Sunday, February 20, 2011

Programme on challenges for minority politicized - By Rehan Ansari, TwoCircles.net

http://twocircles.net/2011feb20/programme_challenges_minority_politicized.html

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Programme on challenges for minority politicized

Submitted by admin3 on 20 February 2011 - 10:37pm
By Rehan Ansari, TwoCircles.net,

Mumbai: ETV Urdu organized a seminar on challenges before the minority in Hotel Kempski in Mumbai on Sunday which was telecast live on all its channels in over 7 countries. The programme ran into trouble when the invitation sent by ETV Urdu, mentioned Rajnath Singh, the former president of the BJP, as the president of the programme. 


Some Muslim organizations boycotted this programme and alleged that ETV Urdu is acting like paid media to soften Muslims towards BJP’s leadership and the Sangh Parivar. As expected people started hooting and disturbing many speakers like Salman Khurshid, P.A. Inamdar- leaders of Congress and Rajnath Singh.

Presence of Politicians politicized the issue and speakers of congress blamed the BJP and BJP blamed the Congress for the backwardness of Muslims. Blaming Congress, Rajnath Singh, leader of the BJP said, “Sachar committee report suggests that it’s not the BJP which ruled only for 6 years but others who are ruling since last 60 years, are responsible for the backwardness of Muslim.”

L-R: Maharashtra CM Prithviraj Chavan and Salman Khurshid

On Gujarat riots 2002, he said that there were many communal riots after the independence and Muslims should also remember other riots also. During his speech some members from the audience started questioning and asked about his views on Sachar Committee and reservations for Muslims and found him non committal. He said, “We will discuss it in the Party and will let you know.” He was also questioned about Malegaon and Swami Aseemanad.

Salman Khurshid, Union Minister of Minority Affair highlighted the commitment of the UPA II on maintaining the minority status of Aligarh Muslim University and Jamia Millia.

Rajnath Singh

Prithivi Raj Chauhan, Chief Minister of Maharashtra announced construction of two more Haj Houses one in Nagpur and the other in Aurangabad. He said, “Lots of discussion has taken place now; we should act and our government have identified the problems and are working on a roadmap.

Arif Nasim Khan Minister of Minority affair and Awqaf declared that government has freed 450 acres of waqf land from illegal occupants. He also announced that the Maharashtra government is the first to implement Prime Minister’s 15 points programme.

He announced that “a monitoring committee of MLAs the legislative committee will be formed to look after the implementation of Minority schemes and prepare a yearly report that later will be tabled in the assembly and will be discussed.”

Maulana Mehmood Madni, secretary, Jamiatul Ulema Hind stressed the need for education and said, “We must teach our kids at any cost.”

Those who participated in the programme include Ms.Fauzia Khan, MoS for Minority affair, Mohan Prakash, secretary Congress Committee, Delhi, Manik Rao Thackeray, president, Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee, Shanwaz Husain, and other leaders of BJP.

Islam and demography - Economist | The Future of the Global Muslim Population - The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life

http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=7294978&story_id=18008022


Islam and demography

A waxing crescent

Islam is growing. But ageing and slowing. That will change the world

Jan 27th 2011 | From The Economist print edition
ARE Muslims taking over the world, or at a minimum, transforming Europe into Eurabia? Whatever your hopes or fears for the future of the world’s religions, a report published this week has plenty to stoke them. “The Future of the Global Muslim Population”, produced by the Pew Research Centre, a non-profit outfit based in Washington, DC, reckons Muslim numbers will soar from 1.6 billion in 2010 to 2.2 billion by 2030. In other words, from 23.4% to 26.4% of the global total.

At the heart of its analysis is the ongoing effect of a “youth bulge” which peaked in 2000. In 1990 Islam’s share of the world’s youth was 20%; in 2010, 26%. In 2030 it will be 29% (of 15-to-29-year-olds). But the Muslim world is slowly heading towards paunchiness: the median age in Muslim-majority countries was 19 in 1990. It is 24 now, and will be 30 by 2030. (For French, Germans and Japanese the figure is 40 or over.) This suggests Muslim numbers will ultimately stop climbing, but later than the rest of the world population.

The authors call their calculations demographic, not political. Drawing on earlier Pew research, they say conversion is not a big factor in the global contest between Islam, Christianity and other faiths; the converts balance out. Nor do they assess piety; via the imperfect data of the United Nations, the European Union and national statistics, they aim simply to measure how many people call themselves Muslim, at least culturally, if asked.

New numbers, they say, will change the world map. As Indonesia prospers, its birth rate is falling; South Asia’s remains very high. By 2030, 80m extra mouths in Pakistan will boost its Muslim numbers to 256m, ousting Indonesia (with 239m) as the most populous Islamic land. India’s Muslim minority will be nearly as large at 236m—though growth is slowing there too. And in 2030 India’s Muslims will still constitute only a modest 15.9% of that country’s swelling total, against 14.6% now.

The report asserts no causal link between Islamic teaching and high fertility rates, although it notes that poverty and poor education are a problem in many Muslim lands. In Muslim countries such as Bangladesh and Turkey, it observes, the lay and religious authorities encourage birth control. Better medical care and lower mortality boost poor-country population numbers too.

Some bleak findings concern Nigeria, where Muslim numbers are seen rising to 117m in 2030 from 76m now, edging up from 47.9% to 51.5% of the population. Illiteracy among Nigerian women of child-bearing age is three times as high among Muslims (71.9%) as among others (23.9%). Two-thirds of Nigerian Muslim women lack any formal education; that goes for just over a tenth of their non-Muslim sisters. The fertility rate is between six and seven children per Muslim woman, versus five for non-Muslims. It is hard to prove that these factors are related, but they do seem to form a pattern.
 

Eurabian nights
The total Muslim share of Europe’s population is predicted to grow from 6% now to 8% in 2030: hardly the stuff of nightmares. But amid that are some sharp rises. The report assumes Britain has 2.9m Muslims now (far higher than the usual estimates, which suggest 2.4m at most), rising to 5.6m by 2030. As poor migrants start families in Spain and Italy, numbers there will rocket; in France and Germany, where some Muslims are middle-class, rises will be more modest—though from a higher base. Russia’s Muslims will increase to 14.4% or 18.6m, up from 11.7% now (partly because non-Muslims are declining). The report takes a cautious baseline of 2.6m American Muslims in 2010, but predicts the number will surge by 2030 to 6.2m, or 1.7% of the population—about the same size as Jews or Episcopalians. In Canada the Muslim share will surge from 2.8% to 6.6%.

How will liberal democracies accommodate such variety? The clarity of a written constitution may give America an advantage over many European countries, where unwritten custom has more sway. Jonathan Laurence, an Islam-watcher and professor at Boston College, thinks Europe could rise to the challenge, but failure is also easy to imagine. Europe’s Muslims should, by 2030, have become articulate and effective political bargainers. But with nativism on the march, it is also highly possible that Muslims will come to feel they have less in common with their fellow citizens than with their growing band of co-religionists elsewhere.

