A LEFTIST LIBERAL WRITER WRITING IN A LEFTIST LIBERAL NEWSPAPER, TRIES TO MUSCLE IN ON MAINSTREAM ISLAM IN A SHORT AND WELL WRITTEN OVERVIEW!
Political Islam: Rise, fragmentation and possible fallNadeem F. Paracha
Published 2013-07-18 12:34:27
Unlike most political ideologies whose adherents by and
large agree with the definitional tags attributed to their respective
ideologies and ideologues, Political Islam is more of an academic concoction.
It works as an analytical umbrella under which political analysts lump
various forces that claim to be using historical Islamic texts and traditions
to achieve modern political goals. One is not quite sure exactly when the term Political Islam was invented, but there is agreement among many academics, studying politics in the Muslim world that the word most probably emerged in the 1940s in Europe to define anti-colonial movements that described themselves to be religious/Islamic in orientation. Though it might have some roots in anti-colonial movements that emerged among the Muslims of India and Arabia in the 19th century, Political Islam is basically a 20th century phenomenon. Its first main expression is believed to be Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood that was formed in 1927. Even though as a political tendency, Political Islam (to analysts) covers a wide range of Islamic political movements involving different sects, sub-sects, nationalities and leftist, as well as rightist rhetoric and narratives, it is the commonalities in these varied movements that makes analysts study and define them as a single ideological entity that they call Political Islam. So what are the basic, commonly held aspects of Political Islam? • Reaction against foreign (especially Western) political and cultural influences in Muslim societies. • Offering political and social alternatives to replace Western political concepts and social values. • The alternatives are based on an understanding of history, society, economics and society culled from modern-day interpretations of a (largely imagined) ‘golden age of Islam’. • Adoption of modern technology because it does not have any particular values attached to it and can thus be tagged and used for the promotion of Islamic values. • Introducing and infusing what are believed to be Islamic precepts of economics and politics. Till about the late 1960s, movements associated with classical Political Islam were largely intellectual pursuits with limited political influence. Nevertheless, they were seen with suspicion, even by those movements and groups that adopted the main aspects of Political Islam but fused them with leftist ideologies. Thus, during the Cold War the central theological and political tussle in most Muslim countries was not exactly between ‘Islamists’ and secularists, or between religious political groups and communists/Marxists The main conflict was between the rightist expressions of Political Islam and the ideology’s leftist versions. 
During the Cold War the main
conflict in the Muslim world was mainly between the rightest expressions of
Political Islam and the ideology’s leftist versions.
The rightist side produced
tendencies like ‘Islamic Fundamentalism,’ while the leftist sides emerged with
concepts like ‘Islamic Socialism,’ ‘Ba’ath Socialism’ and (to a certain
extent), ‘Arab Nationalism.’
Consequently, during the Cold War,
the rightest expressions of Political Islam were backed and supported by
Western powers and Arab monarchies, mainly due to the fact that the leftist
sides of the ideology had moved into what (during the Cold War) was called the
‘Soviet camp.’
Though the rightist sides were repressed
by Muslim regimes that were operating from the left flanks of Political Islam,
the right-wing of Political Islam had by and large failed to attract any
worthwhile mass support.
However, things in this respect
began to change between the late 1960s and 1980s. The right-wing expressions
and groups of Political Islam experienced a surge especially after the defeat
of the Egyptian and Syrian armies and air force at the hands of their Israeli
counterparts in 1967.
Then the bankrolling of the
anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad in Afghanistan by the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in
the 1980s also became one of the catalysts that triggered the shifting of
political and social influence in many Muslim countries from left-wing
Political Islam to its rightest expressions.
The ‘Afghan jihad’ also added a more
militant dimension to right-wing Political Islam. It reached a nadir in the
late 1980s after the Afghan conflict resulted in a stalemate and the Soviet
forces in Afghanistan had to pull out.
In the early 1990s, the militant
expressions of the ideology began to pull away from the orbit of its former
backers (US, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan), and tried to trigger ‘Islamic
revolutions’ in various Muslim countries.
Their methods of creating chaos
through bombings antagonised the regimes that had formerly backed them but now
found themselves under attack.
The revolutions failed to
materialise, but the bombings continued. Frustrated, the militants found
themselves bordering on taking nihilistic action that has caused the deaths of
thousands of civilians in countries like Pakistan, Indonesia, Yemen, Iraq,
Nigeria, Somalia and even Turkey.
The more classical expressions of right-wing Political
Islam have tried to repair the damage by getting involved in the democratic
process in countries like Pakistan, Egypt, Tunisia, Indonesia, Sudan, and
Turkey.
But on most occasions than not (as has been the case of Pakistan for quite some time and recently in Egypt), ‘moderate’ right-wing democratic expressions of Political Islam have proven to be more successful on the social front, but lack the acumen and narrative required to devise and implement coherent economic policies or act decisively against their more violent and nihilist brethren. Also, as was seen in countries like Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey where large demonstrations were held against their respective governments’ attempt to ‘Islamise the Constitution’, the social gains made by Political Islam too now seem to be challenged and questioned. So one can cautiously suggest that Political Islam that emerged in the 1930s-40s and then peaked in the 1980s, is now a withering phenomenon. The answer to just what it will be replaced with, in countries where it has played a leading socio-political role is still up for grabs. Political Islam: From right to left Islamic Fundamentalism: Though usually attributed to the beliefs of modern-day extremist movements in Islam, Islamic Fundamentalism is basically a firm belief in the theological musings of ancient Islamic jurists and traditions. Islamic Fundamentalists all agree with Imam Ghazali’s (12th century) dictum that the ‘gates of ijtihad (rational debate) in Islam are now closed.’ After about three hundred years of open debate in the Islamic world between the conservatives and the rationalists (Mu’tazilites), Ghazali insisted that a perfect synthesis (between the two) had been reached and that Islam’s social and spiritual philosophy had achieved completion. 
The thoughts and writings of 9th Century Arabian theologian,
Ahmed Ibn Hanabal, were perhaps the first renowned expressions of Islamic
Fundamentalism
Islamic Fundamentalists in the shape of scholars (ulema) and clergymen (maulvis and imams), mostly worked as advisers to caliphs and kings, or in mosques and madressas. They were only interested in advocating Islamic laws, but never articulated a political plan that would carry these laws. At the dilapidation of the Muslim empires from the 19th century onwards, the many reformist Islamic movements that emerged criticised the performance of Islamic Fundamentalists, blaming them for getting too close to the ‘decadent’ kings’ due to whose ‘negligence of Islam,’ Islamic political power had crumbled. Islamic Fundamentalism has historically been more interested in rectifying ‘cultural and social deviances’ in a Muslim society and for this it used the mosque and evangelism – not direct politics. 
Shiekh Ahmad Sirhindi (left), the 16th century Islamic
scholar who opposed Mughal King Akbar’s liberal outlook of Islam and the
political and theological accommodation of other religions in Mughal India.
Sirhindi’s role in this respect was greatly embellished and glorified in the
writings of Islamic Fundamentalists of the 20th century.
Islamic Fundamentalism continues to be frozen in an understanding of the Quran, the hadith and Shariah developed centuries ago by ancient Islamic scholars. Though it is vocal in its rhetorical demands for the imposition of Islamic laws, it has little or no political agenda as such. It never did. It remains largely associated with apolitical Muslim individuals, conservative ulema, the clergy and Islamic evangelists. 
Zakir Naik is one of the most well-known faces of modern-day
Islamic Fundamentalism. His lectures are popular among urban middle-class
Pakistani and Indian Muslims.
