries, openly or behind the scenes, because of weak civilian rule that can be traced to the foundation of the states — in some cases, in a bid to circumscribe Islamist influence.

Egypt’s generals ousted the monarchy and established a republic in 1952. Turkey’s first president, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a military revolutionary, led a fierce secularization drive in the 1920s. Pakistan’s military helped unify the country after its traumatic partition from India in 1947, and quickly established itself as the strongest arm of a weak state.

Pakistani, Turkish and Egyptian generals profess to love democracy, but they practice it with varying degrees of reluctance. After seizing power in Pakistan in 1999, General Musharraf promised early elections but stayed for nine years. During a stint at the United States Army War College in 2005, General Sisi wrote a paper titled “Democracy in the Middle East” that was critical of American intervention in the region. Turkey’s army has claimed a popular mandate for inherently undemocratic acts.

Instead, the military has deeply embedded itself in each state’s DNA, winning privileges and lucrative jobs for its officers, all the while controlling politics in blunt fashion. Pakistan’s generals have mounted four coups over the past 55 years; Turkey has had three. In both Pakistan and Egypt, analysts describe the military as the core of the “deep state.”

“The military has been very influential since the 1952 revolution,” said Hala Mustafa, editor of the Journal of Democracy in Cairo. “Even under Morsi, it had the same privileges and status as it had over the past six decades.”

How the militaries exercised that influence has varied. While Turkish and Egyptian generals ruthlessly marginalized political Islamists, Pakistan’s men in uniform co-opted them. During the 1980s, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan used them to both fight and to Islamize Pakistan’s national identity, a source of tension with Egypt at the time.

In all three countries, Islam is often seen as the boogeyman of democracy, Dr. Nasr said. “But that is wrong. The real struggle in the Middle East is between civilian rule and the military.”

That struggle is further complicated by the debate over how to integrate Islam into politics. For years, Turkey was the model of progress for many Muslim countries. But the military’s retreat has been driven, in part, by the country’s desire to join the European Union. And the gloss of civilian rule vanished in June when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan violently suppressed a protest movement in central Istanbul, suggesting that one authoritarianism was being replaced with another. This month’s treason trial brought out sharp divisions between secularists and Islamists, underscoring how Turkey’s nation-building model remains a work in progress.

Yet the Turkish model may still offer the best hope: the protests in Istanbul appeared aimed more at Mr. Erdogan’s hard-nosed policies than at the system of civilian rule itself.

For some Egyptians pondering their future, the dreaded outcome is to become like Pakistan. Yet there are lessons to be learned. For decades, Pakistani generals could intervene in politics at will, a fact that the current prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, appreciates better than most: his last stint in power ended in 1999 with an army coup.

But since General Musharraf was ousted as president in 2008, Pakistan’s notoriously fractious politicians joined hands to give the military little room for maneuver, culminating in the recent, relatively clean election, which Mr. Sharif won with a handsome mandate. The courts have also grown bolder, highlighting military-driven vote rigging and human rights abuses (even if nobody has yet faced charges) and daring to indict General Musharraf, who also faces possible treason charges.

Pakistanis now view themselves as exemplars of transition politics. After Mr. Morsi’s ouster, which many Egyptian liberals supported, their Pakistani counterparts were quick to offer advice on the perils of military intervention. “Been there, done that — and it was definitely the wrong choice,” said the journalist Omar R. Quraishi on Twitter.

Still, Pakistan’s generals remain strong behind the scenes, and Pakistan’s transition is far from complete. General Musharraf’s trial, analysts say, could offer a weather vane of how much prestige they are willing to cede.

Leaders in Pakistan, Turkey and Egypt are acutely aware of the parallels among them. General Musharraf, who speaks Turkish, used to wax lyrical about the secular vision of Turkey’s founder, Mr. Ataturk. More recently Turkish leaders have expressed fear that events in Egypt could stir trouble in their own country. “At moments of peril, it is more important than ever to stick closely to the democratic path,” President Abdullah Gul wrote recently in The Financial Times.