--------------------------
http://pewforum.org/The-Future-of-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx


The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life


The Future of the Global Muslim Population

Projections for 2010-2030

ANALYSIS January 27, 2011
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md2-lede_large Executive Summary
The world’s Muslim population is expected to increase by about 35% in the next 20 years, rising from 1.6 billion in 2010 to 2.2 billion by 2030, according to new population projections by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life.
Globally, the Muslim population is forecast to grow at about twice the rate of the non-Muslim population over the next two decades – an average annual growth rate of 1.5% for Muslims, compared with 0.7% for non-Muslims. If current trends continue, Muslims will make up 26.4% of the world’s total projected population of 8.3 billion in 2030, up from 23.4% of the estimated 2010 world population of 6.9 billion.
While the global Muslim population is expected to grow at a faster rate than the non-Muslim population, the Muslim population nevertheless is expected to grow at a slower pace in the next two decades than it did in the previous two decades. From 1990 to 2010, the global Muslim population increased at an average annual rate of 2.2%, compared with the projected rate of 1.5% for the period from 2010 to 2030.
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These are among the key findings of a comprehensive report on the size, distribution and growth of the global Muslim population. The report by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life seeks to provide up-to-date estimates of the number of Muslims around the world in 2010 and to project the growth of the Muslim population from 2010 to 2030. The projections are based both on past demographic trends and on assumptions about how these trends will play out in future years. Making these projections inevitably entails a host of uncertainties, including political ones. Changes in the political climate in the United States or European nations, for example, could dramatically affect the patterns of Muslim migration.
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If current trends continue, however, 79 countries will have a million or more Muslim inhabitants in 2030, up from 72 countries today.1 A majority of the world’s Muslims (about 60%) will continue to live in the Asia-Pacific region, while about 20% will live in the Middle East and North Africa, as is the case today. But Pakistan is expected to surpass Indonesia as the country with the single largest Muslim population. The portion of the world’s Muslims living in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to rise; in 20 years, for example, more Muslims are likely to live in Nigeria than in Egypt. Muslims will remain relatively small minorities in Europe and the Americas, but they are expected to constitute a growing share of the total population in these regions.
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In the United States, for example, the population projections show the number of Muslims more than doubling over the next two decades, rising from 2.6 million in 2010 to 6.2 million in 2030, in large part because of immigration and higher-than-average fertility among Muslims. The Muslim share of the U.S. population (adults and children) is projected to grow from 0.8% in 2010 to 1.7% in 2030, making Muslims roughly as numerous as Jews or Episcopalians are in the United States today. Although several European countries will have substantially higher percentages of Muslims, the United States is projected to have a larger number of Muslims by 2030 than any European countries other than Russia and France. (See the Americas section for more details.)
In Europe as a whole, the Muslim share of the population is expected to grow by nearly one-third over the next 20 years, rising from 6% of the region’s inhabitants in 2010 to 8% in 2030. In absolute numbers, Europe’s Muslim population is projected to grow from 44.1 million in 2010 to 58.2 million in 2030. The greatest increases – driven primarily by continued migration – are likely to occur in Western and Northern Europe, where Muslims will be approaching double-digit percentages of the population in several countries. In the United Kingdom, for example, Muslims are expected to comprise 8.2% of the population in 2030, up from an estimated 4.6% today. In Austria, Muslims are projected to reach 9.3% of the population in 2030, up from 5.7% today; in Sweden, 9.9% (up from 4.9% today); in Belgium, 10.2% (up from 6% today); and in France, 10.3% (up from 7.5% today). (See the Europe section.)
Several factors account for the faster projected growth among Muslims than non-Muslims worldwide. Generally, Muslim populations tend to have higher fertility rates (more children per woman) than non-Muslim populations. In addition, a larger share of the Muslim population is in, or soon will enter, the prime reproductive years (ages 15-29). Also, improved health and economic conditions in Muslim-majority countries have led to greater-than-average declines in infant and child mortality rates, and life expectancy is rising even faster in Muslim-majority countries than in other less-developed countries. (See the section on Main Factors Driving Population Growth for more details. For a list of Muslim-majority countries and definitions for the terms less- and more-developed, see the section on Muslim- Majority Countries.)

Growing, But at a Slower Rate

The growth of the global Muslim population, however, should not obscure another important demographic trend: the rate of growth among Muslims has been slowing in recent decades and is likely to continue to decline over the next 20 years, as the graph below shows. From 1990 to 2000, the Muslim population grew at an average annual rate of 2.3%. The growth rate dipped to 2.1% from 2000 to 2010, and it is projected to drop to 1.7% from 2010 to 2020 and 1.4% from 2020 to 2030 (or 1.5% annually over the 20-year period from 2010 to 2030, as previously noted).
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The declining growth rate is due primarily to falling fertility rates in many Muslim-majority countries, including such populous nations as Indonesia and Bangladesh. Fertility is dropping as more women in these countries obtain a secondary education, living standards rise and people move from rural areas to cities and towns. (See the Related Factors section for more details.)
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The slowdown in Muslim population growth is most pronounced in the Asia- Pacific region, the Middle East-North Africa and Europe, and less sharp in sub-Saharan Africa. The only region where Muslim population growth is accelerating through 2020 is the Americas, largely because of immigration. (For details, see the charts on population growth in the sections of this report on Asia-Pacific, Middle-East-North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and the Americas.)
Falling birth rates eventually will lead to significant shifts in the age structure of Muslim populations. While the worldwide Muslim population today is relatively young, the so-called Muslim “youth bulge” – the high percentage of Muslims in their teens and 20s – peaked around the year 2000 and is now declining. (See the Age Structure section for more details.)
In 1990, more than twothirds of the total population of Muslim-majority countries was under age 30. Today, people under 30 make up about 60% of the population of these countries, and by 2030 they are projected to fall to about 50%.
At the same time, many Muslim-majority countries will have aging populations; between 2010 and 2030, the share of people age 30 and older in these countries is expected to rise from 40% to 50%, and the share of people age 60 and older is expected nearly to double, from 7% to 12%.
Muslim-majority countries, however, are not the only ones with aging populations. As birth rates drop and people live longer all around the globe, the population of the entire world is aging. As a result, the global Muslim population will remain comparatively youthful for decades to come. The median age in Muslim-majority countries, for example, rose from 19 in 1990 to 24 in 2010 and is expected to climb to 30 by 2030. But it will still be lower than the median age in North America, Europe and other more-developed regions, which rose from 34 to 40 between 1990 and 2010 and is projected to be 44 in 2030. By that year, nearly three-inten of the world’s youth and young adults – 29.1% of people ages 15-29 – are projected to be Muslims, up from 25.8% in 2010 and 20.0% in 1990.
Other key findings of the study include:

Worldwide

  • Sunni Muslims will continue to make up an overwhelming majority of Muslims in 2030 (87- 90%). The portion of the world’s Muslims who are Shia may decline slightly, largely because of relatively low fertility in Iran, where more than a third of the world’s Shia Muslims live.
  • As of 2010, about three-quarters of the world’s Muslims (74.1%) live in the 49 countries in which Muslims make up a majority of the population. More than a fifth of all Muslims (23.3%) live in non-Muslim-majority countries in the developing world. About 3% of the world’s Muslims live in more-developed regions, such as Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.
  • Fertility rates in Muslim-majority countries are closely related to women’s education levels. In the eight Muslim-majority countries where girls generally receive the fewest years of schooling, the average fertility rate (5.0 children per woman) is more than double the average rate (2.3 children per woman) in the nine Muslim-majority countries where girls generally receive the most years of schooling. One exception is the Palestinian territories, where the average fertility rate (4.5 children per woman) is relatively high even though a girl born there today can expect to receive 14 years of formal education.
  • Fewer than half (47.8%) of married women ages 15-49 in Muslim-majority countries use some form of birth control. By comparison, in non-Muslim-majority, less-developed countries nearly two-thirds (63.3%) of all married women in that age group use some form of birth control.

Asia-Pacific

md2-asia(2)
  • Nearly three-in-ten people living in the Asia-Pacific region in 2030 (27.3%) will be Muslim, up from about a quarter in 2010 (24.8%) and roughly a fifth in 1990 (21.6%).
  • Muslims make up only about 2% of the population in China, but because the country is so populous, its Muslim population is expected to be the 19th largest in the world in 2030.

Middle East-North Africa

md2-middle
  • The Middle East-North Africa will continue to have the highest percentage of Muslim-majority countries. Of the 20 countries and territories in this region, all but Israel are projected to be at least 50% Muslim in 2030, and 17 are expected to have a population that is more than 75% Muslim in 2030, with Israel, Lebanon and Sudan (as currently demarcated) being the only exceptions.
  • Nearly a quarter (23.2%) of Israel’s population is expected to be Muslim in 2030, up from 17.7% in 2010 and 14.1% in 1990. During the past 20 years, the Muslim population in Israel has more than doubled, growing from 0.6 million in 1990 to 1.3 million in 2010. The Muslim population in Israel (including Jerusalem but not the West Bank and Gaza) is expected to reach 2.1 million by 2030.
  • Egypt, Algeria and Morocco currently have the largest Muslim populations in the Middle East-North Africa. By 2030, however, Iraq is expected to have the second-largest Muslim population in the region – exceeded only by Egypt – largely because Iraq has a higher fertility rate than Algeria or Morocco.

Sub-Saharan Africa

  md2-africa-(2)
  • The Muslim population in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to grow by nearly 60% in the next 20 years, from 242.5 million in 2010 to 385.9 million in 2030. Because the region’s non- Muslim population also is growing at a rapid pace, Muslims are expected to make up only a slightly larger share of the region’s population in 2030 (31.0%) than they do in 2010 (29.6%).
  • Various surveys give differing figures for the size of religious groups in Nigeria, which appears to have roughly equal numbers of Muslims and Christians in 2010. By 2030, Nigeria is expected to have a slight Muslim majority (51.5%).

Europe

md2-europe(2)
  • In 2030, Muslims are projected to make up more than 10% of the total population in 10 European countries: Kosovo (93.5%), Albania (83.2%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (42.7%), Republic of Macedonia (40.3%), Montenegro (21.5%), Bulgaria (15.7%), Russia (14.4%), Georgia (11.5%), France (10.3%) and Belgium (10.2%).
  • Russia will continue to have the largest Muslim population (in absolute numbers) in Europe in 2030. Its Muslim population is expected to rise from 16.4 million in 2010 to 18.6 million in 2030. The growth rate for the Muslim population in Russia is projected to be 0.6% annually over the next two decades. By contrast, Russia’s non-Muslim population is expected to shrink by an average of 0.6% annually over the same period.
  • France had an expected net influx of 66,000 Muslim immigrants in 2010, primarily from North Africa. Muslims comprised an estimated two-thirds (68.5%) of all new immigrants to France in the past year. Spain was expected to see a net gain of 70,000 Muslim immigrants in 2010, but they account for a much smaller portion of all new immigrants to Spain (13.1%). The U.K.’s net inflow of Muslim immigrants in the past year (nearly 64,000) was forecast to be nearly as large as France’s. More than a quarter (28.1%) of all new immigrants to the U.K. in 2010 are estimated to be Muslim.

The Americas

md2-amer(2)
  • The number of Muslims in Canada is expected to nearly triple in the next 20 years, from about 940,000 in 2010 to nearly 2.7 million in 2030. Muslims are expected to make up 6.6% of Canada’s total population in 2030, up from 2.8% today. Argentina is expected to have the third-largest Muslim population in the Americas, after the U.S. and Canada. Argentina, with about 1 million Muslims in 2010, is now in second place, behind the U.S.
  • Children under age 15 make up a relatively small portion of the U.S. Muslim population today. Only 13.1% of Muslims are in the 0-14 age group. This reflects the fact that a large proportion of Muslims in the U.S. are newer immigrants who arrived as adults. But by 2030, many of these immigrants are expected to start families. If current trends continue, the number of U.S. Muslims under age 15 will more than triple, from fewer than 500,000 in 2010 to 1.8 million in2030. The number of Muslim children ages 0-4 living in the U.S. is expected to increase from fewer than 200,000 in 2010 to more than 650,000 in 2030.
  • About two-thirds of the Muslims in the U.S. today (64.5%) are first-generation immigrants (foreign-born), while slightly more than a third (35.5%) were born in the U.S. By 2030, however, more than four-in-ten of the Muslims in the U.S. (44.9%) are expected to be native-born.
  • The top countries of origin for Muslim immigrants to the U.S. in 2009 were Pakistan and Bangladesh. They are expected to remain the top countries of origin for Muslim immigrants to the U.S. in 2030.