Most of modern-day Islamic Fundamentalism’s activism has been expressed through established as well as ad-hoc groups that lobby for the implementation of the practice of veiling for Muslim women in public, the eradication of ‘obscenity in the media and society,’ for making mandatory certain Islamic rituals, for the enforcement of laws against the sale and consumption of alcohol, etc It never was and still isn’t a dedicated political movement but a social and theological one. Early manifestations: Ahmed Inb Hanbal (9th century Arabian scholar and theologian); Shiekh Ahmed Sirhindi (16th Century Islamic scholar in Mughal India). Noted Modern Islamic Fundamentalist Groups: The Tableeghi Jamaat (Pakistan/Bangladesh/India); Al-Huda (Pakistan/Canada); Islamic Research Foundation (India); Dawat-e-Islami (Pakistan). Emphasis: • Islamisation of society through evangelicalism and advocating rituals and social codes of behaviour (based on sunnah and hadith) for rulers and their subjects. • Largely rejecting modern interpretations of the Qu’ran. Islamism: A word coined in the 1970s (in France), even though it had already (albeit sparsely) been in use among European writers in the 19th century. In the modern political context, Islamism came to explain a series of (post-19th century) Islamic movements that advocated Islam not only as a religion but as a political system as well. Islamism’s roots can be found in the Islamic reformist movements that appeared in the subcontinent and in Arabia in the 18th and 19th centuries. Incensed by the crumbling of the Mughal and Ottoman empires, a series of reformist movements emerged, advocating ‘a return to true Islam’ (Salafi) that was said to be free of innovation and corruption. Some of these movements emphasised on applying reason in religion, but many also added the importance of ‘jihad’ not only against western colonialism but also against the clergy, and especially against Sufi tendencies which these reformists believed were a ‘negative innovation’ and an anathema to ‘true Islam.’ Such movements, though animated, came to a naught, mostly due to the adjustments the more moderate/modern as well as traditional schools of Islam made at the wake of the rise of western colonialism. At the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate (1922), a bulk of Muslim regimes (especially in Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey) vigorously adopted modern western economic, social and political models (i.e. Liberalism, secularism and nationalism). One of the first experiments in Islamism that actually took off was when (in the early 20th century) the Al-Saud family conquered a vast tract in Arabia (with the tacit support of the British who were trying to undermine Ottoman rule in the region). The Al-Saud were ardent followers of Abd Al-Wahhab – an 18th century puritanical Islamic reformist. The Saud family soon enacted the world’s first ‘Islamic State,’ but under the control of a monarchy
The Saud family’s adherence to
puritanical Islam and imposition of harsh Islamic laws went down well with the
early Islamists; but the family’s growing ties with the British and its
monarchical tendencies made a lot of them uncomfortable.
Founder of Saudi Arabia, King
Abdulaziz Ibn Saud. A fringe figure in world politics the 1920s, he shot to
prominence when vast reserves of oil were found in his country. He then laid
the foundation of constructing the first known ‘Islamic state’ that was to be
ruled by his family.
As secular-nationalists dominated
the liberation movements in most Muslim countries, politicised Islamic scholars
retaliated by labelling these movements as ‘anti-Islamic.’
Pioneering Islamism scholars such as
Egypt’s Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, and the subcontinent’s Abul Ala
Maududi, began interpreting the Qu’ran and the hadith by using modern
political concepts and lingo.
For example, Maududi expanded the
Qu’ranic concept of Tauheed (oneness of God) by suggesting that it also meant
the (political) oneness of the Muslim ummah that can only be achieved by
‘Islamising the society’ and through attaining state power to finally formulate
an ‘Islamic state.’
Abul Aala Maududi: One of the
pioneering intellectuals and theoreticians of 20th century ‘Islamism.’
Qutb, on the other hand, implied
that 20th century Muslim societies were in a state of jahiliyya – a term
used by classical Muslim scholars to define the state of ignorance the people
of Arabia were in before the arrival of Islam in the 7th century.
Qutb suggested that a jihad was
required in Muslim countries to grab state power and to rid the Muslims from
the ‘modern forces of jahilyiya’ (i.e., secularism, Marxism, ‘western
materialism’).
Sayyid Qutb (right) was a leading
member of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and an early advocate of armed jihad. He
was arrested and executed by the leftist-nationalist regime of Gamal Abdel
Nasser in 1966
It must be emphasised that the
concept of the Islamic State is very much a 20th century construct.
That is why the theory of Islamism
purposefully eschewed a number of ancient commentaries on Qu’ran and Shariah.
It rejected these scholarly works as being either ‘stuck in the mosque’ or
undertaken to serve kings who had divorced Islam from politics.
It is, however, ironic that Islamism
(across the Cold War), was largely supported and funded by Western and Arab
powers to prop-up opposition against Muslim countries and regimes that were in
the ‘Soviet camp’ or were seen detrimental to Western economic and
geo-political interests.
For example, it is now well-known
how the United States and its Western and Arab allies (especially Saudi
Arabia), funded various early Islamist movements to undermine left-leaning
governments and elements in the Muslim world. These movements included the
Muslim Brotherhood and Jamat-i-Islami.
The exception in this respect was
the (Shia) Iranian Islamists. Though the main groundwork for the 1979
revolution in Iran was done by leftists and constitutionalists, the Iranian
forces of Islamism successfully steered the revolution towards becoming an
Islamic one. Iran also remains to be Islamism’s only tangible political
enactment – though ever since it has greatly suffered from grave economic and
social strife.
Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini was the
leading exponent of Islamism among the Shia Muslims.
The arrangement between Islamists
and its Western and Saudi backers reached a peak in the 1980s during the
‘anti-Soviet jihad’ in Afghanistan.
With the fall of the Soviet Union,
and the drying up of the patronage and funds Islamism’s leading organs were
receiving (from the West), movements attached to Islamism started to weaken and
fragment.
Consequently, Islamism’s less
intellectually inclined (and more brutal) cousin, Neo-Fundamentalism, soon
began usurping its agenda and political space.
Islamism forces tried to rebound
after the Cold War through the democratic process but found themselves being
accused of being apologists of violent Neo-Fundamentalists on the one side and
of being lukewarm towards Islamising the society on the other.
Wherever they did manage to come
into power (through democracy), they have struggled to initiate effective
political and economic reforms mainly due to the fact that they end up creating
polarisation and administrational chaos by trying to couple solutions to
non-religious issues with certain ill-defined religion-orientated alternatives
and manoeuvres.
Muhammad Morsi, a member of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, was
elected President of Egypt in 2012. Within a year he fell from grace as
millions of his opponents took to the streets demanding his resignation. He was
ousted in a military coup in July 2013. Like most moderate components of
modern-day Islamism, Morsi too ended up creating polarisation and
administrational chaos by trying to couple solutions to non-religious issues
with certain ill-defined religion-orientated alternatives and manoeuvres.
Early manifestations: Ibn Taymmiya (13th -14th Century Arabian theologian); Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahab (18th Century Arabian scholar); Abul Ala Maududi (20th Century Indian/Pakistani Islamic scholar). Noted Modern Islamism groups: Muslim Brotherhood (Middle East); Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan); Islamic Republican Party (Iran); National Islamic Front (Sudan); Hamas (Palestine); Hezbollah (Lebanon). Emphasis: • Advocates Islam as a moral as well as political system. • Open to the modern interpretations of traditional Islamic texts but only if they accommodate the political goals of Islamism. • Seeks legislative means to impose ‘Islamic’ moral, economic and social codes and laws. • Persues state power by infiltrating various state organs such as the military, bureaucracy, judiciary and the police. • Absorbs secular ‘Western’ political and economic ideas to tweak them with intellectual improvisations and consequently add an ‘Islamic’ dimension to them (‘Islamic banking’; ‘Islamic democracy;’ Islamic science;’ etc.). • Vehemently opposed to secularism, even though not immune to use secular systems and political processes to achieve state and governmental power. • Analyses modern history as a conflict between revolutionary socio-political and economic doctrines and movements of Islam and the economic, cultural and political hegemony of amoral (capitalist and [formerly] communist) interests (especially emitting from the West
• Doesn't directly resort to armed
militancy but is known to facilitate and support it.
Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism:
Neo-Fundamentalism in Political
Islam is a tendency that aims to politicise and radicalise the social and
cultural aspects of Islamic Fundamentalism.
Neo-Fundamentalism rose with the
emergence of the Taliban in 1996 (in Afghanistan and Pakistan), and began
filling the void created by the post-Cold War weakening of Islamism.
Like traditional Islamic
Fundamentalism, Neo-Fundamentalism too maintains that the gates of ijtihad
in Islam are closed and there is no room for reason in the act of understanding
religious texts that are to be taken at face value.
However, unlike Islamic
Fundamentalism, Neo-Fundamentalism looks to impose Islamic laws, morality and
piety by force and through armed struggle (jihad), and through the
creation of an ‘Islamic State’ (and/or ‘Islamic Emirate’).
Sultan Bajad, the leader of the
early 20th Century radical Islamic militia, the Akhwan, that helped Ibn Saud
come to power in what is today Saudi Arabia.
The rise of the Taliban and the al
Qaeda in the 1990s is seen to symbolise the emergence of ‘Islamic
Neo-Fundamentalism.’
Where Islamic Fundamentalists use
concentrated evangelical tactics to supposedly ‘cleanse Muslim societies of
un-Islamic practices,’ Neo-Fundamentalists use violence, coercion and
terrorism.
Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism has
further narrowed itself to become a squarely Sunni sectarian tendency that in
the last decade has exhibited extreme displays of religious and sectarian
xenophobia and violence bordering on nihilism.
It is also devoid of the
intellectual tradition associated with Islamism, settling instead for radical
polemical Islamist literature and thought that advocates violent action and an
extremely narrow worldview.