Yet as all three countries climb the ladder toward functioning democracies, the effort is complicated by outside pressure, which often favors the military. American support for Pakistan and Egypt has long been predicated on those countries’ geostrategic value: Egypt’s proximity to Israel and Pakistan’s to Afghanistan. Turkey is a major player in NATO.

And in Egypt, General Sisi and his commanders have drawn vocal support for his harsh crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood from the governments of Israel and Saudi Arabia. Even Mr. Mubarak, at the height of his 30-year rule, dared not operate so boldly. But therein lies the danger, perhaps, for General Sisi.

His support from Egyptian civic society could evaporate as revulsion grows at the bloodshed against Islamists and the military’s crackdown on other dissenters. If he alienates Western support, financing from the Middle East cannot sustain his country for very long. And, as events in Turkey and Pakistan have shown, the military’s eminence can endure only by strategically ceding space to civilian players — or the use of violent repression.
 
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Thursday, July 25, 2013

Anti-Modi forces in US unite as Rajnath lobbies for visa - By Aziz Haniffa - Rediff.com

Denial of visa to Gujarat's Chief Minister, Narendra Modi, by US State Department, apparently his controversial role in 2002 Gujarat riots, is at best a half measure. The pogrom was hailed by the fascist party and its various affiliates as an experiment against Muslims, to be repeated all over India, as and when they get empowered. Against such background, Human Rights organisation, whether state or independent, should move international authorities to move for accountability for Gujarat's 2002 communal riots against Muslims, which may get repeated if this man ever get to rule India as he is now being considered by his BJP/RSS organisations for the post of Prime Minister of India.

Ghulam Muhammed, Mumbai


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http://www.rediff.com/news/report/anti-modi-forces-in-us-unite-as-rajnath-lobbies-for-visa/20130724.htm

Anti-Modi forces in US unite as Rajnath lobbies for visa

July 24, 2013 09:41 IST

The letter, to maintain the current policy of denying Narendra Modi a visa to the United States, was released just as the BJP president arrived in Washington DC for a round of meetings with US lawmakers. Aziz Haniffa reports

A well coordinated pre-emptive strike by the anti-Narendra Modi forces in the United States and India has the Bharatiya Janata Party and its American affiliate -- the Overseas Friends of the BJP, livid and crying foul.

Bharatiya Janata Party president Rajnath Singh was at Capitol Hill lobbying influential US lawmakers to prevail upon the Obama administration to lift the US visa ban for the Gujarat chief minister.
The Coalition Against Genocide, a broad alliance, which says it is ‘dedicated to justice and accountability for the Gujarat pogrom of 2002,’ on Tuesday hailed the letters signed by 65 members from both houses of India’s Parliament, calling on President Obama to maintain the ban. The letter was released by one of the CAG’s affiliate, the Indian American Muslim Council.

In the letters to Obama, Indian parliamentarians from 15 parties from both the Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha said, ‘We wish to respectfully urge you to maintain the current policy of denying Mr Modi a visa to the United States.’

In the missive, the MPs noted, ‘Given the legal cases against the culprits, including many senior officials in Mr Modi’s administration are still pending in the court of law, any revoking of the ban at this juncture would be seen as a dismissal of the issues concerning Mr Modi’s role in the horrific massacres of 2002.’

‘It would legitimise Mr Modi’s human rights violations and seriously impact the nature of US-India relations by sending a message that the United States values economic interests over and above the universal values of human rights and justice,’ it said.

The letter was released by the IAMC just as Singh, after three days in New York, arrived in Washington, DC and started a round of meetings with US lawmakers, including senior members and founders of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans.

The BJP president Singh met the likes of House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Ed Royce, California Republican.
In New York, Singh had told reporters that when he goes to DC, he would urge members of the US Congress to call on the US administration to lift the visa ban on Modi who has been virtually anointed by the BJP as its prime ministerial candidate.

The letters, written in November and December 2012, and faxed to Obama, were again faxed to the White House to coincide with Singh’s visit to DC and released to the media simultaneously. 