About the Report

This report makes demographic projections. Projections are not the same as predictions. Rather, they are estimates built on current population data and assumptions about demographic trends; they are what will happen if the current data are accurate and the trends play out as expected. But many things – immigration laws, economic conditions, natural disasters, armed conflicts, scientific discoveries, social movements and political upheavals, to name just a few – can shift demographic trends in unforeseen ways, which is why this report adheres to a modest time frame, looking just 20 years down the road. Even so, there is no guarantee that Muslim populations will grow at precisely the rates anticipated in this report and not be affected by unforeseen events, such as political decisions on immigration quotas or national campaigns to encourage larger or smaller families.
The projections presented in this report are the medium figures in a range of three scenarios – high, medium and low – generated from models commonly used by demographers around the world to forecast changes in population size and composition. The models follow what is known as the cohort-component method, which starts with a baseline population (in this case, the current number of Muslims in each country) divided into groups, or cohorts, by age and sex. Each cohort is projected into the future by adding likely gains – new births and immigrants – and subtracting likely losses – deaths and emigrants. These calculations were made by the Pew Forum’s demographers, who collaborated with researchers at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria on the projections for the United States and European countries. (For more details, see Appendix A: Methodology.)
The current population data that underpin this report were culled from the best sources available on Muslims in each of the 232 countries and territories for which the U.N. Population Division provides general population estimates. Many of these baseline statistics were published in the Pew Forum’s 2009 report, Mapping the Global Muslim Population, which acquired and analyzed about 1,500 sources of data – including census reports, large-scale demographic studies and general population surveys – to estimate the number of Muslims in every country and territory. (For a list of sources, see Appendix B: Data Sources by Country.) All of those estimates have been updated for 2010, and some have been substantially revised. (To find the current estimate and projections for a particular region or country, see Muslim Population by  Country, 1990-2030.) Since many countries are conducting national censuses in 2010-11, more data is likely to emerge over the next few years, but a cut-off must be made at some point; this report is based on information available as of mid-2010. To the extent possible, the report provides data for decennial years – 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020 and 2030. In some cases, however, the time periods vary because data is available only for certain years or in five-year increments (e.g., 2010-15 or 2030-35).
The definition of Muslim in this report is very broad. The goal is to count all groups and individuals who self-identify as Muslims. This includes Muslims who may be secular or nonobservant. No attempt is made in this report to measure how religious Muslims are or to forecast levels of religiosity (or secularism) in the decades ahead.2
The main factors, or inputs, in the population projections are:
  • Births (fertility rates)
  • Deaths (mortality rates)
  • Migration (emigration and immigration), and
  • The age structure of the population (the number of people in various age groups)
Related factors – which are not direct inputs into the projections but which underlie vital assumptions about the way Muslim fertility rates are changing and Muslim populations are shifting – include:
To fully understand the projections, one must understand these factors, which the next section of the report will discuss in more detail.
Readers can also explore an online, interactive feature that allows them to select a region or one of the 232 countries and territories – as well as a decade from 1990-2030 – and see the size of the Muslim population in that place and time.

Footnotes
1 The seven countries projected to rise above 1 million Muslims by 2030 are: Belgium, Canada, Congo, Djibouti, Guinea Bissau,Netherlands and Togo. (return to text)
2 In other reports, the Pew Forum and the Pew Research Center have used large-scale public opinion surveys to measure the beliefs and practices of many religious groups, including Muslims in several countries. See, for example,Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2010, and Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, 2007. (return to text)

Saturday, February 19, 2011

Raymond Davis, an American “Tweetie Bird” : Syed Zaidi - Veterans Today


Veterans Today

SYED ZAIDI: Raymond Davis, an American “Tweetie Bird”

February 18, 2011 posted by Veterans Today · 9 Comments

The Raymond Davis murders — American empire comes unhinged

FOR THE BENEFIT OF MY AMERICAN FRIENDS

By Dr. Zaidi for Veterans Today

About a year ago Gordon Duff and Jeff Gates, both associated with the Veterans Today website, and both well-connected with the Pentagon and the Pakistani military, visited the border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan in the company of top Pakistani army officers.  They heard the complaints and saw the evidence that the US, Israel and India had secretly created and were arming and nurturing the so-called Pakistani Taliban (TTP — Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan) insurgency.

Duff and Gates noticed that a great many of the supposed aid projects that were claimed to be German were actually manned by Western and Israeli Jews. The Pakistanis couldn’t tell the difference, but these Americans obviously could.  The private armies run by contractors such as Xe (the new name for Blackwater), it turns out, are under Zionist control. The effort to break up nuclear-armed Muslim Pakistan is most of all a Zionist project.

As Christopher Bollyn has pointed out, the main aim of the American war effort in Afghanistan, brought about by the Zionist-engineered 9/11 event, is for the benefit of ostensibly Israeli-owned (and ultimately Rothschild-et -al-controlled and -owned) gas, mineral and heroin interests in Central Asia.

The late Richard “Holbrooke” (hiding behind an olde Englishe name his father was not born to) turns out to have been a relative of the Rothschilds.  And his replacement is one Mr Grossman, who will no doubt prove to link to the same networks. The Raymond Davis incident points to the unhinging of American, really Zionist, empire, in this zone as much as in the Arab world.

Since Obama and Hilary are, like 99% of American politicians, totally the creatures of Zionists, it comes as no surprise that they are going all out to try to keep a lid on this incident.  Both have put their prestige on the line in support of the absurd claim that Davis must be given diplomatic immunity under the Vienna conventions.  

The State Department conveyed through an American TV channel a threat to expel the Pakistani ambassador. 

Now they are threatening to cut off US aid.

It’s not working.

America does have the support of Pakistani president Zardari — no wonder: they probably helped him murder his wife to make a claim for the presidency, and they helped get all the cases against him dropped so that the Swiss would release his massive accounts.  Zardari has sacked — thus making a hero of — the foreign minister for opposing the release of Davis.

But there is not that much more within his power to do.  If he did get close to getting Davis freed, the army would once more take over the country. Meanwhile, with or without the help of the latest American / Israeli torture technology, Davis is reported to be singing like Tweetie.

Stay tuned.
About the Author: Syed Zaidi is a retired professor of philosophy, University of Delhi, Delhi, India.

Friday, February 18, 2011

US and Pakistan square off - By M K Bhadrakumar - Asian Times

America's high-handed machinations in client states is exposed through this episode that should be interpreted as Pakistan unleashing a parallel 'Egyptian People's Revolution' against its tormentor.

Ghulam Muhammed, Mumbai


http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MB15Df01.html

US and Pakistan square off

By M K Bhadrakumar


United States State Department has announced that the trilateral United States-Pakistan-Afghanistan meeting at foreign minister level, scheduled to take place in Washington on February 23-24, has been indefinitely postponed. Washington ascribes the postponement due to a cabinet reshuffle in Islamabad on Friday in which foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi was replaced.

Islamabad has also signaled that the proposed visit by Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari is in doubt - "There is no clear date for the president's visit".

Meanwhile, there have been threatening noises from Washington that US aid to Pakistan might be in jeopardy and, if ABC News is to be believed, a top White House official warned the Pakistani ambassador that diplomatic ties might be curtailed.

All this is happening on account of the continued detention of a single American national commonly known as "Raymond Davis" in the Pakistani city of Lahore, despite the urgings by senior US officials at the political and diplomatic level that he should be forthwith released.