Armed members of Nigeria’s
Neo-Fundamentalist group, the Boko Haram
Early manifestations: The Kharijites (7th Century Arabian puritans); the Akhwan
(an early 20th century Islamic militia that helped Ibn Saud capture power in
what today is Saudi Arabia).
Noted modern-day Islamic
Neo-Fundamentalist groups: Al Qaeda
and its many affiliates (international); the Taliban (Pakistan/Afghanistan);
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Pakistan); Islamic Salvation Army (Algeria); Armed Islamic
Group (Algeria); Union of Islamic Courts (Somalia); Boko Haram (Nigeria).
Emphasis:
• Totally rejects any modern
interpretation of the Qu’ran and insists that it should be read and understood
literally.
• Rejects all modern concepts of
participatory and constitutional politics.
• Advocates armed jihad as
one of the foremost tenants of Islam.
• Describes a majority of Islamic
sects to be heretical.
• Rejects most intellectual works
and commentaries on Qu’ran, hadith and Shariah by both
traditional and modern Islamic scholars, except those by ancient Arabian scholar,
Hanabal and radical ‘Wahabi’ polemical l texts produced by various
modern-day ‘jihadist/sectarian ideologues.’
• Not immune to committing
genocide-like violence against ‘infidels’ and ‘heretical Islamic sects.’
• Treats violence as a replenishing force
for Islam.
Islamic Socialism:
A term first used by the Muslim
Socialist community in Kazan (Russia) just before the 1917 Communist revolution
there. Staunchly anti-clerical, the community supported communist forces but
retained its Muslim identity.
The term then became popular with
certain Muslim members of the Indian National Congress Party and among some
left-leaning sections of the All Indian Muslim League.
Islamic Socialism, as an ideology
that attempted to equate Qu’ranic concepts of equality and charity with modern
Socialist economics, was adopted (as ‘Arab Socialism’ and Ba’ath Socialism) in
Iraq, Syria and Egypt, where secular Muslim leaders fused Islamic notions of
parity and justice with socialism and Arab nationalism.
Though known for its usage of
Islamic symbolism, Islamic Socialism was largely secular, anti-clerical,
socially liberal and mostly sympathetic towards communist powers - Soviet Union
and China.
It eventually became the left-wing
of Political Islam.
Leading architect of ‘Arab
Socialism,’ Egyptian leader, Gamal Abul Nasser (right), with famous Latin
American revolutionary Marxist, Che Guevara in Cairo
Egypt’s popular leader, Gamal Abdel
Nasser, became Arab Socialism’s leading advocate and practitioner; while in
Syria and Iraq the concept became to be known as ‘Ba’ath Socialism’ (Ba’th in
Arabic means renaissance).
After the political success of
Islamic Socialism in these countries, the idea also gained currency in
Pakistan, Algeria, Indonesia, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and Libya.
The National Liberation Front that
led Algeria’s independence from France (1962) described itself as a follower of
Islamic Socialism, and so did the populist Pakistan Peoples Party.
Libya too began calling itself an
Islamic Socialist state after Muammar al-Qadhafi toppled the Libyan monarchy in
a coup in 1969. Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) also
described itself as being Islamic Socialists.
Famous PLO revolutionary and Islamic
Socialist of the 1970s, Leila Khalid in Algeria (1972).
In Iran, radical anti-Shah militant
organisations that fused Islamic symbolism with Marxist/socialist ideas also
appeared. They took an active part in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, but were
then eliminated or banished by the new Islamic regime.
Islamic Socialism was vehemently
attacked and criticised by conservative Muslim monarchies (mainly Saudi
Arabia), as well as by those forces associated with Islamism (such as
Jamaat-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood).
Painter, poet and writer, Hanif
Ramay, was the main theorist and ideologue behind the Pakistan Peoples Party’s
‘Islamic Socialism.’
The charisma attached to Islamic
Socialism began to wither after the death of Nasser in 1970, and when most
Muslim countries began coming closer to the conservative oil-rich Arab
monarchies.
The international oil crises of
1973-74 saw the economic policies of regimes professing Islamic Socialism come
under great stress, creating disillusionment among the masses that began being
drawn towards the advocates of Islamism.
The last major expression of Islamic
Socialism was the (Soviet-backed) ‘Saur Revolution’ in Afghanistan in 1978, led
by the People’s Democratic Party.
By the late 1970s Islamic Socialism
had all but withered away, even though some mainstream right-wing parties in
Muslim countries have (ironically) adopted old Islamic Socialist slogans
despite the fact that most of them had opposed Islamic Socialism during the
Cold War.
Early manifestations: Jamaluddin Afghani (19th Century Pan-Islamic ideologue); Ubaidullah Sindhi (Early 20th Century Indian/Muslim nationalist); Ghulam Ahmed Parvez (20th century Indian/Pakistani nationalist and scholar); Michel Aflaq (20th Century Syrian sociologist, philosopher and Arab nationalist); Ali Shariati (20th Century Iranian scholar and activist). Noted Islamic Socialist groups: Arab Socialist Party (Egypt); Ba’ath Socialist Party (Iraq, Syria); National Liberation Front (Algeria); Pakistan Peoples Party (Pakistan); PLO (Palestine); National Front (Iran); Mojahedin-e-Khalq (Iran); Peoples Fadayeen (Iran). Emphasis: • Described socialist doctrines to be the modern manifestations of Islam’s emphasis on equality, charity and justice. • In the context of the historicity of Muslim societies, Islamic Socialism understood the Marxist concept of historical class struggle as an on-going tussle between the upright have-nots and the oppressive ruling elites in the shape of kings, dictators and those exploiting Islam (through distortion of Islamic texts, superstition and coercion) to safeguard the rulers’ political and economic interests. • Defined Islamism, the politicised clergy, conservative ulema and Arab monarchies as tools of capitalist/feudal exploitation and ‘Western imperialism.’ • Contextualised secularism in Muslim societies by suggesting that Islam was inherently secular because it had no official priesthood and that the Prophet Muhammad was exceptionally pluralistic in his handling of the non-Muslim populations of Makkah and Madina. • Offered itself to be the most effective alternative (in Muslim countries) to monopolistic capitalism/feudalism/ • Was extremely pro-ijtihad and encouraged an understanding and reading of Islamic texts as reflecting the modern economic, political and secular manifestations of Islamic Socialism. Liberal Islam: Though many liberal Muslims consider 8th and 9th century Islamic rationalists (the Mu’tazilites) to be the first political and philosophical expressions of Liberal Islam, in the political context, Liberal Islam just like all other branches of Political Islam, too is a late 19th/early 20th century creation – despite the fact that there is historical accuracy in the claim that major Muslim empires of yore were already largely pluralistic in orientation. Again, in the political context, Liberal Islam can find its roots in some 19th century reformist movements and in the way Muslim countries such as Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey adopted secular western economic and social models in the early 20th century. 
Famous 9th Century Muslim scholar and Mu’tazilite, Al-Kindi.
The emergence of the secular-nationalist movements in the Muslim world too gave impetus to the thought attached to Liberal Islam, and so did the coming to prominence of effusive ideologies such as Islamic Socialism. Liberal Islam has been a flexible entity. Both the anti-West as well as pro-West sections profess it, with the acknowledgment of secularism being the common link between the two. 
Kamal Ataturk, founder of the modern Turkish nation, remains
to be the most secular expression of Liberal Islam.
Many democratic political parties of the left as well of the right, and also authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world can be termed as having liberal views about Islam’s political and social role. These parties and regimes are highly suspicious of the clergy and repulsed by the political ambitions of Islamism and Neo-Fundamentalism. They encourage ijtihad in matters like the understanding of the Qu’ran and Shariah, and emphasise that Islam is best served through the mosque instead of through state or the government. An emphasis on multiculturalism, nationalism and democratic pluralism too is made, even though, as mentioned before, some Liberal Muslim organs have been authoritarian as well. 
The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was a liberal
Muslim and envisioned Pakistan as a modern, democratic and progressive
Muslim-majority state. However, after his death in 1948 (just a year after
Pakistan’s creation), Pakistan’s politics gradually slipped from the hands of
liberal Muslims.
The next six decades saw an intense political tussle between
forces of Islamism and Islamic Socialism and then between Islamism, Islamic
Neo-Fundamentalism and the more watered down expressions of Liberal Islam.
