Indian Security Agencies Unleash Home Grown
Terror!
Jo
Chup Rahega Zuban-e-Khanjar
Lahu Pukarega Aasteen Ka...
In the best, figurative-dialectical tradition of Urdu
poetry, the afore-mentioned couplet unites two opposite meanings. First, the silence of the knife, an instrument
that is used to kill, and by virtue of its nature and material force, cannot remain noiseless. Second, the clamour of spilled blood on the collar,
that again by nature and insinuation, is in reality, condemned to remain devoid, forever, of speech.
I am not aware whether officers of various security
agencies—the IB and state-level ATS’, special cells and crime branches—know
Urdu. But one thing is sure—that Urdu knows them well. Like the perennial,
hard-boiled detective of the jasoosi novels
of Ibn-e-Safi—the Allahabad based father of detective fiction in the Urdu-Hindi
heartland—the language catches the contradictions in their stories, points
towards blatant lies and ambiguities in their charge-sheets. Urdu stalks the agencies as they go around inventing
an entity like Indian Mujahideen, grind innocent Muslims and their families to
dust in turf wars, undermine India’s constitution, sovereignty, and dance to
the tune of RSS, Mossad, the CIA and maybe the MI6.
In my last column, I had written about Abu Jundal—actually Zabiuddin
Ansari, an IB informer, who had helped the agency track down illegal arms in
2006 at Aurangabad. The Delhi Police Special Cell brought him over to India,
painting him as the mastermind/moving force behind 26/11. He supposedly
revealed sensational aspects of the 26/11 case—how orders were being passed in
a `control room’ on Pakistani soil—and so on and forth.
Yet, during secretary level talks between India and Pakistan, Indian MEA
officials were unable to present something concrete in terms of evidence to
back the claim that 26/11 was state sponsored by Pakistan. All we could present
were confessions that even Indian Courts scorn!
So the agency that brought Abu Jundal over to India—flashing his revelations
all across the compliant Indian media—basically made a fool out of genuine
Indians who want terror attacks to stop and unearth the truth behind 26/11.
India’s position on 26/11 stands severally weakened—not strengthened—the
world over—after the Abu Jundal affair.
If we rewind the story of turf wars between agencies, certain
uncomfortable angles emerge:
1.
On 19th September 2008,
during the Batala House encounter, which was conducted by the Delhi Police, a
team of Mumbai Police was present in the same Zakir Nagar area. Apparently, the Mumbai Police was looking
for someone else, most probably Riaz and Iqbal Bhatkal whom they thought
were responsible for the 16th July Ahmedabad and several other
blasts of 2008.
2.
A Mumbai Police source reveals that the Mumbai
Police knew of Atif and Sajid, and the `terror module cell’ of the Zakir Nagar,
Delhi area where they lived. Yet, as per the source, the Mumbai Police was not of the view that Atif and Sajid were behind
the 2008 blasts.
3.
According to the official Mumbai
Police version, Atif’s name appeared first from the lips of one Afzal Usmani, a car thief, caught by the Mumbai
Crime Branch (headed by Rakesh Maria at that time). Usmani was accused by the
Mumbai Police for stealing the cars which were used to plant bombs in Ahmedabad
on 16th July, 2008.
4.
But the Gujarat Police have a different take
on the issue. According to them, the cars
used in the Ahmedabad blasts were parked first in Bharuch in the premises of a
London based NRI.
5.
Acting on this tip, the Gujarat
Police found out that one Sajid Mansuri was living in that house on rent. The
Gujarat Police had Mansuri’s number—while tracing call records, the Gujarat
Police `stumbled’ on the `fact’ that a call was made from an eastern Uttar
Pradesh from Mumbai to Sajid’s phone, just before the Ahmedabad blasts. Then
that eastern Uttar Pradesh called Atif’s number in Delhi.
6.
Notably, Gujarat Police does not mention the
role of Usmani; the Mumbai Police knows nothing about Sajid Mansuri. Yet, a
third agency—the Delhi Police—makes these connections. A story is constructed
as to how Afzal Usmani first stole the cars from Mumbai, brought them over to
Bharuch, from where they were transported to Ahmedabad and used in the blasts.
7.