Davis is employed by the US government and is accused of shooting dead two armed men in Lahore. The US Embassy in Islamabad said the man, who it claims fired in self-defense, is covered by diplomatic immunity and should be immediately released.

Davis' detention ought to have been a perfect case for some quiet, patient diplomacy. The incident has impacted on Pakistan's fragile political situation. The widespread "anti-Americanism" that lurks just below the surface in Pakistani society; popular indignation bordering on anger that the government is colluding with the US's war in Afghanistan; tensions between the federal government in Islamabad and the opposition-run provincial government in Lahore (which arrested Davis); the tenuous equations between the civilian government and the military; and the sheer ambiguity surrounding the incident (who is "Davis" actually, what was his mission on that fateful evening in Lahore, and so on) - all these complicate the Davis case.

Despite all this, Washington has deliberately opted for a course of muscular diplomacy, of openly pressuring the Pakistani authorities in full public view. The abrasive diplomacy appears unwarranted, and it is common sense that given the sensitivities involved it would incur the risk of being counter-productive.

Even vis-a-vis Iran and North Korea, Washington prefers to painstakingly use back channels when diplomatic feathers get ruffled. Pakistan is also a traditional ally of the US, and Washington has no lack of communication lines to get through to the powers that be in Islamabad and the garrison city of Rawalpindi. Discretion demanded that Washington allow a "cooling-off" period and in the meanwhile work through confidential channels of communication to arrive at a satisfactory solution.

Astoundingly, what we are witnessing is exactly to the contrary. An "area specialist" in the US with links to the establishment wrote:

Better relations will require Washington and Pakistan to confront the edifice of ossified fictions that surround and ultimately undermine this complex and strained relationship. Washington needs to aggressively combat the historical untruths that have become legendary fact as vigorously as it needs to understand the Pakistan that is, not the Pakistan it might want to be ... If the United States and Washington can ever re-optimize their bilateral relationship, both will have to make a concerted effort to resist rehearsing past fictions and creating new ones.
Tirades like this and the steady stream of American official threats in the past fortnight directed at Pakistan over the Davis case aren't having the desired effect.

Islamabad is not impressed by the US's posturing. Even after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke to Pakistani army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani on the sidelines of the 47th Munich security conference 10 days ago, Pakistan crossed the Rubicon with the decisive step to formally charge Davis in a court of law in Lahore with pre-meditated murder and on that basis got him remanded to prison for another 14 days for interrogation.

Again, the ousted Qureshi has plunged into the controversy without any foreplay, alleging that Clinton pressured him to "publicly confirm diplomatic immunity of Davis. However, I refused to do so because it was against the factual position in the case."

He said, "The kind of blanket immunity Washington is pressing for Davis is not endorsed by the official record of the Foreign Ministry," adding that Washington even "threatened that Hillary Clinton would not meet me at the Munich conference on February 6 if the request was not granted." Qureshi possibly has a motivation to link his removal as foreign minister with his firm stance on the Davis case, but the damage has been done.

Why are the stakes so heavily loaded? What raises eyebrows among observers in Delhi is that Davis, who as a highly trained operative killed two motorcyclists who were tailing his car in obtrusive intelligence work for over an hour, knowing full well who they were. As a former US special forces officer, Davis was knowledgeable enough to estimate that such obtrusive intelligence was not meant to be life-threatening but was intended to be intimidating and obstructive. In short, Davis lost his cool at some point when he found he couldn't shake off his "tail".

The Pakistani authorities have been leaking to the media that they knew Davis was in touch with the "Pakistani Taliban". The Washington Post quoted Pakistani intelligence officials to the effect that the two motor cyclists were warning Davis that he was crossing some "red line" (meaning, he was about to do something unacceptable to Pakistan's national security interests) and it was at that point he shot them.

Clearly, the US has every reason to believe that the Pakistani side knows much more than it is prepared to admit, and if Davis breaks down after sustained interrogation in police custody, he might spill explosive stuff. This explains the highly contradictory versions that the US has given about Davis' identity and the nature of his assignment in Pakistan.

What emerges from the pattern of the US reaction is that Davis' detention has sent alarm bells ringing all the way to the White House. The US is apprehensive that the Davis case has the potential to shake up the very foundations of its alliance with Pakistan. Therefore, it has done the most natural thing that most countries facing a grave predicament vis-a-vis a foreign country would do - take the high moral ground straightaway and place itself in denial mode, come what may.

So, what did Davis do for a living? From the adamant fashion in which Islamabad (despite being highly vulnerable to US aid cutoff) is reacting, it seems it has no real choices in the matter. This seems to be a situation in which, as someone once said, you only live once.

The heart of the matter is that Pakistan has been wondering for a long time who it is who could be instigating the so-called "Pakistani Taliban" to inflict such bloody wounds on the Pakistani military and weaken and incrementally destabilize the Pakistani state.

It has been convenient to point the finger from time to time at the Indians, but when Pakistani state institutions were attacked, especially the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence, as precise targets, Islamabad would have had deeper suspicions, especially asa the close links between the former Afghan intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh and the US security establishment was a fact known to Pakistani agencies.

Conventional wisdom, especially among Indian propagandists, has been that what is happening inside Pakistan is a kind of "blowback" of terrorism. Some Indian pundits even claimed that the "serpent" that the Pakistani state nurtured over the years (namely, extremist outfits) for poisoning India's environs has now turned against the Pakistani state itself.

While this thesis has its seductive power, it is based on simplistic assumptions regarding the processes going on within Pakistan, especially the dialectics involving the vehicles of militancy and extremism and the state security apparatus. The Pakistani military and its highly efficient intelligence set-up could have concluded a long time ago that under the cover of the "Pakistani Taliban", all sorts of free-wheeling forces were at work. Washington is openly doing hero-worshipping of Amrullah Saleh even months after Afghan President Hamid Karzai sacked the spymaster almost as a prerequisite for improving Afghan-Pakistan relations.

Davis can most certainly provide the proverbial "missing link" to Pakistan to connect several dots on an intriguing chessboard. Conceivably, he will be sent back home at some point, but by then he may be a "burnt-out case" and Pakistan would have gained a far better understanding of the US's regional policies.

With over 100,000 American troops out on a limb in Afghanistan and the snow melting on the Hindu Kush mountains and a new "fighting season" just round the corner, the prospect surely unnerves Washington. The postponement of the trilateral meeting in Washington shows up the uncertainties.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

Thursday, February 17, 2011

Some Muslim Organisations in Mumbai to boycott ETV Urdu’s Seminar on Problem of Minority Communities

Thursday, February 17, 2011

Some Muslim Organisations in Mumbai to boycott ETV Urdu’s Seminar on Problem of Minority Communities


ETV Urdu under Jagdish Chander has sent out invitations for a Seminar in Mumbai on Sunday, February 20, 2011 in Hotel Kempski, Andheri. Though it was supposed to be building bridges between political parties and common people from minority communities, the line up of celebrities from the two Brahmin political groups, BJP and Congress, under the Presidentship of former BJP President, Rajenath Nath Singh, MP, has sufficiently irked the rank and file of Muslim organisations to canvass for a boycott of the event by Muslims.