Most mainstream political parties in the Muslim world today can be said to be following various degrees of Liberal Islam. Not all of them are secular in the western sense of the word, but they are flexible in their outlook towards matters such as Islamic laws, and concepts and practices that are deemed as ‘un-Islamic’ by their Islamist opponents (such as co-education, non-segregated events, women’s rights, films, music, alcohol, etc.). Early manifestations: Al-Kindi (9th Century Arabian philosopher and scholar); Akbar (16th Century Mughal emperor); Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Syed Amer Ali (19th Century Indian Muslim scholars); Mustafa Kamal Pasha (Turkish general, nationalist and founder of modern Turkey); Mohammad Arkoun (20th Century Algerian scholar); Noted Liberal Islam political parties with large vote banks: Indonesian Democratic Party; People’s Alliance (Malaysia); National Liberation Front (Algeria); Bangladesh Awami League (Bangladesh); National Democratic Party (Egypt); Maldivian Democratic Party (Maldives); Socialist Union (Morocco); Popular Movement (Morocco); Action Congress (Nigeria); Pakistan Peoples Party (Pakistan); Muttahida Qaumi Movement (Pakistan); Awami National Party (Pakistan); People’s Democratic Party (Tajikistan); Republican People’s Party (Turkey); Liberal Democratic Party (Uzbekistan). Emphasis: • Encourages constant Ijtihad and the contextualised, metaphorical and rational reading of the Qu’ran and related Islamic texts. • Also advocates an individual (non-clerical) reading of the Qu’ran and the hadith; some strands of Liberal Islam reject the hadith for being unreliable and being manipulated manifestations of the political and theological interests of ancient Muslim kings and ulema and thus dangerous in the hands of modern-day clerics and Islamists. • Understands Qu’ran to be a book of moral guidance as opposed to a political manifesto (as proclaimed by Islamism). • Advocates the complete separation of the state and religion because politics (that, by nature, is amoral), ends up staining Islam that is supposed to be pristine and dignified. • Abhors coercion in matters of dress, ritual and social behaviour (imposed in the name of Islam) because according to the Qu’ran ‘there is no compulsion in religion.’ • Insists that the Qu’ranic concept of aqal (reason, observation and logic) should be given precedence over the ritualistic aspects to form an educated and progressive Muslim society that can through reasoning come to a democratic consensus on what is right or wrong as long as it does not retard the society’s economic, social, cultural and political evolution. • Also insists that faith should be a personal matter because when it is dragged out into the public it might come into conflict with certain rules and regulations prescribed by the state and the government and with the sentiments of other religions and differing sects. References: Oliver Roy, The failure of Political Islam (Harvard University Press, 1998) p.2 Muhammad Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam (University of Michigan, 2007). Roger Hardy, The Muslim Revolt, (Harsh Publishers 1999) p.18 Ziauddin Sardar, Islam, Post-Modernism & Other Futures (Pluto Press 2001) p.100 Martin Kramer, Fundamentalists or Islamists? (Middle East Qutarly, 2003) pp.65-70 Abdullah Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy & Islam (Ashgate Publishing, 2004) p.90 James Toth, Syed Qutb (Oxford University Press, 2013) p.324 Comments (43)
S Shastri
4 hours ago
@Jibreel Sohail: I also find the multi-page format disturbing and
irritating. It breaks the flow of the narrative. Perhaps DAWN and others do
this to artificially increase the number of "hits" on their web site
which helps in raising their KPIs (key performance indicators), which has
commercial implications.
Satyameva Jayate
5 hours ago
WoW. NFP can educate without being humourous too. Thanks.
Hammad Ansari
5 hours ago
@muhajirkhan: Advertisements
Karachi Wala
5 hours ago
Yeh daagh daagh ujaala, yeh shab gazeedah sahar wo intezaar tha jis ka, yeh
wo sahar to nahin Yeh wo sahar to nahin jis ki aarzoo lekar Chale the yaar ke
mil jaaygi kahin na kahin Falak ke dasht mein taaron ki aakhri manzil Kahin to
hoga shab e sust mauj ka sahil Kahin to ja ke rukega safina e gham e dilJigar ki aag, nazar ki umang, dil ki jalan Kisi pe chaara e hijraan ko kuch asar hi nahin Kahan se aayi nigaar e sabaa, kidhar ko gayi Abhi Charagh e sar e rah ko kuch khabr hi nahin Abhi giraani e shab mein kami nahin aayi Najaat e deedah o dil ki ghari nahi aayi Chale chalo ke wo manzil abhi nahin aayi
Dhammi
5 hours ago
@AbbasToronto: I am Surprised there are Muslims who can think
balance.Congratulations you are human. Dhammi
Karachi Wala
5 hours ago
?? ??? ??? ????? ? ?? ?? ????? ??? ?? ?????? ??? ???? ? ?? ?? ??? ?? ???? ??
?? ??? ?? ???? ?? ?? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ?? ?? ?????? ???? ?? ???? ??? ?? ???
??? ????? ?? ???? ???? ???? ?? ???? ?? ??? ??? ?? ???? ???? ?? ???? ??? ??
????? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ? ??? ?? ????? ?? ?? ??? ??? ?? ???? ????? ?? ??? ??? ??
???? ???? ?? ? ?? ???? ??? ? ???? ?? ??? ???? ???? ?? ??? ?? ??? ??? ?? ????
???? ????? ?? ??? ??? ???? ?? ???? ???? ? ?? ?? ???? ???? ? ?? ??? ??? ?? ??
???? ???? ???? ? ??
muhajirkhan
6 hours ago
@ Dawn web dev, remove the page style, because normally people dont want to
read the complete article in 13pages. whts the strategy behind this page style article?
Karachi Wala
7 hours ago
A deep and thought provoking analysis as usual. Thanks NFP
Ahsan Raza
7 hours ago
Not many writers have such a grip and vision in now a days who can summarize
such a vast topic according to young generation. As usual Nadeem F Paracha,
well done..
hamid
7 hours ago
@Pankaj: when u talk about Indian Muslims u r in fact falling short of
understanding the main concept of liberal Islam.
Jamshed Khan
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Friday, July 19, 2013
Political Islam: Rise, fragmentation and possible fall - By Nadeem F. Paracha - DAWN, Karachi
Wednesday, July 17, 2013
When will India root out the tyranny of the Majority? - Ghulam Muhammed | Appeasing the Majority? - Tahir Mahmood - The Times of India
When will India root out the tyranny of the Majority?
The short answer could be: when it suits the West.
Egyptian episode is fresh, when an elected President Mursi was overthrown and put in prison on trumped up charges, the West with an overwhelming support from paid media writers, filing out reams of analysis, accusing President Mursi of the 'tyranny of the Majority'. For arguments sake, India's democratic polity has been unleashing and justifying the 'tyranny of the Majority' for over 60 years and there is no respite for those marginalized and pushed down the barrel from continuous and relentless ostracization, demonisation and incarceration by 3% Brahmins with their contrived Hindu majority. To suppress and demoralize the Muslim minority, the latest exposure from the media leak of a internal letter by an under-secretary of the Home Ministry (Interior Ministry) is alleged role of Government in getting its secret agencies to stage attack on Parliament and the terror strikes on the city of Mumbai on 26/11. This diabolic move in which innocent Indian citizens have killed, is supposedly undertaken to ensure that Muslim minority should stay off terrorism. Will this state terrorism can be legitimized. Is this not a case of tyranny of the Majority over a minority?
Muslims are awaiting how the wheels of justice move to put the government in dock and take away the false stigma of the 'terrorism' from the Muslim minority. All the media who are willingly or inadvertently or forcibly and knowingly aided and abetted the government and its agencies should be made accountable in such a horrendous subversion of state machinery working against its own people to impose the tyranny of the majority.
The following article by Professor Dr. Tahir Mahmood, being intermittantly interacting with the government, has tried to be politically correct, by branding the 'Tyranny of the Majority' as possibly 'Appeasement of Majority' with a question mark, or Times of India would not have published his article as TOP ARTICLE.
Ghulam Muhammed, Mumbai
<ghulammuhammed3@gmail.com>
http://timesofindia.
Edit Page
The short answer could be: when it suits the West.
Egyptian episode is fresh, when an elected President Mursi was overthrown and put in prison on trumped up charges, the West with an overwhelming support from paid media writers, filing out reams of analysis, accusing President Mursi of the 'tyranny of the Majority'. For arguments sake, India's democratic polity has been unleashing and justifying the 'tyranny of the Majority' for over 60 years and there is no respite for those marginalized and pushed down the barrel from continuous and relentless ostracization, demonisation and incarceration by 3% Brahmins with their contrived Hindu majority. To suppress and demoralize the Muslim minority, the latest exposure from the media leak of a internal letter by an under-secretary of the Home Ministry (Interior Ministry) is alleged role of Government in getting its secret agencies to stage attack on Parliament and the terror strikes on the city of Mumbai on 26/11. This diabolic move in which innocent Indian citizens have killed, is supposedly undertaken to ensure that Muslim minority should stay off terrorism. Will this state terrorism can be legitimized. Is this not a case of tyranny of the Majority over a minority?