In 2005, in the wake of a campaign spearheaded by the CAG, which co-opted the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, Modi’s US visa was revoked. Modi’s entry to the US was banned by the State Department under the provisions of the International Religious Freedom Act, which makes any foreign government official who ‘was responsible for or directly carried out, at any time, particularly severe violations of religious freedom’ ineligible for a visa.

Raja Swamy, spokesman for the CAG, said, “The fact that over 60 MPs from 15 political parties across 15 states chose to write a joint letter to President Obama about Narendra Modi's US visa, is a stark reminder that Modi and the divisive ideology he represents continue to be anathema to a cross section of Indians.”

“After having long denied any desire on the part of Mr Modi to acquire a US visa, Mr Rajnath Singh's visit to the US, to lobby lawmakers here for Modi's visa reeks of hypocrisy,’ he added.

The letter by the MPs, referred to the conviction of  Maya Kodnani, a sitting BJP MLA and then minister in Modi’s cabinet, as ‘a damning indictment of the Modi administration, and proof that the pogrom was planned and executed at the highest levels of the state government.’

It argued that the visa ban on Modi was ‘consistent with US law and the shared values of the United States and India,’ and called on Obama to ‘stand in solidarity with the survivors, human rights activists and all those who value justice and freedom of religion.’
Ahsan Khan, President of IAMC, which released the letters to the media, told rediff.com, “The joint letters of 65 MPs from both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha was an independent effort undertaken by the MPs themselves.”

He said, “Mohammed Adeeb, Rajya Sabha MP has already gone on record to say that he initiated this effort. IAMC, which is a member of the Coalition Against Genocide, was able to get copies of these letters through its sources in India, and saw it fit to release them to the media. We did not alert the MPs to the release of the letter,” he said.

Khan argued, “When Mr Rajnath Singh, president of a major political party saw it fit to come to US begging for a visa for Modi, criticism of the MPs for writing to President Obama, is a case of the pot calling the kettle black.”

The Times Now television news channel and the New York Times reported from New Delhi, had run a primetime debate titled, ‘Is it appropriate of Indian politicians to drag their fight with Modi to Washington’s court?’ while Jay Narayan Vyas, a senior colleague of Modi in the Gujarat government, had pilloried this letter by Indian parliamentarians akin to ‘washing dirty linen outside the country.’

But Khan asserted, “As for countering Mr Rajnath Singh's efforts, we do not believe we need to do that. The fact that Mr Modi has an uncanny ability to unite against himself, elected officials across the ideological spectrum in both India and the US, speaks volumes about his chances of ever being granted a visa to the US.”

Dr Shaik Ubaid, president of Indian Muslim Advocacy Network, another affiliate of CAG, also rejected the BJP and Overseas Friends of BJP's criticism of the letter as hypocritical and without merit.

Ubaid argued, ‘Human rights are universal. The victims of Gujarat pogrom have not received justice even after a decade while the person responsible might become the candidate for PM. Where is the accountability and justice in that? India took a moral stand in ‘internal affairs' of other countries, such as against apartheid in South Africa and even after riots against Indians in Fiji, so why cannot President Obama be involved. After all Mr Rajnath brought the issue to the US, coming with a begging bowl for visa and a laundry bag with Modi's dirty linen.’

He also brushed off the BJP’s contention that one MP has backtracked, and asserted, ‘It is a desperate diversionary tactic by the Modi camp. The issue is not if one or two MPs are backing off, not being able to stand the heat generated by sustained BJP attacks. Politicians ‘flip flop’ even in the US, I was expecting more to come under pressure.’

Ubaid said, ‘The issue is Modi. The whole episode shows Mr Modi is a stigma and liability for India, Gujarat, Hinduism and even for BJP.’
He said, ‘Instead of attacking Congress Party the BJP has to spend each day justifying its annotation of a politician with blood stained hands.’

Ubaid said, ‘Indians living in the US are endangering the future political prospects of Indian community here and for US investment in Gujarat by closely associating themselves with an extremist politician.’

Singh, who is scheduled to meet with a few selected members of the Indian media in Washington at the National Press Club on Wednesday to apprise them of his meetings in Washington, was expected to respond to this latest anti-Modi campaign timed to coincide with his DC visit.

Aziz Haniffa in Washington DC