The argument against the line-up is that ETV Urdu is acting like paid media to soften Muslims towards BJP’s leadership while the sentiments against Sangh Parivar, especially after Swami Aseemanand’s confession implicating RSS cadre to be involved in several bombing events, in which local police authorities from Congress and BJP governments have ruthlessly rounded up innocent Muslims and unleashed torture on them in prisons. ETV’s invitation lines up only Congress and BJP  political bigwigs, like Parthavi Chavan, the Maharashtra Chief Minister to inaugurate, Salman Khursheed, the Union Minister as Special Guest. Four Honourary Guests: Praful Patel (NCP), Union Minister, Arif Naseem Khan, Maharashtra Cabinet Minister, Mohan Prakash, Secretary, AICC and Bheuji Maharaj, a spiritual saint. ( Note – No balancing by inviting any Muslim Maulana of standing as guest or speaker that could have honored the invitation card).

On the face of it, there seems to be cartelization of the political power between the two major Brahminical parties – Congress and BJP to cooperate, now publicly, once again to fool the minorities especially the Muslim Minority in a public exercise to open lines of communications with minorities. Congress appears to be introducing BJP to their Muslim constituents, so that both Political parties together can use them as football between them, kicking them all over the country.

No major Muslim leader of any independent standing in the community has been invited and mentioned as a guest to be interacting with the both political groups. The entire exercise is being treated as most humiliating and insulting by the Muslims. The general feeling is that those that have been shamelessly involved in brutalizing Muslims and reducing them to lowest of low in the nation, have now shown their real colours, by sitting side by side on one single platform.

The most astonishing feature was the involvement of ETV URDU that rather innocently behaves as if it is doing a big favour to Muslims to provide them an opportunity to listen to the harangues of the people who have been their constant tormentors.  At least as organizers of the Seminar, they should have drawn on their vast experience judging the sentiments of Muslim minority to be more sensitive than to expect them to tamely appreciate the coming together of Congress and BJP in a single united attempt to tune their responses to the minorities. As if it was meant to threaten them with a united front of their tormentors, with which they will have to confront in seeking justice for their legitimate grievances.

Ghulam Muhammed, Mumbai

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

A Tunisian-Egyptian Link That Shook Arab History ???

TWEETS ON KIRKPATRICK'S NYT ARTICLE:

Ghulam Muhammed
GhulamMuhammed Ghulam Muhammed

Kirkpatrick writes a brilliant concoction of a screenplay to hijack the revolution that had no father till yesterday.
»
Ghulam Muhammed
GhulamMuhammed Ghulam Muhammed

NYT article by David kirkpatrick is a brazen attempt to give a face to the faceless Tahrir Square revolution by bringing in FACEBOOK. Clever!!!

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A Tunisian-Egyptian Link That Shook Arab History

Holly Pickett for The New York Times

Tunis, Jan. 14 Demonstrators climbed the walls of the Interior Ministry as thousands gathered outside to demand the resignation of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. The protests that brought down Mr. Ben Ali that day began on Facebook.
By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK and DAVID E. SANGER
Published: February 13, 2011
CAIRO — As protesters in Tahrir Square faced off against pro-government forces, they drew a lesson from their counterparts in Tunisia: “Advice to the youth of Egypt: Put vinegar or onion under your scarf for tear gas.”

Cairo, Feb. 3 After more than a week of unrest, anti-Mubarak protesters clashed with supporters of the president for control of Tahrir Square. When confronting the police, the protesters wore armor made of cardboard and Pepsi bottles.
Moises Saman for The New York Times
Cairo, Feb. 11 Egyptians celebrated the announcement that President Mubarak was stepping down. “Eighty-five million people live in Egypt, and less than a 1,000 people died in this revolution — most of them killed by the police,” an organizer said.

Readers' Comments

Readers shared their thoughts on this article.
The exchange on Facebook was part of a remarkable two-year collaboration that has given birth to a new force in the Arab world — a pan-Arab youth movement dedicated to spreading democracy in a region without it. Young Egyptian and Tunisian activists brainstormed on the use of technology to evade surveillance, commiserated about torture and traded practical tips on how to stand up to rubber bullets and organize barricades.

They fused their secular expertise in social networks with a discipline culled from religious movements and combined the energy of soccer fans with the sophistication of surgeons. Breaking free from older veterans of the Arab political opposition, they relied on tactics of nonviolent resistance channeled from an American scholar through a Serbian youth brigade — but also on marketing tactics borrowed from Silicon Valley.

As their swelling protests shook the Egyptian state, they were locked in a virtual tug of war with a leader with a very different vision — Gamal Mubarak, the son of President Hosni Mubarak, a wealthy investment banker and ruling-party power broker. Considered the heir apparent to his father until the youth revolt eliminated any thought of dynastic succession, the younger Mubarak pushed his father to hold on to power even after his top generals and the prime minister were urging an exit, according to American officials who tracked Hosni Mubarak’s final days.

The defiant tone of the president’s speech on Thursday, the officials said, was largely his son’s work.

“He was probably more strident than his father was,” said one American official, who characterized Gamal’s role as “sugarcoating what was for Mubarak a disastrous situation.” But the speech backfired, prompting Egypt’s military to force the president out and assert control of what they promise will be a transition to civilian government.

Now the young leaders are looking beyond Egypt. “Tunis is the force that pushed Egypt, but what Egypt did will be the force that will push the world,” said Walid Rachid, one of the members of the April 6 Youth Movement, which helped organize the Jan. 25 protests that set off the uprising. He spoke at a meeting on Sunday night where the members discussed sharing their experiences with similar youth movements in Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Iran.

“If a small group of people in every Arab country went out and persevered as we did, then that would be the end of all the regimes,” he said, joking that the next Arab summit might be “a coming-out party” for all the ascendant youth leaders.
 
Bloggers Lead the Way
 
Egyptian revolt was years in the making. Ahmed Maher, a 30-year-old civil engineer and a leading organizer of the April 6 Youth Movement, first became engaged in a political movement known as Kefaya, or Enough, in about 2005. Mr. Maher and others organized their own brigade, Youth for Change. But they could not muster enough followers; arrests decimated their leadership ranks, and many of those left became mired in the timid, legally recognized opposition parties. “What destroyed the movement was the old parties,” said Mr. Maher, who has since been arrested four times.

By 2008, many of the young organizers had retreated to their computer keyboards and turned into bloggers, attempting to raise support for a wave of isolated labor strikes set off by government privatizations and runaway inflation.