Muslims are awaiting how the wheels of justice move to put the government in dock and take away the false stigma of the 'terrorism' from the Muslim minority. All the media who are willingly or inadvertently or forcibly and knowingly aided and abetted the government and its agencies should be made accountable in such a horrendous subversion of state machinery working against its own people to impose the tyranny of the majority.
The following article by Professor Dr. Tahir Mahmood, being intermittantly interacting with the government, has tried to be politically correct, by branding the 'Tyranny of the Majority' as possibly 'Appeasement of Majority' with a question mark, or Times of India would not have published his article as TOP ARTICLE.
Ghulam Muhammed, Mumbai
<ghulammuhammed3@gmail.com>
P.S. Comments posted on TOI website -
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
http://timesofindia.
TOP ARTICLE
Appeasing the majority?
Tahir Mahmood | Jul 18, 2013, 12.00 AM IST
Pitched political battles are being waged between the votaries of secularism
(the Congress) and those who complain about minority appeasement (the
BJP). But neither of them discuss a third possibility : Indian-style
secularism actually appeases the majority, at the expense of the
country's two largest minorities — Muslims and Christians. It`s worth
pointing out, in that regard, the religious provisions in the
Constitution as well as the lopsided interpretation of secularism since
the very beginning of the constitutional era.
At the time of its adoption, the Constitution neither declared any state religion nor proclaimed India a secular state. By pronouncing 'equality before law and equal protection of laws' as fundamental rights, it mandated the state not to discriminate between the two 'on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them' in respect of public places and employment or appointment under the state.
This was considered enough to make the country `secular` without a formal declaration to that effect. The principle of undeclared secularism was, however, countered by several community-specific provisions either initially incorporated into the Constitution or inserted by some early amendments to it. In the years to come, the state applied, and the courts interpreted, some general constitutional provisions in ways that benefited particular religious communities.
Twenty-six years after its promulgation, the Preamble to the Constitution was amended to include the word `secular`, but all the religion-based provisions survived and remain in force to this day. The custodians of state authority have also continued to apply, and the courts of justice interpret, the general constitutional provisions the same way as before. Successive governments and the judiciary have consistently believed that these special constitutional provisions, administrative measures and judicial decisions detract nothing from the secularity of the state.
Among the religious provisions in the original version of the Constitution, in the chapter on Directive Principles of State Policy, was Article 48 that mandated the state to protect by law the cow and its progeny. Interpreting the laws, the Supreme Court made it clear that the mandate was based on Hindu beliefs. In a later case, the court even said that secularity of the state would not be `relevant` for deciding whether an administrative action mitigating the rigidity of any such law on religious grounds was permissible.
While another Article protected the religious right of the Sikhs to carry the kirpan, among the religious provisions introduced later by way of amendments was Article 290-A, directing the governments of Kerala and Tamil Nadu to pay from their respective exchequers substantial annual annuities to dewasom temples.
The word `only` in the non-discrimination provisions of the Constitution left room for according special favours to particular sections of citizens. Combining caste with social backwardness, the Constitution empowered the state to grant special favours to Scheduled Castes by way of protective discrimination, deciding which castes would be brought under the umbrella.
Although social stratification has always been, and remains, a general phenomenon shared by all religious communities, a Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order was quickly promulgated, furnishing the initial list of `Scheduled Castes`, subject to a condition that only Hindu members of those castes would be covered by the list. Converts to Buddhism from castes named `neo-Buddhists` were to be excluded.
While the Sikhs succeeded just six years later to get their lower castes included, the Buddhists had to wage a 40-year-long struggle to get relief. The Muslims and Christians, who also share those castes, are still struggling against this discriminatory provision. The theoretical egalitarianism of these global faiths is invariably cited to keep their followers out of the ambit of the privileged class of Scheduled Castes.
If a Scheduled Caste Hindu, Buddhist or Sikh were to embrace Christianity or Islam, he would lose his SC status and all its attendant privileges. But should he ever return to his original faith, the privileges would be automatically restored. Although this is not made clear in the Constitution or the Scheduled Castes Order of 1950, this is how the apex court has interpreted the law, asserting it would `serve the interest of justice.`
But no government or court has ever introduced the `interest of justice` principle in respect of any non-minority institution. On the contrary, recognition of `minority character` of even historic minority institutions has been a hard nut to crack. Despite constitutional provisions, state actions and judicial interpretations of a clearly religious nature, the state`s blanket secularity has always been claimed as an alibi to deny any form of `protective discrimination` to Muslims and Christians.
Secularism has been developed on these clearly non-secular lines by political parties claiming to be absolutely secular and minority-friendly. How about parties who denounce their `pseudo-secularism` accusing them of `minority appeasement`? Will the policies hitherto followed to interpret state secularity entitle votaries of `cultural nationalism` to develop secularism to their liking? In view of the forthcoming possibility of change of guard this question merits serious consideration by all right-thinking citizens.
At the time of its adoption, the Constitution neither declared any state religion nor proclaimed India a secular state. By pronouncing 'equality before law and equal protection of laws' as fundamental rights, it mandated the state not to discriminate between the two 'on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them' in respect of public places and employment or appointment under the state.
This was considered enough to make the country `secular` without a formal declaration to that effect. The principle of undeclared secularism was, however, countered by several community-specific provisions either initially incorporated into the Constitution or inserted by some early amendments to it. In the years to come, the state applied, and the courts interpreted, some general constitutional provisions in ways that benefited particular religious communities.
Twenty-six years after its promulgation, the Preamble to the Constitution was amended to include the word `secular`, but all the religion-based provisions survived and remain in force to this day. The custodians of state authority have also continued to apply, and the courts of justice interpret, the general constitutional provisions the same way as before. Successive governments and the judiciary have consistently believed that these special constitutional provisions, administrative measures and judicial decisions detract nothing from the secularity of the state.
Among the religious provisions in the original version of the Constitution, in the chapter on Directive Principles of State Policy, was Article 48 that mandated the state to protect by law the cow and its progeny. Interpreting the laws, the Supreme Court made it clear that the mandate was based on Hindu beliefs. In a later case, the court even said that secularity of the state would not be `relevant` for deciding whether an administrative action mitigating the rigidity of any such law on religious grounds was permissible.
While another Article protected the religious right of the Sikhs to carry the kirpan, among the religious provisions introduced later by way of amendments was Article 290-A, directing the governments of Kerala and Tamil Nadu to pay from their respective exchequers substantial annual annuities to dewasom temples.
The word `only` in the non-discrimination provisions of the Constitution left room for according special favours to particular sections of citizens. Combining caste with social backwardness, the Constitution empowered the state to grant special favours to Scheduled Castes by way of protective discrimination, deciding which castes would be brought under the umbrella.
Although social stratification has always been, and remains, a general phenomenon shared by all religious communities, a Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order was quickly promulgated, furnishing the initial list of `Scheduled Castes`, subject to a condition that only Hindu members of those castes would be covered by the list. Converts to Buddhism from castes named `neo-Buddhists` were to be excluded.
While the Sikhs succeeded just six years later to get their lower castes included, the Buddhists had to wage a 40-year-long struggle to get relief. The Muslims and Christians, who also share those castes, are still struggling against this discriminatory provision. The theoretical egalitarianism of these global faiths is invariably cited to keep their followers out of the ambit of the privileged class of Scheduled Castes.
If a Scheduled Caste Hindu, Buddhist or Sikh were to embrace Christianity or Islam, he would lose his SC status and all its attendant privileges. But should he ever return to his original faith, the privileges would be automatically restored. Although this is not made clear in the Constitution or the Scheduled Castes Order of 1950, this is how the apex court has interpreted the law, asserting it would `serve the interest of justice.`
But no government or court has ever introduced the `interest of justice` principle in respect of any non-minority institution. On the contrary, recognition of `minority character` of even historic minority institutions has been a hard nut to crack. Despite constitutional provisions, state actions and judicial interpretations of a clearly religious nature, the state`s blanket secularity has always been claimed as an alibi to deny any form of `protective discrimination` to Muslims and Christians.
Secularism has been developed on these clearly non-secular lines by political parties claiming to be absolutely secular and minority-friendly. How about parties who denounce their `pseudo-secularism` accusing them of `minority appeasement`? Will the policies hitherto followed to interpret state secularity entitle votaries of `cultural nationalism` to develop secularism to their liking? In view of the forthcoming possibility of change of guard this question merits serious consideration by all right-thinking citizens.
The writer is a former chairman of the National Minorities Commission and an ex-member, Law Commission of India.