Now, cases against alleged IM
operatives are registered in Maharashtra, Delhi, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh and
Karnataka. But in the charge-sheet submitted by various agencies in their
respective courts, the role played by different actors do not tally. Most of
the charge-sheets are fudged and not available. Yet, even a cursory look shows
that in the same case, Sajid Mansuri is playing a different role in Mumbai
Police files, a different one in Gujarat Police charges—and a different one in
Delhi Police records!
8.
But the best part has yet to come.
Officially, both Mumbai and Gujarat Police had alerted the IB about Atif Ameen.
Days before the Batala House encounter, the IB was keeping Atif’s phone under
surveillance! A post-Batala House encounter article, published in The Hindu,
states that the IB did not arrest Atif as his phone might have led the agencies
to the Bhatkals, who were supposed to be the main guys behind the 2008 blasts.
9.
It is important that the Hindu article (http://www.hindu.com/2008/10/
10.
The Hindu article also suggests that
Mohan Chandra Sharma and other Delhi Police cops went to Batala House merely to
enquire about Atif. They received a burst of fire that hit Mohan Chandra
Sharma, after which they fired in return and killed Atif and Sajid.
11.
But the question is that if the
Mumbai and Gujarat Police got Atif’s name respectively from Usmani and Mansuri,
what was Delhi Police’s source?
12.
Maybe the IB let Delhi Police in—but officially
the IB was keeping Atif not only alive but kicking to net the bigger catch.
Now the really uncomfortable part starts:
1.
Was IB in agreement—or was it even
informed—about Delhi Police’s attempt to storm the Batala House compound?
2.
Mumbai, Gujarat, Delhi and other
state agencies need not necessarily share information. The IB too possesses the
right to withhold or share its information. Here however, it is obvious that
the Delhi Police acted on its own—more importantly other state and central
agencies were not in the loop. What was a Mumbai Police team doing in the same
area on the same day? Looking for Bhatkals? Then why was there no coordination
between Delhi and Mumbai Police? The IB
and Mumbai Police still believe that arresting Atif would have been a better
option.
3.
But what if the Delhi Police say that
it had gone only to enquire and the encounter was an accident? Ha! Ha! The Delhi Police do not claim thus; on
the contrary, they still take the credit of what is described as a full-fledged
encounter in which both sides were armed.
Interestingly, since the chain linking Usmani, Sajid Mansuri and Atif is
different in different charge-sheets of different state Police’, isn’t it
logical to merge the different versions and create a proper, professional,
scientific file that makes sense? But of course, how can that happen? Different
states are ruled by different governments. Naquee Ahmed, the Delhi Police
informer, is arrested by the Mahrashtra ATS as a terrorist. Qateel Siddiqui, a
man wanted by IB and West Bengal Police in a fake currency racket, is arrested
by the Delhi Police and declared a terrorist. The Mumbai Police take his
custody for interrogation. He is found dead—killed by so called Hindu criminals
in the maximum security, anda cell of
Pune’s Yerwada Jail. Then the Delhi Police brings Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu
Jundal—an IB informer—over from Saudi Arabia—declaring him a terrorist.
It would require a full enquiry to fill in the horrendous gaps and trace
the messy, convoluted trail of blood, inefficiency and slaughter left behind by
the devilish dance of security agencies. But some issues are clear:
1.
The Mahrashtra Police has a role to
play—and a vested interest—in Qateel Siddiqui’s murder in Pune. Qateel after
all was a `terrorist’ arrested by the Delhi Police. The credit for
`revelations’ made by him would have gone to the Delhi Police.
2.
Naquee Ahmed was arrested by the
Maharashtra Police for the same reason—settling scores with the Delhi Police.
3.
Abu Jundal’s extradition too is
linked to the turf wars between various agencies.
4.
Hundreds of Muslim youth are
languishing in jail in the name of anti-terror operations for being IM members.
The situation has become so desperate that as soon one state agency catches a Muslim
youth, the other state agency immediately wants his custody. Then the third
state agency starts demanding its pound of flesh. It seems that state Police
agencies are not confident about the suspects they have charge-sheeted. Are
they nervous that there is no evidence against youths lodged in Delhi, Jaipur,
Ahmedabad, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Karntaka jails? So all state agencies clamour for custody as
soon as one of them nets a `catch’?
5.