After a strike that March in the city of Mahalla, Egypt, Mr. Maher and his friends called for a nationwide general strike for April 6. To promote it, they set up a Facebook group that became the nexus of their movement, which they were determined to keep independent from any of the established political groups. Bad weather turned the strike into a nonevent in most places, but in Mahalla a demonstration by the workers’ families led to a violent police crackdown — the first major labor confrontation in years.

Just a few months later, after a strike in Tunisia, a group of young online organizers followed the same model, setting up what became the Progressive Youth of Tunisia. The organizers in both countries began exchanging their experiences over Facebook. The Tunisians faced a more pervasive police state than the Egyptians, with less latitude for blogging or press freedom, but their trade unions were stronger and more independent. “We shared our experience with strikes and blogging,” Mr. Maher recalled.

For their part, Mr. Maher and his colleagues began reading about nonviolent struggles. They were especially drawn to a Serbian youth movement called Otpor, which had helped topple the dictator Slobodan Milosevic by drawing on the ideas of an American political thinker, Gene Sharp. The hallmark of Mr. Sharp’s work is well-tailored to Mr. Mubark’s Egypt: He argues that nonviolence is a singularly effective way to undermine police states that might cite violent resistance to justify repression in the name of stability.

The April 6 Youth Movement modeled its logo — a vaguely Soviet looking red and white clenched fist—after Otpor’s, and some of its members traveled to Serbia to meet with Otpor activists.

Another influence, several said, was a group of Egyptian expatriates in their 30s who set up an organization in Qatar called the Academy of Change, which promotes ideas drawn in part on Mr. Sharp’s work. One of the group’s organizers, Hisham Morsy, was arrested during the Cairo protests and remained in detention.

“The Academy of Change is sort of like Karl Marx, and we are like Lenin,” said Basem Fathy, another organizer who sometimes works with the April 6 Youth Movement and is also the project director at the Egyptian Democratic Academy, which receives grants from the United States and focuses on human rights and election-monitoring. During the protesters’ occupation of Tahrir Square, he said, he used his connections to raise about $5,100 from Egyptian businessmen to buy blankets and tents.
 
‘This Is Your Country’
 
Then, about a year ago, the growing Egyptian youth movement acquired a strategic ally, Wael Ghonim, a 31-year-old Google marketing executive. Like many others, he was introduced into the informal network of young organizers by the movement that came together around Mohamed ElBaradei, the Nobel Prize-winning diplomat who returned to Egypt a year ago to try to jump-start its moribund political opposition.

Mr. Ghonim had little experience in politics but an intense dislike for the abusive Egyptian police, the mainstay of the government’s power. He offered his business savvy to the cause. “I worked in marketing, and I knew that if you build a brand you can get people to trust the brand,” he said.
The result was a Facebook group Mr. Ghonim set up: We Are All Khalid Said, after a young Egyptian who was beaten to death by police. Mr. Ghonim — unknown to the public, but working closely with Mr. Maher of the April 6 Youth Movement and a contact from Mr. ElBaradei’s group — said that he used Mr. Said’s killing to educate Egyptians about democracy movements.

He filled the site with video clips and newspaper articles about police violence. He repeatedly hammered home a simple message: “This is your country; a government official is your employee who gets his salary from your tax money, and you have your rights.” He took special aim at the distortions of the official media, because when the people “distrust the media then you know you are not going to lose them,” he said.

He eventually attracted hundreds of thousands of users, building their allegiance through exercises in online democratic participation. When organizers planned a “day of silence” in the Cairo streets, for example, he polled users on what color shirts they should all wear — black or white. (When the revolt exploded, the Mubarak government detained him for 12 days in blindfolded isolation in a belated attempt to stop his work.)

After the Tunisian revolution on Jan. 14, the April 6 Youth Movement saw an opportunity to turn its little-noticed annual protest on Police Day — the Jan. 25 holiday that celebrates a police revolt that was suppressed by the British — into a much bigger event. Mr. Ghonim used the Facebook site to mobilize support. If at least 50,000 people committed to turn out that day, the site suggested, the protest could be held. More than 100,000 signed up.

“I have never seen a revolution that was preannounced before,” Mr. Ghonim said.

By then, the April 6 movement had teamed up with Mr. ElBaradei’s supporters, some liberal and leftist parties, and the youth wing of the Muslim Brotherhood to plaster Cairo with eye-catching modernist posters advertising their Tunisia-inspired Police Day protest. But their elders — even members of the Brotherhood who had long been portrayed as extremists by Mr. Mubarak and the West — shied away from taking to the streets.

Explaining that Police Day was supposed to honor the fight against British colonialism, Essem Erian, a Brotherhood leader, said, “On that day we should all be celebrating together.
“All these people are on Facebook, but do we know who they are?” he asked. “We cannot tie our parties and entities to a virtual world.”
 
‘This Was It’
 
When the 25th came, the coalition of young activists, almost all of them affluent, wanted to tap into the widespread frustration with the country’s autocracy, and also with the grinding poverty of Egyptian life. They started their day trying to rally poor people with complaints about pocketbook issues: “They are eating pigeon and chicken, but we eat beans every day.”

By the end of the day, when tens of thousands had marched to Tahrir Square, their chants had become more sweeping. “The people want to bring down the regime,” they shouted, a slogan that the organizers said they had read in signs and on Facebook pages from Tunisia. Mr. Maher of the April 6 Youth Movement said the organizers even debated storming Parliament and the state television building — classic revolutionary moves.

“When I looked around me and I saw all these unfamiliar faces in the protests, and they were more brave than us — I knew that this was it for the regime,” Mr. Maher said.

It was then that they began to rely on advice from Tunisia, Serbia and the Academy of Change, which had sent staff members to Cairo a week before to train the protest organizers. After the police used tear gas to break up the protest that Tuesday, the organizers came back better prepared for their next march on Friday, the 28th, the “Day of Rage.”

This time, they brought lemons, onions and vinegar to sniff for relief from the tear gas, and soda or milk to pour into their eyes. Some had fashioned cardboard or plastic bottles into makeshift armor worn under their clothes to protect against riot police bullets. They brought spray paint to cover the windshields of police cars, and they were ready to stuff the exhaust pipes and jam the wheels to render them useless. By the early afternoon, a few thousand protesters faced off against well over a thousand heavily armed riot police officers on the four-lane Kasr al-Nile Bridge in perhaps the most pivotal battle of the revolution.

“We pulled out all the tricks of the game — the Pepsi, the onion, the vinegar,” said Mr. Maher, who wore cardboard and plastic bottles under his sweater, a bike helmet on his head and a barrel-top shield on his arm. “The strategy was the people who were injured would go to the back and other people would replace them,” he said. “We just kept rotating.” After more than five hours of battle, they had finally won — and burned down the empty headquarters of the ruling party on their way to occupy Tahrir Square.
 