RVS Mani whistle-blowing is too horrendous to brush under the carpet!
RVS Mani whistle-blowing is too horrendous to brush under the carpet!
My comments posted on THE HINDU article: 'IB-CBI tussle will hurt us badly' - By Sandeep Joshi:
There is one tangential but very much Himalayan-sized fact that is being exposed by RVS Mani, the Home ministry Under-secretary in his 'leaked' official letter is the shocking decades long policy to target innocent Muslims as 'terrorists' and legislate draconian laws, circumventing all international Human Rights norms --- all in the name of fighting terror. The Mani letter is second most important historical document, as the first Aseemanand affidavit in front of a magistrate, about the role of Hindu terror groups involved in Malegaon and Samjhuta Express bombings. It is most devious logic to target India's own citizens, and giving the pretext of confronting Pakistan in world media condemnations. The guilty should be outed in the name of justice and fair-play without making spurious issues of Pakistan. We seek justice for injustice. If there is involvement of our own agency that is exposed, we should put our own house in order; or we'll always remain target of blackmail by adversaries.
Ghulam Muhammed, Mumbai
<ghulammuhammed3@gmail.com>
P.S.: http://timesofindia.
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
http://www.thehindu.com/news/
The ongoing tussle between the Intelligence Bureau (IB)
and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) over allegations of
involvement of an IB officer in the Ishrat Jahan fake encounter case may
give Pakistan a chance to push back on India’s demand that it do more
to punish those responsible for the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks of 2008.
The most recent — and potentially most damaging — product of the bickering between the two agencies is the leaking of a letter written by a junior former official of the Home Ministry in which he accuses the CBI’s lead investigator in the Ishrat Jahan case of saying both 26/11 and the attack on Parliament in 2001 were orchestrated by the Indian government.
Details of the letter written by R.V.S. Mani were leaked last week, presumably in order to undermine the credibility of senior IPS officer Satish Verma, who led the CBI investigations that saw eight Gujarat police officers chargesheeted and several IB men named for complicity in the murder of Ishrat Jahan.
After first being published in the Times of India, Mr. Mani’s letter has been seized upon by Pakistani newspapers and TV channels to buttress the claim that 26/11 and the Parliament attack were not done by Pakistan-based terrorists but stage-managed by India.
In his letter, Mr. Mani, who signed affidavits on behalf of his Ministry in the Ishrat Jahan case, has complained about pressure being put on him by senior IPS officer Satish Verma to implicate the IB in the drafting of a key affidavit. He added that Mr. Verma also believed the attacks on Parliament in 2001 and Mumbai in 2008 were set up “with the objective of strengthening the counterterror legislation.”
“The way the Pakistani media has blown up this news, it is just matter of days before the Pakistan government again denies any role of Pakistani elements in the 26/11 Mumbai carnage,” a senior Home Ministry official told The Hindu. “The IB-CBI tussle may hurt us badly,” he added. Though Home has yet to receive any letter or document from Mr. Mani, who has since shifted to another ministry, it may order a probe into the entire episode.
In Pakistan, the Express Tribune reproduced the entire Indian news report and headlined it — ‘Startling revelations: Mumbai, Parliament attacks orchestrated.’ “In a shocking disclosure a former officer of the Indian Home Ministry has alleged that the Indian government had orchestrated the two high-profile terrorist attacks which New Delhi has blamed on Pakistan-based militant groups,” its report on Monday said.
Similarly, The Nation published the story as its first lead, titled ‘Indian govt behind Parliament, 26/11 attacks’, while Pakistan Today wrote ‘Indian officer claims govt behind Parliament, 26/11 attacks’. By Tuesday, Mr. Mani’s allegations against Mr. Verma had become, in the telling of Pakistani TV anchors, a “court document,” a “sworn affidavit,” and most studio guests in discussion shows on the subject took the view that Pakistan must formally take up the matter with India and stop giving in to Indian demands that it act against the Lashkar-e-Taiba.
Keywords: Ishrat Jahan fake encounter case, political intereference, IB-CBI tussle, Mumbai terror attacks, R.V.S. Manj,
-----
My comments posted on THE HINDU article: 'IB-CBI tussle will hurt us badly' - By Sandeep Joshi:
There is one tangential but very much Himalayan-sized fact that is being exposed by RVS Mani, the Home ministry Under-secretary in his 'leaked' official letter is the shocking decades long policy to target innocent Muslims as 'terrorists' and legislate draconian laws, circumventing all international Human Rights norms --- all in the name of fighting terror. The Mani letter is second most important historical document, as the first Aseemanand affidavit in front of a magistrate, about the role of Hindu terror groups involved in Malegaon and Samjhuta Express bombings. It is most devious logic to target India's own citizens, and giving the pretext of confronting Pakistan in world media condemnations. The guilty should be outed in the name of justice and fair-play without making spurious issues of Pakistan. We seek justice for injustice. If there is involvement of our own agency that is exposed, we should put our own house in order; or we'll always remain target of blackmail by adversaries.
Ghulam Muhammed, Mumbai
<ghulammuhammed3@gmail.com>
P.S.: http://timesofindia.
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
http://www.thehindu.com/news/
News
NEW DELHI, July 17, 2013‘IB-CBI tussle will hurt us badly’
Sandeep JoshiHome Ministry officials say Pakistan likely to push back on 26/11 demands
The most recent — and potentially most damaging — product of the bickering between the two agencies is the leaking of a letter written by a junior former official of the Home Ministry in which he accuses the CBI’s lead investigator in the Ishrat Jahan case of saying both 26/11 and the attack on Parliament in 2001 were orchestrated by the Indian government.
Details of the letter written by R.V.S. Mani were leaked last week, presumably in order to undermine the credibility of senior IPS officer Satish Verma, who led the CBI investigations that saw eight Gujarat police officers chargesheeted and several IB men named for complicity in the murder of Ishrat Jahan.
After first being published in the Times of India, Mr. Mani’s letter has been seized upon by Pakistani newspapers and TV channels to buttress the claim that 26/11 and the Parliament attack were not done by Pakistan-based terrorists but stage-managed by India.
In his letter, Mr. Mani, who signed affidavits on behalf of his Ministry in the Ishrat Jahan case, has complained about pressure being put on him by senior IPS officer Satish Verma to implicate the IB in the drafting of a key affidavit. He added that Mr. Verma also believed the attacks on Parliament in 2001 and Mumbai in 2008 were set up “with the objective of strengthening the counterterror legislation.”
“The way the Pakistani media has blown up this news, it is just matter of days before the Pakistan government again denies any role of Pakistani elements in the 26/11 Mumbai carnage,” a senior Home Ministry official told The Hindu. “The IB-CBI tussle may hurt us badly,” he added. Though Home has yet to receive any letter or document from Mr. Mani, who has since shifted to another ministry, it may order a probe into the entire episode.
In Pakistan, the Express Tribune reproduced the entire Indian news report and headlined it — ‘Startling revelations: Mumbai, Parliament attacks orchestrated.’ “In a shocking disclosure a former officer of the Indian Home Ministry has alleged that the Indian government had orchestrated the two high-profile terrorist attacks which New Delhi has blamed on Pakistan-based militant groups,” its report on Monday said.
Similarly, The Nation published the story as its first lead, titled ‘Indian govt behind Parliament, 26/11 attacks’, while Pakistan Today wrote ‘Indian officer claims govt behind Parliament, 26/11 attacks’. By Tuesday, Mr. Mani’s allegations against Mr. Verma had become, in the telling of Pakistani TV anchors, a “court document,” a “sworn affidavit,” and most studio guests in discussion shows on the subject took the view that Pakistan must formally take up the matter with India and stop giving in to Indian demands that it act against the Lashkar-e-Taiba.
Keywords: Ishrat Jahan fake encounter case, political intereference, IB-CBI tussle, Mumbai terror attacks, R.V.S. Manj,
-----
Monday, July 15, 2013
MY TODAY'S TWEETS: MURSI AND GHULAM AZAM; ISLAMISM PERCHED ON HIGH MORAL GROUND
Tuesday,
July 16, 2013
MY TODAY'S TWEETS:
https://twitter.com/
Tweets
-
Will Mursi face the same fate as Prof Ghulam Azam Bangladesh sentenced to 90 years in fighting Left liberals to save his country?.
-
"Not since 1980 Iranian revolution, has Islamism again perched itself on the moral high ground": Swapan Dasgupta
Ghulam Muhammed
Saturday, July 13, 2013
How can Sonia Gandhi face any Indian Muslim with a straight face - Ghulam Muhammed
How can Sonia Gandhi face any Indian Muslim with a straight face when her Government's intelligence agencies have an assembly line to manufacture terror incidents. Times of India's reporting is shocking and the buck should stop at the top for such anti-national policy. Supreme Court should take up suo moto a highest level enquiry into this grave matter that concerns India's national security, integrity and unity as pluralist and secular nation.