There is big money involved in
keeping the various state level ATS’, Special Cells and the Crime Branches.
These forces are allowed to spend millions—including buying `sophisticated’
weaponry—and are not accountable to anyone.
6.
Anti-Muslim, communal biases seem to
guide the agencies. But even if we set aside the communal angle for a moment,
MONEY also can function as a major motivator for state and central actors to
implicate innocents and start a game which has no end.
7.
It is an open secret that Mossad, the
infamous, dirty agency of Israel interrogates Muslim prisoners inside Indian
jails, especially in Mumbai and Delhi.
8.
Mossad functionaries have been found
inside Military Intelligence (MI) zones in Rajasthan and Jammu and Kashmir. The
pathetic manner in which Colonel Raj Kumar Purohit, leader of the Hindutva
terror brigade and an accused in the 2008 Malegaon blasts, was sought to be
shielded recently by forces inside the Indian Military, is a stern reminder of the fact that foreign agencies might have
infiltrated our Military s well.
For personal gains, and to feed the anti-Muslim
phobia of Israel and the US, Indian security
agencies are putting India’s security and sovereignty at risk. IF THERE IS HOME
GROWN TERRORISM IN INDIA, IT IS NOT BEING PERPRETRATED BY THE IM OR SOME
IMAGINED MUSLIM TERRORIST GROUP. THE IB, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND VARIOUS
STATE AGENCIES REPRESENT THE REAL HUB OF HOME GROWN TERROR. MY CHARGE IS THAT
TERROR PLOTS, IN WHICH INNOCENT INDIANS LOSE THEIR LIVES, ARE PLANNED INSIDE
THEIR OFFICES, IN COLLUSION WITH MOSSAD TYPE SECURITY FORCES. THEY NEED TO BE
EXPOSED AND PUNISHED.
EVERYTHING AGAIN BOILS DOWN TO URDU. THERE IS A
COMPLETE LACK OF TRUST BETWEEN VICTIMS AND INDIAN SECURITY FORCES. THE LATTER
HAVE BECOME A LAW UNTO THEMSELVES. INDIANS CAN ONLY TAUNT THEM WITH GHALIB’S
COUPLET:
Tere waade par jiye hum to ye jaan jhoot jaana
To say that I lived on your promises (of national security) is
to make my life a lie
Ki khushi se mar na jaate agar aitbaar hota
Ki khushi se mar na jaate agar aitbaar hota
Would I not have died of happiness if you were really
trustworthy?
But
the old-timers had a point in the sense that cities formed mosaics in
which different communities cohabited in the same neighbourhoods. In the
old cities—which were also known as the walled cities—next to a Brahmin
or a Jain lane, one could find a Pathan mohalla. Similarly, on the
periphery of these urban cores—especially after industrialisation
resulted in the creation of new suburbs—low-caste Muslims and Dalits
used to coexist in separate, but adjacent settlements. Many of them had a
shared culture as part of the labour movement, especially in the cities
where unions had fostered a labour culture. Ahmedabad is a case in
point: in addition to the mosaic of ‘pols’ (lanes) of the walled city,
the ‘challis’ (the dense rows of one room-houses) of the ‘Manchester of
India’ developed along these lines in the first decades of the 20th
century.
But
the Muslims from Kerala are not the only ones to benefit from Gulf
remittance money. In fact, in almost each and every city mentioned
above, including Bhopal, Jaipur, Lucknow and, of course, Mumbai and
Hyderabad, large numbers of Muslim families have expatriate members
working in that part of the world. This external resource plays a major
role in keeping them afloat. But the new, emerging (if not embryonic)
middle class which is developing among the Muslims in the cities
elsewhere is hopeful that other opportunities will materialise in India
itself thanks to liberalisation. They not only expect more international
trade from the economic reforms, but also more jobs. Usually, weaker
sections—including the Dalits—long for a stronger public sector. The
Muslims (who do not get the benefit of reservations) have no nostalgia
for the Nehruvian pattern because the State has discriminated against
them more than against any other community—as evident from the figures
of the Sachar Committee reports which show, for instance, that non-OBC
Muslims represent 2.7 per cent of the psus’ personnel and 4.5 per cent
of the railways, when the Hindu OBCs are respectively 8.3 and 9.3 per
cent.
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