Pressuring Mubarak
 
In Washington that day, President Obama turned up, unexpectedly, at a 3:30 p.m. Situation Room meeting of his “principals,” the key members of the national security team, where he displaced Thomas E. Donilon, the national security adviser, from his seat at the head of the table.

The White House had been debating the likelihood of a domino effect since youth-driven revolts had toppled President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, even though the American intelligence community and Israel’s intelligence services had estimated that the risk to President Mubarak was low — less than 20 percent, some officials said.

According to senior officials who participated in Mr. Obama’s policy debates, the president took a different view. He made the point early on, a senior official said, that “this was a trend” that could spread to other authoritarian governments in the region, including in Iran. By the end of the 18-day uprising, by a White House count, there were 38 meetings with the president about Egypt. Mr. Obama said that this was a chance to create an alternative to “the Al Qaeda narrative” of Western interference.

American officials had seen no evidence of overtly anti-American or anti-Western sentiment. “When we saw people bringing their children to Tahrir Square, wanting to see history being made, we knew this was something different,” one official said.

On Jan. 28, the debate quickly turned to how to pressure Mr. Mubarak in private and in public — and whether Mr. Obama should appear on television urging change. Mr. Obama decided to call Mr. Mubarak, and several aides listened in on the line. Mr. Obama did not suggest that the 82-year-old leader step aside or transfer power. At this point, “the argument was that he really needed to do the reforms, and do them fast,” a senior official said. Mr. Mubarak resisted, saying the protests were about outside interference.

According to the official, Mr. Obama told him, “You have a large portion of your people who are not satisfied, and they won’t be until you make concrete political, social and economic reforms.”

The next day, the decision was made to send former Ambassador Frank G. Wisner to Cairo as an envoy. Mr. Obama began placing calls to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and other regional leaders.

The most difficult calls, officials said, were with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Mr. Netanyahu, who feared regional instability and urged the United States to stick with Mr. Mubarak. According to American officials, senior members of the government in Saudi Arabia argued that the United States should back Mr. Mubarak even if he used force against the demonstrators. By Feb. 1, when Mr. Mubarak broadcast a speech pledging that he would not run again and that elections would be held in September, Mr. Obama concluded that the Egyptian president still had not gotten the message.

Within an hour, Mr. Obama called Mr. Mubarak again in the toughest, and last, of their conversations. “He said if this transition process drags out for months, the protests will, too,” one of Mr. Obama’s aides said.

Mr. Mubarak told Mr. Obama that the protests would be over in a few days.

Mr. Obama ended the call, the official said, with these words: “I respect my elders. And you have been in politics for a very long time, Mr. President. But there are moments in history when just because things were the same way in the past doesn’t mean they will be that way in the future.”

The next day, heedless of Mr. Obama’s admonitions, Mr. Mubarak launched another attack against the protesters, many of whom had by then spent five nights camped out in Tahrir Square. 

By about 2:30 p.m., thousands of burly men loyal to Mr. Mubarak and armed with rocks, clubs and, eventually, improvised explosives had come crashing into the square.

The protesters — trying to stay true to the lessons they had learned from Gandhi, the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Gene Sharp — tried for a time to avoid retaliating. A row of men stood silent as rocks rained down on them. An older man told a younger one to put down his stick.
But by 3:30 p.m., the battle was joined. A rhythmic din of stones on metal rang out as the protesters beat street lamps and fences to rally their troops.

The Muslim Brotherhood, after sitting out the first day, had reversed itself, issuing an order for all able-bodied men to join the occupation of Tahrir Square. They now took the lead. As a secret, illegal organization, the Brotherhood was accustomed to operating in a disciplined hierarchy. The group’s members helped the protesters divide into teams to organize their defense, several organizers said. One team broke the pavement into rocks, while another ferried the rocks to makeshift barricades along their perimeter and the third defended the front.

“The youth of the Muslim Brotherhood played a really big role,” Mr. Maher said. “But actually so did the soccer fans” of Egypt’s two leading teams. “These are always used to having confrontations with police at the stadiums,” he said.

Soldiers of the Egyptian military, evidently under orders to stay neutral, stood watching from behind the iron gates of the Egyptian Museum as the war of stone missiles and improvised bombs continued for 14 hours until about four in the morning.

Then, unable to break the protesters’ discipline or determination, the Mubarak forces resorted to guns, shooting 45 and killing 2, according to witnesses and doctors interviewed early that morning. The soldiers — perhaps following orders to prevent excessive bloodshed, perhaps acting on their own — finally intervened. They fired their machine guns into the ground and into the air, several witnesses said, scattering the Mubarak forces and leaving the protesters in unmolested control of the square, and by extension, the streets.

Once the military demonstrated it was unwilling to fire on its own citizens, the balance of power shifted. American officials urged the army to preserve its bond with the Egyptian people by sending top officers into the square to reassure the protesters, a step that further isolated Mr. Mubarak. 

But the Obama administration faltered in delivering its own message: Two days after the worst of the violence, Mr. Wisner publicly suggested that Mr. Mubarak had to be at the center of any change, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton warned that any transition would take time. Other American officials suggested Mr. Mubarak might formally stay in office until his term ended next September. Then a four-day-long stalemate ensued, in which Mr. Mubarak refused to budge, and the protesters regained momentum.

On Thursday, Mr. Mubarak’s vice president, Omar Suleiman, was on the phone with Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. at 2 p.m. in Washington, the third time they had spoken in a week. The airwaves were filled with rumors that Mr. Mubarak was stepping down, and Mr. Suleiman told Mr. Biden that he was preparing to assume Mr. Mubarak’s powers. But as he spoke to Mr. Biden and other officials, Mr. Suleiman said that “certain powers” would remain with Mr. Mubarak, including the power to dissolve the Parliament and fire the cabinet. “The message from Suleiman was that he would be the de facto president,” one person involved in the call said.

But while Mr. Mubarak huddled with his son Gamal, the Obama administration was in the dark about how events would unfold, reduced to watching cable television to see what Mr. Mubarak would decide. What they heard on Thursday night was a drastically rewritten speech, delivered in the unbowed tone of the father of the country, with scarcely any mention of a presumably temporary “delegation” of his power.

It was that rambling, convoluted address that proved the final straw for the Egyptian military, now fairly certain that it would have Washington’s backing if it moved against Mr. Mubarak, American officials said. Mr. Mubarak’s generals ramped up the pressure that led him at last, without further comment, to relinquish his power.

“Eighty-five million people live in Egypt, and less than 1,000 people died in this revolution — most of them killed by the police,” said Mr. Ghonim, the Google executive. “It shows how civilized the Egyptian people are.” He added, “Now our nightmare is over. Now it is time to dream.”

 
David D. Kirkpatrick reported from Cairo, and David E. Sanger from Washington. Kareem Fahim and Mona El-Naggar contributed reporting from Cairo, and Mark Mazzetti from Washington.