Ghulam Muhammed, Mumbai
<ghulammuhamed3@gmail.com>
----- ---- ----- ----- -----
http://timesofindia.
Govt behind Parliament attack, 26/11: Ishrat probe officer
TNN | Jul 14, 2013, 12.30 AM IST
The officer said that the terror attacks were set up "with the objective of strengthening the counter-terror legislation (sic)".
NEW DELHI: In what is certain to escalate the already vicious fight between the CBI and the IB over the IshratJahan
"fake encounter case", a former home ministry officer has alleged that a
member of the CBI-SIT team had accused incumbent governments of
"orchestrating" the terror attack on Parliament and the 26/11 carnage in
Mumbai.
R V S Mani, who as home ministry under-secretary signed the affidavits submitted in court in the alleged encounter case, has said that Satish Verma, until recently a part of the CBI-SIT probe team, told him that both the terror attacks were set up "with the objective of strengthening the counter-terror legislation (sic)".
Mani has said that Verma "...narrated that the 13.12. 2001(attack on Parliament) was followed by Pota (Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act) and 26/11 2008 (terrorists' siege of Mumbai) was followed by amendment to the UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act)."
The official has alleged Verma levelled the damaging charge while debunking IB's inputs labelling the three killed with Ishrat in the June 2004 encounter as Lashkar terrorists.
Contacted by TOI, Verma refused to comment. "I don't know what the complaint is, made when and to whom. Nor am I interested in knowing. I cannot speak to the media on such matters. Ask the CBI," said the Gujarat cadre IPS officer who after being relieved from the SIT is working as principal of the Junagadh Police Training College.
Mani, currently posted as deputy land and development officer in the urban development ministry, has written to his seniors that he retorted to Verma's comments telling the IPS officer that he was articulating the views of Pakistani intelligence agency ISI.
According to him, the charge was levelled by Verma in Gandhinagar on June 22 while questioning Mani about the two home ministry affidavits in the alleged encounter case.
In his letter to the joint secretary in the urban development ministry, Mani has accused Verma of "coercing" him into signing a statement that is at odds with facts as he knew them. He said Verma wanted him to sign a statement saying that the home ministry's first affidavit in the Ishrat case was drafted by two IB officers. "Knowing fully well that this would tantamount to falsely indicting of (sic) my seniors at the extant time, I declined to sign any statement."
Giving the context in which Verma allegedly levelled the serious charge against the government, Mani said the IPS officer, while questioning him, had raised doubts about the genuineness of IB's counter-terror intelligence. He disputed the veracity of the input on the antecedents of the three killed in June 2004 on the outskirts of Ahmedabad with Ishrat in the alleged encounter which has since become a polarizing issue while fuelling Congress's fight with Gujarat CM Narendra Modi.
Gujarat Police has justified the encounter citing the IB report that Pakistani nationals Zeeshan Zohar, Amzad Ali Rana and Javed Sheikh were part of a Lashkar module which had reached Gujarat to target Modi and carry out terrorist attacks.
In its first affidavit, filed in August 2009, the home ministry had cited IB inputs that those killed with Ishrat in the alleged encounter were part of a Lashkar sleeper cell, and had objected to a CBI probe into the "encounter".
In its second affidavit, filed in September 2009, the home ministry, irked by the Gujarat government treating the first affidavit as justification of the encounter, said the IB input did not constitute conclusive proof of the terrorist antecedents of those killed. It supported the demand for a CBI probe.
Mani said Verma doubted the input saying MHA's first affidavit was actually drafted by IB officer Rajinder Kumar, who looked after IB's operations in Gujarat at the time of Ishrat "encounter" and now runs the serious risk of being chargesheeted by the CBI for hatching the conspiracy behind the alleged extra-judicial killings.
Mani said Verma stuck to his guns even after being told that the home ministry did not need outside help. The former home ministry official said Verma insisted that the "input" was prepared after the encounter.
R V S Mani, who as home ministry under-secretary signed the affidavits submitted in court in the alleged encounter case, has said that Satish Verma, until recently a part of the CBI-SIT probe team, told him that both the terror attacks were set up "with the objective of strengthening the counter-terror legislation (sic)".
Mani has said that Verma "...narrated that the 13.12. 2001(attack on Parliament) was followed by Pota (Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act) and 26/11 2008 (terrorists' siege of Mumbai) was followed by amendment to the UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act)."
The official has alleged Verma levelled the damaging charge while debunking IB's inputs labelling the three killed with Ishrat in the June 2004 encounter as Lashkar terrorists.
Contacted by TOI, Verma refused to comment. "I don't know what the complaint is, made when and to whom. Nor am I interested in knowing. I cannot speak to the media on such matters. Ask the CBI," said the Gujarat cadre IPS officer who after being relieved from the SIT is working as principal of the Junagadh Police Training College.
Mani, currently posted as deputy land and development officer in the urban development ministry, has written to his seniors that he retorted to Verma's comments telling the IPS officer that he was articulating the views of Pakistani intelligence agency ISI.
According to him, the charge was levelled by Verma in Gandhinagar on June 22 while questioning Mani about the two home ministry affidavits in the alleged encounter case.
In his letter to the joint secretary in the urban development ministry, Mani has accused Verma of "coercing" him into signing a statement that is at odds with facts as he knew them. He said Verma wanted him to sign a statement saying that the home ministry's first affidavit in the Ishrat case was drafted by two IB officers. "Knowing fully well that this would tantamount to falsely indicting of (sic) my seniors at the extant time, I declined to sign any statement."
Giving the context in which Verma allegedly levelled the serious charge against the government, Mani said the IPS officer, while questioning him, had raised doubts about the genuineness of IB's counter-terror intelligence. He disputed the veracity of the input on the antecedents of the three killed in June 2004 on the outskirts of Ahmedabad with Ishrat in the alleged encounter which has since become a polarizing issue while fuelling Congress's fight with Gujarat CM Narendra Modi.
Gujarat Police has justified the encounter citing the IB report that Pakistani nationals Zeeshan Zohar, Amzad Ali Rana and Javed Sheikh were part of a Lashkar module which had reached Gujarat to target Modi and carry out terrorist attacks.
In its first affidavit, filed in August 2009, the home ministry had cited IB inputs that those killed with Ishrat in the alleged encounter were part of a Lashkar sleeper cell, and had objected to a CBI probe into the "encounter".
In its second affidavit, filed in September 2009, the home ministry, irked by the Gujarat government treating the first affidavit as justification of the encounter, said the IB input did not constitute conclusive proof of the terrorist antecedents of those killed. It supported the demand for a CBI probe.
Mani said Verma doubted the input saying MHA's first affidavit was actually drafted by IB officer Rajinder Kumar, who looked after IB's operations in Gujarat at the time of Ishrat "encounter" and now runs the serious risk of being chargesheeted by the CBI for hatching the conspiracy behind the alleged extra-judicial killings.
Mani said Verma stuck to his guns even after being told that the home ministry did not need outside help. The former home ministry official said Verma insisted that the "input" was prepared after the encounter.
Thursday, July 11, 2013
Biryani entrepreneurs stir quick-service pot - The Times of India
Just like Pizza is identified with Italy, Biryani is identified with the Muslim world. Times article opens a new vista to market Biryani as an aristocratic dish, now available to masses, if its marketing as piping hot home delivery product is taken up by well capitalized entrepreneurs. The Biryani without any further ado, is a Muslim dish and Muslims should come forward and build up a brand to promote a positive identity in the world.
Ghulam Muhammed, Mumbai
<ghulammuhammed3@gmail.com>
----- ----- -----
Biryani entrepreneurs stir quick-service pot
“Biryani
is possibly the Indian pizza. It remains intact for deliveries and has
the flavours so essential for local taste buds,” says Gaurav Mathur, one
of the most successful private equity investors in domestic food
sector.
BANGALORE/CHENNAI:
Navaj Sharief, 39, left the family steel business to start Ammi's
Biryani in Bangalore five years ago. It delivers traditional biryani
hassle-free to hungry diners at their homes. Private equity firm SAIF Partners
whetted this self-proclaimed foodie's appetite with an investment deal -
to furiously expand home deliveries and express outlets within the city
first and later nationally.
SAIF committed Rs 40 crore, an amount 10-fold bigger than Ammi's revenue in August last year. Sharief has more than doubled the turnover to Rs 10 crore since then.
Some 600 kilometres away in Hyderabad, Ali Hemmati is working on an overseas investment to take his 60-yearold biryani restaurant Paradise beyond the city of Nizam. The second-generation restaurateur is tweaking the business model to drive home delivery and takeaway sales as he prepares to roll out Paradise in other metros.
A casual encounter with an executive from a fast food MNC fuelled Hemmati's ambitions. "He told me that the only competition to pizzas in India would be if someone could replicate the pizza business model with biryani," he recalls.
Kolkata's Shiraz - the Awadhi biryani served there has found admirers in Javed Akthar, Shabana Azmi and late MF Husain - is talking to private equity investors to expand nationally, and overseas. Shiraz was born in 1970 though its origin dates back to a small restaurant called Taz, established in pre-independence Kolkata by Arshad Ali along with a descendant of the Awadh Nawab's chef.
Sharief and Hemmati are among the new breed of biryani entrepreneurs cooking up a storm in India's fast food business, while challenging the might of global giants such as Yum Brands and McDonald's. Their swift rise in recent years, with a business model to deliver biryani faster than pizzas and burgers is still localized but could raise the stakes in the $1-billion organized quick service restaurant (QSR) industry.
"Biryani is possibly the Indian pizza. It remains intact for deliveries and has the flavours so essential for local taste buds," says Gaurav Mathur, one of the most successful private equity investors in domestic food sector. "But the challenge is to scale up and build a brand. The biryani styles are varied, with strong regional preferences," adds Mathur, who was involved with early investments of JP Morgan in Jubilant Foodworks and MTR Foods.
Biryani's fast food makeover and investor interest have tempted many regional cousins to aspire for their break-out moments. Neighbourhood express counters serving biryani from Ambur, Bhatkal, Beary, Malabar and Kolkata have already cluttered southern cities with a significant influx of formal workforce and a serious eating-out economy.
The more than five-decade old Thalapakatti Restaurant, a family-run biryani business from Dindigul in Tamil Nadu, now serves over 8,500 plates across 15 outlets in Chennai. Nagasamy Naidu started Ananda Vilas Biryani Stall at Dindigul in 1957, which later evolved as Thalappakatti Restaurant, referring to the turbaned (or 'thalappakatti' ) Naidu.
"About 30% of our business is sent out on delivery and that number is growing. With people increasingly having lesser time, they prefer home or office deliveries which is sent free of cost," says D Nagasamy, Thalappakkatti Hotels MD and third generation family scion. After winning a recent trademark dispute, he is spearheading Dindigul style biryani into newer markets like Bangalore, Mumbai and Delhi. "We plan to open another 40 outlets in the next two years," Nagasamy adds.
Bangalore in the past four years has seen multiple biryani start-ups such as Mani's Dum Biryani and Biryani Zone, modelling their business along international QSR chains. "Home delivery is the core growth driver accounting for 50% of our sales," says Sharief of Ammi's Biryani, who built his business on a central kitchen model to augment home deliveries. His TMA Hospitality also operates 25 express outlets of the Ammi's brand.
While Hemmati of Paradise argues that biryani can reach your home faster than a pizza, it's also the pricing that makes it a serious challenger in the galloping fast food industry. A regular plate of nonvegetarian biryani retails at approximately Rs 150-170 across the country, while a medium pizza would set one back by Rs 500. The operating profit in a predominantly delivery-run business is between 15-25 %, while some push it up offering kebabs or a full meal around the biryani.
These modern biryani retailers have also kept pace with the changing food habits of more health conscious diners, says Nimish Bhatia, corporate chef at Lalit Suri Hospitality Group based in Delhi. "Ghee has been replaced by refined oil, spices have been tempered and the meat is lean," he explains as these entrepreneurs try to dispel the myth that one needs to hit the bed after a biryani session laced with spices and aroma.
Dishing out a delight
Competition to pizza
A regular plate of non-veg biryani retails at approximately Rs 150-170 while a medium pizza costs Rs 500.
The operating profit in a delivery-run biryani business is 15-25 %, which goes up with kebab offerings.
In expansion mode
Bangalore's Ammi's Biryani has won Rs 40 crore funding from SAIF Partners Kolkata's Shiraz, which serves Awadhi biryani, is talking to PE investors to expand nationally and overseas Hyderabad's Ali Hemmati biryani is eyeing overseas investment to expand beyond the city of Nizams.
SAIF committed Rs 40 crore, an amount 10-fold bigger than Ammi's revenue in August last year. Sharief has more than doubled the turnover to Rs 10 crore since then.
Some 600 kilometres away in Hyderabad, Ali Hemmati is working on an overseas investment to take his 60-yearold biryani restaurant Paradise beyond the city of Nizam. The second-generation restaurateur is tweaking the business model to drive home delivery and takeaway sales as he prepares to roll out Paradise in other metros.
A casual encounter with an executive from a fast food MNC fuelled Hemmati's ambitions. "He told me that the only competition to pizzas in India would be if someone could replicate the pizza business model with biryani," he recalls.
Kolkata's Shiraz - the Awadhi biryani served there has found admirers in Javed Akthar, Shabana Azmi and late MF Husain - is talking to private equity investors to expand nationally, and overseas. Shiraz was born in 1970 though its origin dates back to a small restaurant called Taz, established in pre-independence Kolkata by Arshad Ali along with a descendant of the Awadh Nawab's chef.
Sharief and Hemmati are among the new breed of biryani entrepreneurs cooking up a storm in India's fast food business, while challenging the might of global giants such as Yum Brands and McDonald's. Their swift rise in recent years, with a business model to deliver biryani faster than pizzas and burgers is still localized but could raise the stakes in the $1-billion organized quick service restaurant (QSR) industry.
"Biryani is possibly the Indian pizza. It remains intact for deliveries and has the flavours so essential for local taste buds," says Gaurav Mathur, one of the most successful private equity investors in domestic food sector. "But the challenge is to scale up and build a brand. The biryani styles are varied, with strong regional preferences," adds Mathur, who was involved with early investments of JP Morgan in Jubilant Foodworks and MTR Foods.
Biryani's fast food makeover and investor interest have tempted many regional cousins to aspire for their break-out moments. Neighbourhood express counters serving biryani from Ambur, Bhatkal, Beary, Malabar and Kolkata have already cluttered southern cities with a significant influx of formal workforce and a serious eating-out economy.
The more than five-decade old Thalapakatti Restaurant, a family-run biryani business from Dindigul in Tamil Nadu, now serves over 8,500 plates across 15 outlets in Chennai. Nagasamy Naidu started Ananda Vilas Biryani Stall at Dindigul in 1957, which later evolved as Thalappakatti Restaurant, referring to the turbaned (or 'thalappakatti' ) Naidu.
"About 30% of our business is sent out on delivery and that number is growing. With people increasingly having lesser time, they prefer home or office deliveries which is sent free of cost," says D Nagasamy, Thalappakkatti Hotels MD and third generation family scion. After winning a recent trademark dispute, he is spearheading Dindigul style biryani into newer markets like Bangalore, Mumbai and Delhi. "We plan to open another 40 outlets in the next two years," Nagasamy adds.
Bangalore in the past four years has seen multiple biryani start-ups such as Mani's Dum Biryani and Biryani Zone, modelling their business along international QSR chains. "Home delivery is the core growth driver accounting for 50% of our sales," says Sharief of Ammi's Biryani, who built his business on a central kitchen model to augment home deliveries. His TMA Hospitality also operates 25 express outlets of the Ammi's brand.
While Hemmati of Paradise argues that biryani can reach your home faster than a pizza, it's also the pricing that makes it a serious challenger in the galloping fast food industry. A regular plate of nonvegetarian biryani retails at approximately Rs 150-170 across the country, while a medium pizza would set one back by Rs 500. The operating profit in a predominantly delivery-run business is between 15-25 %, while some push it up offering kebabs or a full meal around the biryani.
These modern biryani retailers have also kept pace with the changing food habits of more health conscious diners, says Nimish Bhatia, corporate chef at Lalit Suri Hospitality Group based in Delhi. "Ghee has been replaced by refined oil, spices have been tempered and the meat is lean," he explains as these entrepreneurs try to dispel the myth that one needs to hit the bed after a biryani session laced with spices and aroma.
Dishing out a delight
Competition to pizza
A regular plate of non-veg biryani retails at approximately Rs 150-170 while a medium pizza costs Rs 500.
The operating profit in a delivery-run biryani business is 15-25 %, which goes up with kebab offerings.
In expansion mode
Bangalore's Ammi's Biryani has won Rs 40 crore funding from SAIF Partners Kolkata's Shiraz, which serves Awadhi biryani, is talking to PE investors to expand nationally and overseas Hyderabad's Ali Hemmati biryani is eyeing overseas investment to expand beyond the city of Nizams.
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